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Abstract 
What do people envy? According to emotion theory, people envy what is self-relevant 
to them, because self-relevance of a situation is a necessary precondition for every emotion to 
arise. However, self-relevance is vaguely defined. Self-relevance can be defined by what is 
important to people themselves, i.e. internally self-relevant, and by what is important to 
people’s social groups, i.e. externally self-relevant. Both forms of self-relevance should 
influence envy. Envy comes in two distinct forms: benign envy, promoting upward motivation, 
and malicious envy, promoting hostility. I predicted that internal and external self-relevance 
would differentially shape benign and malicious envy. Internal self-relevance should increase 
benign envy and decrease malicious envy. External self-relevance should decrease benign envy 
and increase malicious envy. I conducted seven studies to test these hypotheses. In all studies, 
values, as prototypes of what is self-relevant to people, operationalized self-relevance. In the 
first set of studies, I measured internal and external self-relevance of values in a within-subjects 
design. In the second set of studies, I manipulated internal and external self-relevance of a 
value in a between-subjects design. In every study, I then measured participants’ envious 
reactions towards an ideal person who embodied a certain value. The data consistently showed 
that high internal self-relevance leads to more benign envy and low internal self-relevance leads 
to more malicious envy.  
In sum, people envy what is important to them, but they also envy what is not important 
to them. More precisely, when people envy what is important to them, benign envy arises 
fostering upward motivation. When people envy what is not important to them, malicious envy 
arises fostering harmful behavior, probably because it implies external self-relevance. A more 
detailed understanding of self-relevance is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of 
emotions. My research thus provides important implications for emotion research and beyond.  
2  Deutsche Kurzzusammenfassung 
Deutsche Kurzzusammenfassung 
Worauf sind Menschen neidisch? Laut Emotionstheorien, beneiden Menschen, was 
selbstrelevant für sie ist, weil Selbstrelevanz eine notwendige Bedingung für die Entstehung 
jeder Emotion ist. Selbstrelevanz ist aber nur vage definiert. Selbstrelevanz kann zum einen 
dadurch definiert sein, was einer Person persönlich wichtig ist, d.h. was intern selbstrelevant 
ist. Selbstrelevanz kann zum anderen dadurch definiert sein, was für die soziale Gruppe einer 
Person wichtig ist, d.h. was extern selbstrelevant ist. Beide Formen von Selbstrelevanz sollten 
Neid beeinflussen. Neid wird durch zwei Formen charakterisiert: gutartiger Neid, der die 
Motivation sich zu verbessern fördert, und bösartiger Neid, der Feindseligkeit fördert. Ich habe 
vorhergesagt, dass interne und externe Selbstrelevanz unterschiedliche Effekte auf gut- und 
bösartigen Neid haben würden. Interne Selbstrelevanz sollte gutartigen Neid verstärken und 
bösartigen Neid verringern. Externe Selbstrelevanz sollte gutartigen Neid verringern und 
bösartigen Neid verstärken. Diese Hypothesen wurden in sieben Studien getestet. In allen 
Studien wurde Selbstrelevanz durch Werte operationalisiert. Im ersten Teil habe ich interne 
und externe Selbstrelevanz in einem Innersubjektdesign gemessen. Im zweiten Teil habe ich 
interne und externe Selbstrelevanz in einem Zwischensubjektdesign manipuliert. In jeder 
Studie habe ich dann die Neidreaktion auf eine ideale Person, die einen Wert verkörperte, 
gemessen. Die Daten zeigen konsistent, dass hohe interne Selbstrelevanz zu mehr gutartigem 
Neid führt und niedrige interne Selbstrelevanz zu mehr bösartigem Neid führt. 
Zusammengefasst, Menschen beneiden, was ihnen wichtig ist und was ihnen nicht wichtig ist. 
Genauer gesagt, wenn Menschen beneiden, was ihnen wichtig ist, entsteht gutartiger Neid, der 
die Motivation sich zu verbessern fördert. Wenn Menschen beneiden, was ihnen nicht wichtig 
ist, entsteht bösartiger Neid, der schädigendes Verhalten begünstigt. Ein detailliertes 
Verständnis von Selbstrelevanz ist notwendig, um Emotionen umfassend zu verstehen. Meine 
Forschung hat daher wichtige Implikationen für die Emotionsforschung und darüber hinaus.   
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Introduction 
 
“Envy is there to let us know what we want.” (The School of Life, 2016) 
“I have a friend who casually remarked feeling envious of a couple in her building who 
travelled whenever they wanted. “But you hate traveling!” I said. “So you envy what you don’t 
really want?” (Smookler, 2016). 
 
What do we envy? Conventional wisdom holds that we envy what we really want, what 
is important and relevant to us. For example, we might continuously envy our colleague’s 
success or our sister’s athletic achievements. What does that reveal about what we want? 
Sometimes our envy might reflect that it feels painful to see our colleague or sister succeed 
because we would like to be successful in these domains as well. Other times, we are envious 
although we do not actually care about promotions or athletics ourselves. We prefer creative 
writing over athletic achievements or we prefer working closely together in our team rather 
than striving for a managerial position. It seems that envy can also arise because others care 
about these achievements. So, do people feel envy because certain domains are important to 
them, i.e. internally self-relevant? Or do people sometimes feel envy because certain domains 
promise status in the eyes of others, i.e. because these domains are externally self-relevant?  
It seems that we sometimes envy what we really want. Envy is higher when seeing 
someone who is successful in areas that we want to excel in as well (Salovey & Rodin, 1984), 
and it is generally higher when a comparison domain is important to us (Van de Ven, 
Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). However, sometimes we seem to envy what is primarily valued 
by others, i.e. what symbolizes status in a social group, even though we don’t care so much 
about it ourselves. In fact, certain comparison domains, such as material possessions, 
attractiveness, success and popularity, are more likely to fuel envy (Poelker, Gibbons, Hughes, 
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& Powlishta, 2016). These domains seem to transport social status rather than containing an 
inherent importance to the individual. Hence, envy is often considered a status-related emotion 
(Crusius & Lange, 2017). I propose that what is important to a person and what is important to 
others are both self-relevant dimensions. However, these different sources of self-relevance 
might lead to different emotional and motivational reactions.  
Self-relevance has been proposed as one of the necessary preconditions for the 
elicitation of emotions (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; for a review on appraisal theories see 
Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; Scherer, 2009, 2013; Smith & Kirby, 2009). Self-
relevance is described in the “laws of emotion” as the “law of concerns: Emotions arise in 
response to events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns” (Frijda, 
1988, p. 351). “A situation could have implications for many things, but would not be appraised 
as motivationally relevant if the person did not care about those things” (Smith & Kirby, 2009, 
p. 1358). Self-relevance is not only a primary appraisal for emotions to arise, but it also strongly 
influences social comparisons (Corcoran, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2011; LeBoeuf & Estes, 
2004; Tesser & Smith, 1980) and, thus, comparison-based emotions – such as envy (Lin, van 
de Ven, & Utz, 2018; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Smith, 2004; Van de Ven et al., 2009). However, 
a systematic experimental investigation of the sources of self-relevance has only recently begun 
(De Leersnyder, Koval, Kuppens, & Mesquita, 2017; Olteanu, Golani, Eitam, & Kron, 2018). 
In particular, it remains unclear whether self-relevance is defined by what is important to 
persons themselves, i.e. internally self-relevant, and what is important to persons’ social 
groups, i.e. externally self-relevant (e.g., Scherer, 2013). Accordingly, the distinction between 
internal and external self-relevance will be important for understanding how emotions, in 
particular comparison-based emotions such as envy, arise.  
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Benign and Malicious Envy  
Envy is the painful emotion (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018) that is likely to arise 
when comparing to another person who acquired a superior quality, achievement, or possession 
(Parrott & Smith, 1993). People engage in social comparisons on a regular basis (Mussweiler, 
2003), most of them being upward comparisons (Nosanchuk & Erickson, 1985). As an 
emotional reaction to an upward comparison, envy is likely to arise (Smith, 2000). Envy is 
therefore supposedly a very prevalent emotion in daily life, even though people are hesitant to 
admit feeling envious (Foster, 1972).  
Envy has powerful consequences. On the one hand, envy has been related to upward 
motivation reflected in increased desire, approach and achievement motivation (Crusius & 
Mussweiler, 2012; Lange & Crusius, 2015b). Envy is also associated with higher job 
performance and an increased motivation to study harder (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004; Van de 
Ven et al., 2009). On the other hand, envy has been related to anti-social consequences such as 
rejection of superior others (Salovey & Rodin, 1984), deception (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008), 
and social loafing (Thompson, Glasø, & Martinsen, 2016). Studies in the professional context 
show detrimental effects on behavior in the workplace (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007; Eissa & 
Wyland, 2015; Erdil & Müceldili, 2014; Khan, Quratulain, & M. Bell, 2014; Parks, Rumble, & 
Posey, 2002). In the academic context, envy mediated the effect of low self-esteem on hostile 
tendencies (Rentzsch, Schröder-Abé, & Schütz, 2015). Low self-esteem is associated with 
hostile tendencies towards peers when people feel envious (Rentzsch et al., 2015). Envious 
reactions can go so far as that they do not only harm the superior person, but also the inferior 
person herself. For example, participants were ready to burn their own money in order to reduce 
the other person’s money (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Taken together, just as upward comparisons 
have advantageous and disadvantageous effects (Collins, 1996), envy has powerful 
consequences that can be desirable and hostile.  
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These diverse consequences of envy partially map onto two distinct forms of envy: benign 
and malicious envy (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Benign envy 
motivates enviers to improve their position, e.g., by trying harder to achieve their goals (Van 
de Ven et al., 2009). Malicious envy motivates enviers to level the difference between 
themselves and the superior other by taking away what the superior other had achieved or by 
harming the superior person (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Both forms are accompanied by negative 
and painful affect (e.g., Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018).  
Despite their equally aversive valence, benign and malicious envy are differently 
related to appraisal patterns, cognition and behavior (for a review see Van de Ven & 
Zeelenberg, 2018). First, benign and malicious envy are more likely to arise when different 
appraisal patterns are triggered in a given situation. Based on how the situation is perceived, 
one situation is more likely to cause benign envy than malicious envy, and vice versa (Van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2012). Research that examined appraisal patterns accompanied by 
benign and malicious envy found that malicious envy is stronger when a situation is appraised 
as undeserved and when the perceiver experienced low control (Van de Ven et al., 2012). 
Benign envy was stronger when the envied person was perceived as deserving of the superior 
position and the situation was appraised as controllable by the envier (Van de Ven et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, perceived unfairness was a component of malicious envy but not benign envy 
(Van de Ven et al., 2009). Because of their different appraisal patterns, benign and malicious 
envy were related to different beliefs and personality traits. Benign envy is more strongly 
related to beliefs that stress the malleability of success and status, such as Protestant Work 
Ethic (Blatz, Crusius, & Lange, in prep.). On the contrary, malicious envy is more strongly 
related to beliefs that stress the stability of success and status, such as Fatalistic Determinism 
(Blatz et al., in prep.). Benign and malicious envy also differentially direct attention (Crusius 
& Lange, 2014). Whereas benign envy leads to a focus on the envy object, i.e. the desired 
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object that the superior person possesses, and the superior other alike, malicious envy leads to 
a stronger focus on the superior person than towards the envy object (Crusius & Lange, 2014). 
Benign and malicious envy also differ in how they influence behavior. Whereas benign envy 
is related to approach motivation, i.e. hope for success, malicious envy is related to avoidance 
motivation, i.e. fear of failure (Lange & Crusius, 2015a). This is further illustrated by research 
showing that benign envy is associated with a desire for the other’s advantage leading to 
increased effort, e.g., the intention to study more to also obtain what the other has (Crusius & 
Mussweiler, 2012; Van de Ven, 2017; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011). On the other 
hand, malicious envy entails negative thoughts about the superior other (Van de Ven et al., 
2009) and Schadenfreude when the other fails (Van de Ven et al., 2015). Malicious envy was 
related to other harmful consequences for the person who envies, such as goal disengagement 
(Lange & Crusius, 2015a), and for the envied person, such as intentions to hurt the superior 
other (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Taken together, data suggest that benign and malicious envy 
can be clearly differentiated by their antecedences and motivational consequences.  
 Based on these results, one could have the impression that benign envy portrays the 
constructive side of envy and malicious envy portrays the destructive side of envy. However, 
both forms relate to antisocial personality traits and behavioral intentions (Lange, Paulhus, & 
Crusius, 2018). Benign envy was found to be related to Machiavellianism, i.e. manipulative 
behavior. Malicious envy was found to be related to Machiavellianism and psychopathy 
(Lange, Paulhus, et al., 2018). Despite these adverse effects, this indicated that benign and 
malicious envy can both be functional by helping to regulate status hierarchies (for similar 
argument, see Lange & Crusius, 2015b; Lange, Blatz, et al., 2018). The function of envy might 
thus be to regulate hierarchies by levelling the differences between the envied person and the 
inferior person. Benign envy does so by moving upwards in the status hierarchy. Malicious 
envy does so by pulling the envied person down (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Thus, it would be 
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too simple to say that benign envy marks the “good” side of envy and malicious envy marks 
the “bad” side of envy. It rather seems that both forms can be functional.  
As outlined above, research showed many differences between benign and malicious 
envy (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009). However, different theoretical 
conceptualizations of envy coexist that more or less recognize the distinction between benign 
an malicious envy as distinct forms of envy (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017; Lange, 
Weidman, et al., 2018). A recently published paper sought to solve this debate by proposing an 
integrative theory of envy (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). Based on data-driven content and 
factor analyses, the Pain-driven Dual Envy (PaDE) Theory was derived proposing that envy 
consists of three factors: pain (i.e., preoccupation with the envy-eliciting situation, inferiority), 
benign envy (i.e., desire for the envy object, improvement motivation, emulation of the other) 
and malicious envy (i.e., communication about the other, directed aggression, non-directed 
aggression; Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018, Figure 3). Pain was positively related to benign and 
malicious envy confirming the frustrating nature of envy, and showing that benign and 
malicious envy both form a part of the concept of envy. Thus, all components of envy should 
be considered when studying its antecedences and consequences.  
Besides research on the differential effects and antecedences of benign and malicious 
envy, self-relevance is supposed to be a necessary precondition in the elicitation of envy (Lin 
et al., 2018; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Smith, 2004; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Higher self-
relevance explained why experiential purchases elicited more envy than material purchases 
(Lin et al., 2018). In a content analysis of envy episodes, domain relevance was found to be 
characteristic for benign and malicious envy alike (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Experimental 
findings also support this notion. In a study by Salovey and Rodin (1984), students were 
presented with their results in a test that was either relevant or irrelevant to them. Then, they 
saw the results of another student who was more successful in a test that was either relevant or 
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irrelevant to the participants. Participants reacted with more envy when presented with test 
results of a student who was better in a domain that was self-relevant to them (Salovey & 
Rodin, 1984). Self-relevance, thus, seems to be an important appraisal for the elicitation of 
envy.  
Despite the importance of self-relevance in the elicitation of envy, it has not been 
investigated how internal and external self-relevance of a comparison domain account for the 
elicitation of benign or malicious envy. As the example at the beginning of this introduction 
illustrates, envy can be elicited when a comparison domain is important to a person and when 
a comparison domain is important on a social level. I argue that both facets of self-relevance 
can play a role in the elicitation of emotions in general and their distinction is especially 
important for envy because envy has been construed as a “status-related emotion” (see section 
“envy as a status-related emotion”). However, the unique contribution of internal and external 
self-relevance on benign and malicious envy has thus far not been addressed. A research gap 
that I seek to fill in the current investigation.  
 
The Appraisal of Self-Relevance  
The appraisal of self-relevance “detects and assesses the significance of the 
environment for well-being. Significance for well-being is best conceptualized as the 
satisfaction or obstruction of concerns” (Moors et al., 2013, p. 120). Self-relevance consists 
of an individual’s needs, attachments, values, current goals, and beliefs (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 
1991; Scherer, 2005; Smith & Kirby, 2009). Thus, self-relevance contains everything that is 
important to a person. Self-relevance has been proposed as one of the necessary preconditions 
for the elicitation of emotions (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; for a review, see Moors et al., 
2013; Scherer, 2009, 2013; Smith & Kirby, 2009). A situation needs to be self-relevant in order 
for emotions to arise. Arguably, people cannot react to every stimulus in their environment. 
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The situation has to be related to their needs, values, or concerns to elicit an emotion. Thus, 
self-relevance is referred to as the primary appraisal (Lazarus, 1991).  
Appraisal theories particularly stress that the self-relevance of a situation is a necessary 
precondition for the elicitation of emotions (e.g., Scherer, 2013). Appraisal theories are a 
family of emotion theories that are based on the cognitive evaluation of a given situation for 
emotion elicitation. Although they differ in their specification, their common factor is that they 
view emotional episodes as consisting of an appraisal component, containing evaluations of 
the environment and their interaction with the person, a feeling component, and a motivational 
component, containing action tendencies (cf. Moors et al., 2013). These emotion components 
are connected in a recursive process, each component influencing each other. Accordingly, 
appraisal theories assume that appraisals, in particular the primary appraisal of self-relevance, 
are at the core of the emotion process. Other theories on emotions, too, mention the role of 
cognitions in emotional processes, for example basic affect theories (Ekman, 1992) 
constructionist theories (Barrett & Russell, 2014; Russell, 2003) or more novel network models 
of emotion (Lange, Borsboom, Dalege, Fischer, & Van Kleef, in prep.). Appraisals are thus not 
only important according to appraisal theories. However, appraisal theories place a special 
significance on appraisals and therefore provide more precise definitions and models for 
appraisal patterns.  
Besides the basic appraisal of relevance, other appraisals are also supposed to shape 
emotions, such as certainty, agency, control potential, or deservingness (see e.g., Roseman, 
1996, for a list of appraisals). Some appraisal theories discuss that different concerns or 
appraisals should be related to different emotions (Roseman, 1996; Scherer, 1988). In a recent 
investigation, the assumption that different types of concerns are associated with different 
emotions has been tested (De Leersnyder et al., 2017). The prediction was confirmed: In 
situations where other-focused values (such as loyalty) were more prevalent, socially engaging 
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emotions (such as closeness and shame) were more intense. In situations where self-focused 
values (such as ambition) were more prevalent, socially disengaging emotions (such as pride 
and anger) were more intense (De Leersnyder et al., 2017). Other evidence supports the idea 
that specific appraisals cause specific emotions (e.g., Griner & Smith, 2000). People high in 
affiliative orientation construed situations as more related to affiliative concerns and thereby 
appraising the situation as important to interpersonal concerns. This effect was associated with 
higher levels of interest and lower levels of boredom (Griner & Smith, 2000). Thus, it seems 
that different appraisals are associated with different emotions.  
Also for envy, appraisal patterns were studied. As already mentioned above, when a 
situation is appraised as controllable and the envied person is perceived to deserve her 
advantage, benign envy is more likely to arise. On the other hand, when a situation is appraised 
as uncontrollable and undeserving, malicious envy is more likely to arise (Van de Ven et al., 
2012). Although there are different appraisals, the appraisal of self-relevance remains a crucial 
component in the elicitation of emotions in general and envy in particular (Lin et al., 2018; 
Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Van de Ven et al., 2015). The appraisal of self-relevance should, thus, 
be studied in more detail.  
 
Values as Prototypes of Self-Relevance 
Self-relevance is defined as the individual evaluation of an event as related to a person’s 
needs, goals, values, or concerns, i.e. everything that a person cares about (cf. Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1988). This broad definition needs to be broken down in order to study 
the effects of self-relevance. I started by studying values as prototypical domains of self-
relevance. Part of what is relevant to people is reflected in their values. Values are guiding 
principles in a person’s life. They reflect what is important to a person. They are also shared 
by members of a social group and culture (e.g., Vauclair et al., 2015), and therefore also reflect 
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what is important to others. Thus, values as guiding principles are prototypes of what is relevant 
to a person and to a social group.  
The most prominent theory of values is the theory of basic values (Schwartz, 1992). 
Schwartz (1992) proposes a circumplex model of values that defines values as concepts or 
beliefs about desirable goals that transcend specific situations, guide behavior, and are ordered 
by relative importance (Schwartz, 2012, p. 12). The theory of basic values has been supported 
by a large number of studies across different samples in several countries (Brosch & Sander, 
2014; Cheung, Maio, Rees, Kamble, & Mane, 2016; Collins, Lee, Sneddon, & Döring, 2017; 
Gollan & Witte, 2014; Khaptsova & Schwartz, 2016; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Sandy, Gosling, 
Schwartz, & Koelkebeck, 2016; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2001, 2012; Schwartz 
& Butenko, 2014). 
Values are important drivers of cognition, emotion, and behavior. Values influence 
information search in decision making and decision making processes (for a review see Brosch 
& Sander, 2014; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Values guide behavior (Maio, Pakizeh, 
Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Schwartz, 2012) and they are related to a person’s needs (Gouveia, 
Milfont, & Guerra, 2014). For example, people are more likely to act egalitarian after prior 
contemplation of egalitarian values in a specific situation (Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009). Similarly, 
priming specific values of the value circumplex systematically increases behavior compatible 
with the primed values while decreasing behavior compatible with opposing values (Maio, 
Pakizeh, et al., 2009). Contemplating on one’s values has positive effects for a variety of 
outcomes, such as education, health, and relationship quality (for a review see Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014). Writing about values can protect people from threats and threatening social 
comparisons (Burson, Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012). Burson et al. (2012) found that 
intentional social exclusion reduces self-control, presumably by threatening the self. This effect 
was attenuated when people wrote about their important values after the experience of social 
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exclusion. Values seem to be a relevant factor in a person’s life affecting cognition and 
behavior.   
Values also guide which emotions people feel and want to feel (Nelissen, Dijker, & de 
Vries, 2007; Tamir et al., 2016). For example, the frequency with which certain emotions (e.g., 
fear) are experienced correlates with the endorsement of a certain value (e.g., security) 
(Nelissen et al., 2007). De Leersnyder, Koval, Kuppens, and Mesquita (2017) showed that the 
importance of specific values predicts specific emotions: High relevance of self-focused values 
increases socially disengaging emotions (e.g., pride, anger), whereas high relevance of other-
focused values increases socially engaging emotions (e.g., closeness, shame). Depending on 
which values are important to a person values also guide which corresponding emotion a person 
desires to feel (Tamir et al., 2016). In a cross-cultural study, it was found that certain values 
(e.g., self-transcendence values such as benevolence) predicted emotions that are consistent 
with these values (e.g., empathy and compassion; Tamir et al., 2016). Taken together, there is 
compelling evidence that values guide emotional experiences.  
Previous research underlined the importance of values for people’s cognitions, 
emotions, and behavior. Thus, values are part of what defines what is self-relevant to a person. 
I therefore chose values as an adequate operationalization of self-relevance. Moreover, values 
are determined by internal and external factors. I argue that this distinction needs to be 
considered when studying the effects of values on psychological processes.  
 
Distinguishing Internal and External Self-Relevance 
It is important to distinguish between what is valued by a person and what is socially 
valued to predict cognition, emotion and behavior (Leary, Raimi, Jongman-Sereno, & Diebels, 
2015; Parkinson & Manstead, 2015; Vauclair et al., 2015). On the one hand, human behavior 
is driven by motives to seek certain internal cognitive and affective states, i.e. intrapsychic 
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motives. On the other hand, human behavior is driven by motives to obtain social goals, such 
as certain resources, reactions, or outcomes from other people, i.e. interpersonal motives (cf. 
Leary et al., 2015). Depending on which goal a person desires to achieve, different 
psychological processes are triggered. After reviewing literature on that topic, Leary et al. 
(2015) conclude that differentiating between these two motives that drive human behavior is 
important to adequately describe the psychological foundations of cognition, emotion, and 
behavior. Even if not entirely overlapping, my working definition of internal self-relevance, 
i.e., what is important to people themselves, and external self-relevance, i.e., what is important 
to people’s social groups, is close to the definition of intrapsychic and interpersonal motives 
(Leary et al. 2015). However, Leary et al. (2015) discuss their theory from the perspective of 
motivation research. I discuss this differentiation from the perspective of emotion research. 
Thus, I chose different terms for ease of understanding and to not confuse the different 
theoretical perspectives. Still, the common factor is that internal and external influences on 
psychological processes should be disentangled.  
Other theories on motivation also propose the differentiation between internal and 
external factors. Self-determination theory distinguishes between autonomous motivation, i.e., 
the motivation that stems from the intrinsic enjoyment or personal meaning obtained from goal 
pursuit, and controlled motivation, i.e., the motivation that stems from perceived pressure to 
think, feel, or behave in a certain way (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 
2004). Thus, the differentiation between internal and external influences on psychological 
processes is common in motivation research.  
For emotions, this distinction translates into distinguishing between internal and 
external self-relevance. A distinction that lacks empirical investigation. However, social 
factors in appraisal processes, such as the appraisal of self-relevance, would lead to a better 
understanding of the social nature of emotions (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Scherer (2013) 
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argues that the “motivational classes” that drive the appraisal of relevance (such as tastes, 
needs, goals, or values) are not clearly defined. It is not clear whether self-relevance means that 
something is important to persons themselves or whether it is influenced by a social goal (i.e., 
striving for status [cf. Scherer, 2013, p. 151]). External self-relevance is even proposed to have 
an influence on self-conscious emotions, i.e. emotions which should be primarily triggered by 
personal concerns about the self (Baldwin & Baccus, 2004). An idea that has been tested in 
research on pride (Osch, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018). Pride as a self-conscious as well 
as a social emotion could be prone to external as well as internal concerns. Yet, self-inflation 
was the most important factor in experiences of pride (Osch et al., 2018). Thus, internal goals 
seemed to drive experiences of pride. This research shows that distinguishing different sources 
of self-relevance in the elicitation of emotions leads to a more detailed understanding of 
emotions.  
This more detailed understanding of self-relevance also applies to values. Values are 
prototypes of what is self-relevant to a person. Arguably, self-relevance in influenced by 
internal and external factors. Accordingly, values should be influenced by internal and external 
factors. Let’s illustrate this with an example: A person strives for the value of universalism 
(defined as the “understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature” [Schwartz, 1994, p. 22]). This can be an intrinsic goal of the person. 
However, this goal can also stem from the person’s social group that values universalism. The 
distinction becomes clearer when internal and external values differ. For example, the person 
who values universalism then becomes part of a social group that values power more highly. 
The person then still has the internal value of universalism, but is also exposed to the external 
value of power. Therefore, seeing someone excel in the universalism domain and in the power 
domain could both elicit emotional reactions but the nature of these emotional reactions might 
be different.   
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Thus, there should be internal and external influences on values. Indeed, values are 
organized in a hierarchical system within a person, but they are also shared by members of a 
social group and culture (Barni, Vieno, Rosnati, Roccato, & Scabini, 2014; Boer & Boehnke, 
2015; Thompson, 1952). Values (e.g., conservatism) are transmitted by a person’s family (e.g., 
the degree to which mothers endorse conservatism). This relationship seems to be especially 
strong when family values are in line with values transported by a person’s social context (e.g., 
teachers and classmates; Barni, Vieno, et al., 2014). Furthermore, value profiles are similar in 
cultures, within families and among friends (Barni, Knafo, Ben-Arieh, & Haj-Yahia, 2014; 
Solomon & Knafo-Noam, 2007). Values are therefore partially defined by a person’s social 
group. 
Despite the social influence on values, values are also relatively stable within a person. 
As a person develops and changes social contexts, personal values remain relatively stable from 
an early age on (Collins et al., 2017). How important specific values are to a person was found 
to stay stable across social contexts, such as family, school, or country, from mid-adolescence 
on (Boer & Boehnke, 2015; Daniel et al., 2012). Further data showed that even from the age 
of five, children make coherent choices of their values when testing with an instrument 
adequate to their age (Collins et al., 2017). So, on the one hand, values are shaped by social 
and cultural influences. On the other hand, individuals form their own internal value system 
which remains relatively stable across varying contexts. Thus, values reflect what individuals 
deem important, but also what their social group deems important.  
A similar distinction between internal and external values has also been proposed in the 
theory of basic values (e.g., Schwartz, 2006b). It proposes that value attainment serves different 
purposes. Personal values (e.g., hedonism or stimulation) “regulate how one expresses personal 
interests” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 13). Social values (e.g., benevolence or conformity) regulate how 
one “relates socially to others and affect[s] their interests”. Additionally, in a refined theory of 
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basic values (Schwartz et al., 2012), some values were redefined in a way that can be perceived 
as reflecting internal and external self-relevance. For example, the value of power is 
differentiated in “power over domains” and “power over resources” which resembles concepts 
of personal and social power (Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009). The value of security was 
redefined into personal and social security (Schwartz et al., 2012), also reflecting internal and 
external influences on the same value. Thus, research on values takes internal and external 
influences into account.  
The distinction between internal and external self-relevance is striking when self-
relevant values diverge or contradict. Congruence between people’s values and those of their 
social group promotes greater life satisfaction and subjective well-being (Lu, 2006; Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 2000). This association even extends to value congruence between people who do 
not directly interact, but share social-demographic characteristics (Khaptsova & Schwartz, 
2016). Value congruence also relates to positive effects at the workplace, such as higher 
commitment to the organization or job satisfaction (for a meta-analysis, see Verquer, Beehr, & 
Wagner, 2003). Friends and families share similar values (Barni, Knafo, et al., 2014; Solomon 
& Knafo-Noam, 2007) and having similar value profiles increases liking between strangers 
(Boer et al., 2011). In contrast, value discrepancies are associated with adverse effects. 
Perceived discrepancies between personal (i.e., internal) and societal (i.e., external) values 
predicts feelings of cultural estrangement, which is a subjective sense of alienation or 
separation from others (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2006). Value discrepancies are also related 
to perceived stress (Bouckenooghe, Buelens, Fontaine, & Vanderheyden, 2005) and decreased 
well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). This research implies that the distinction between what 
is relevant to a person and what is relevant to a person’s social group influences a variety of 
psychological phenomena.  
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To adequately describe the psychological foundations of cognition, emotion, and 
behavior, internal and external influences on values should be disentangled. I propose that this 
approach is especially important when studying benign and malicious envy. As outlined above, 
self-relevance is an important factor in the elicitation of envy. However, self-relevance is not 
clearly defined and can refer to internal as well as external sources of self-relevance. 
Furthermore, envy has been conceptualized as a “status-related emotion”. As status is primarily 
awarded by others, concerns about external self-relevance should be crucial for the assessment 
of status. Envy, as a status-related emotion, should therefore be prone to external influences as 
well.  
 
Envy as a Status-Related Emotion  
Prominent theories on the elicitation of envy posit that envy arises when comparing 
one’s own status to another person’s status (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange, Blatz, & Crusius, 
2018; Smith, 2004). Status is a fundamental human desire (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 
2015) that is awarded by a person’s social group to those who possess useful attributes in a 
given socio-cultural environment (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). “[S]tatus is defined as the 
respect, admiration, and voluntary deference an individual is afforded by others, based on that 
individual’s perceived instrumental social value” (Anderson et al., 2015, p. 2). Status is 
therefore defined by what is valued by others. Status is desirable for many reasons: Having 
status increases subjective well-being, self-esteem, and physical and psychological health (for 
a review see Anderson et al., 2015). A high-status position is therefore a desirable attribute in 
a social environment. To assess one’s status position relative to other’s status position, it is 
necessary to perform a social comparison between one’s status to another person’s status. 
Especially when status is linked to access to scarce resources, a lower status may cause a 
painful feeling of inferiority – namely envy (e.g., Smith, 2000). In this case, envy has the 
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function of informing a person about deficiencies in status-relevant domains. Realizing these 
deficiencies can then motivate behavior to change one’s inferior status position, either by moving 
up or by levelling down (Hill & Buss, 2008; Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan, 2011; Steckler & Tracy, 
2014). This motivation is mirrored in the experiences of benign and malicious envy. Furthermore, 
envy is connected to status regulation strategies and other status-related emotions. Envy is 
intertwined with expressions of pride on a social level. Similar to envy, pride occurs in two 
distinct forms: authentic pride, about effortful achievements, and hubristic pride, when success 
is attribute to stable features, such as talent (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Benign envy is increased 
when perceiving a superior other expressing authentic pride. Malicious envy is increased when 
perceiving a superior other expressing hubristic pride (Lange & Crusius, 2015b). This dynamic 
interplay between pride and envy was mediated by liking and strategies for status attainment. 
Whereas authentic pride was linked to benign envy via prestige, hubristic pride was linked to 
malicious envy via dominance (Lange & Crusius, 2015b). This research illustrates the social-
functional nature of envy as an emotion that facilitates status regulation. The interplay between 
envy and pride and their association to status-regulation strategies, i.e., prestige and dominance, 
(Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Lange & Crusius, 2015b), underlines why envy can be 
conceptualized as a status-related emotion.  
The psychodynamic tradition also posits that envy is especially influenced by social 
evaluation. Lacanian theory characterizes envy by a triadic relationship. The triad supposedly 
consists of the person who envies, the envied person, and the imagined evaluation by others. 
Therefore, envy should be especially strong when the comparison dimension is important to 
others (Vidaillet, 2007). Taken together, empirical data and theoretical reasoning suggest 
envy’s strong connection to the regulation and attainment of status.  
According to this perspective, status seems to be a driving force in eliciting envy. Where 
one stands in a social status hierarchy can only be defined by members of a social group. To 
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obtain status, people need to take into account what is valued by others. Therefore, what people 
are most envious about should be what is valued by others because it signals what is required 
to gain a superior status position (for a similar argument, see Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange, 
Blatz, et al., 2018). This argumentation would imply that people envy what is important to 
others and not so much what is important to themselves: What we really desire when we feel 
envy is more or less independent of the object of envy itself, but what we actually desire is 
status awarded by our social group. Status, as a facet of external self-relevance, should thus 
drive envious reactions.  
Based on this reasoning, external self-relevance should influence benign and malicious 
envy. In contrast, other data supports the importance of internal self-relevance appraisals on 
the elicitation of emotions in general, and envy in particular (Lin et al., 2018; Salovey & Rodin, 
1984; Smith, 2004; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Derived from previous literature, there are reasons 
to assume that internal and external self-relevance both play a role in eliciting envy. I propose 
that the distinction between internal and external self-relevance is important for a 
comprehensive understanding of envy. I further propose that to study the effects of internal and 
external self-relevance on envy, it is important to consider the distinction between benign and 
malicious envy. Based on the reasoning outlined below, internal and external self-relevance 
should have different effects on benign and malicious envy.  
 
How Internal and External Self-Relevance Affect Benign Envy  
Imagine you are a volunteer for a charity organization that helps children with 
difficulties in school. You deeply care for that project because the value of universalism is 
important to you. You give private lessons to a child with dyscalculia. The child enjoys the 
lessons, but her math abilities barely improve. Another volunteer at the same organization gives 
private lessons to a child with dyscalculia, too. She tries a new intervention. In the next math 
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exam her student has the best grade she ever achieved in a math exam. How do you react? I 
predict that the success of the other volunteer will cause a painful feeling of inferiority, namely 
envy. This project is very important to you, next time you will implement the new intervention, 
too. You hope that this helps your student to succeed in the next math exam as well.  
 As illustrated in this example, I predict that that comparing to a superior other who 
excels in a domain that is internally self-relevant will elicit benign envy. The more internally 
important a value is the more benign envy will arise. As benign envy is accompanied by 
motivations to improve and move up, these hypotheses are in line with previous research that 
showed that reminding people about what is important in their lives leads to higher 
achievement motivation (Cohen & Sherman, 2014) and better test performance under 
stereotype threat (Kinias & Sim, 2016). Furthermore, intrinsic goals, i.e., focusing on inherent 
interests increases achievement motivation (e.g., Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006). 
Achievement and approach motivation have been linked to benign envy (e.g., Lange & Crusius, 
2015b). I therefore predict that comparing to a superior other who excels in a domain that is 
internally self-relevant will increase benign envy.  
Additionally, internally self-relevant goals are associated with perceived competence 
about being able to pursue these goals (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Vallerand & Reid, 1987). Intrinsic 
goals also increase feelings of competence, interest, excitement, and confidence which is 
associated with better performance (for a review see Ryan & Deci, 2000). Internal self-
relevance should, thus, be related to a stronger sense of control. Perceiving a situation as 
controllable is associated with benign envy (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2016; Van de Ven 
et al., 2012). Thus, values that are internally self-relevant should result in a stronger sense of 
control and should therefore increase benign envy.  
Furthermore, an advantage in a domain of internal self-relevance might seem more 
deserved because people try to achieve that value themselves. This underlines that the 
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achievement is difficult to obtain and therefore increases appraisals of deservingness. 
Deservingness in turn predicts benign envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012). Arguably, internal self-
relevance also makes the comparison domain more salient. When a person cares about an 
object, she directs her attention towards that object (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Benign 
envy has also been shown to increase the focus of attention towards the object of envy and the 
envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Additionally, counterfactual thoughts about the 
envying person herself induce more benign envy than counterfactual thoughts about the 
superior other person (Lange & Crusius, in prep.). Because both, internal self-relevance and 
benign envy, are accompanied by a stronger focus on the comparison domain and the superior 
other, internal self-relevance should be associated with more benign envy.  
In sum, I predict that benign envy will be stronger when a comparison domain is of 
internal self-relevance. In contrast, I predict external self-relevance to decrease benign envy.  
 
How Internal and External Self-Relevance Affect Malicious Envy  
Imagine that you are at your mother’s birthday party. Your cousin is also there. She 
talks about her family, her three kids, and the nice house they recently built close to her parents’ 
house. Your family congratulates her on her well-behaving children, her hardworking husband, 
and her nice house. You yourself chose a different lifestyle. The value of tradition is not 
important to you, you care more about the value of self-direction (i.e. the value of autonomy 
and independence). You always wanted to be independent. Settling down and having a modest, 
traditional life is not what you want for yourself. However, seeing your cousin being 
appreciated for her lifestyle, although you wouldn’t want it for yourself, causes a painful 
feeling of inferiority - envy. You secretly wish that your cousin would lose her achievements. 
At the next possible moment, you will complain about her to someone else.  
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I predict that values of low intrinsic self-relevance increase feelings of malicious envy. 
Data suggests that people with high levels of detachment show more harmful intentions 
towards the envied person than motivation to improve their own situation (Vrabel, Zeigler-
Hill, McCabe, & Baker, 2018). Detachment is defined by low motivation and low ability to be 
aroused by achievement opportunities. A person with a high level of detachment seems to be 
disconnected from their personal values and goals (Vrabel et al., 2018). Thus, when internal 
self-relevance is low, people should be more likely to react with malicious envy towards a 
superior other.  
Further research on the effects of internal and external motivation supports this 
prediction. Low internal self-relevance is associated with fewer implementation intentions and 
less goal progress (Koestner, Otis, Powers, Pelletier, & Gagnon, 2008). Low intrinsic 
motivation is also associated with less perceived self-efficacy, i.e., the belief of being capable 
to succeed (Walker, Greene, & Mansell, 2006). Low internal self-relevance therefore 
undermines achievement motivation and sense of control and should, thus, be associated with 
stronger feelings of malicious envy.  
Additionally, success in a domain that is not important to a person might seem less 
deserved. Low deservingness is a predictor of malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012). 
Therefore, low internal self-relevance should be associated with more malicious envy. When a 
person does not care about a domain, this domain is not likely to attract much attention. In a 
social interaction, the person will then focus more on the other person than on the comparison 
domain. In malicious envy, the focus is stronger on the superior other than on the comparison 
object (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Additionally, counterfactual thoughts about the superior other 
induce more malicious envy (Lange & Crusius, in prep.) Arguably, low internal self-relevance 
should increase malicious envy.  
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A goal that is externally enforced by others undermines intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) supposedly by reducing perceived competence (Williams & Deci, 
1996). External goals are also related to increased avoidance motivation (Moneta & Spada, 
2009). Additionally, external expectations were associated with more anxiety and maladaptive 
coping with failures in a school context (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Connell, 1989). 
Motivation driven by external expectations was also associated with antisocial behavior 
towards teammates in a sports context (Hodge & Lonsdale, 2011). Thus, external self-relevance 
is associated with increased avoidance motivation and less perceived competence and control, 
and more harmful tendencies. More external self-relevance of an upward comparison should 
therefore lead to more malicious envy.  
In addition to the main effect of external self-relevance on malicious envy, I propose 
that this effect should be strongest when internal self-relevance is low. Findings showed 
adverse effects of value incongruence (e.g., Bernard et al., 2006; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). 
Also, as argued above, when internal self-relevance is low, perceived control and competence 
are low, and achievement motivation is lacking. Under these circumstances, external self-
relevance should be the driving factor for malicious envy amplifying the effect of external self-
relevance on malicious envy especially. Thus, I propose that the effect of external self-
relevance on malicious envy should be especially strong when internal self-relevance is low. 
In sum, I propose a negative association between internal self-relevance and malicious 
envy, a positive association between external self-relevance and malicious envy, and an 
interaction effect predicting that the effect of external self-relevance is stronger when internal 
self-relevance is low.  
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The Current Research 
Self-relevance is a driving factor for the elicitation of emotions. However, a detailed 
understanding of the sources of self-relevance is missing. I propose that there are at least two 
sources of self-relevance: what is relevant to the person, i.e., internal self-relevance, and what 
is relevant to others, i.e., external self-relevance. This distinction should be taken into account 
for a comprehensive understanding of emotions. It is of particular importance for envy. On the 
one hand, internal self-relevance should increase feelings of envy. On the other hand, envy has 
been conceptualized as a status-related emotion and should thus be influenced by external self-
relevance. I propose that internal and external self-relevance should have differential effects 
on benign and malicious envy. Benign envy should be stronger when internal self-relevance is 
high and when external self-relevance is low. Malicious envy should be stronger when internal 
self-relevance is low and when external self-relevance is high, with a stronger effect of external 
self-relevance when internal self-relevance is low.  
Self-relevance were studied by investigating the internal and external self-relevance of 
values. Values are prototypes of what is relevant to a person. At the same time, values are 
influenced by internal and external factors. Therefore, I consider them an appropriate 
operationalization of internal and external self-relevance.  
Taken together, the current research will provide a more detailed understanding of self-
relevance and its differential effects on benign and malicious envy. 




The current research was designed to investigate the role of internal and external self-
relevance in the elicitation of benign and malicious envy. In order to understand the role of 
internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy, I conducted seven studies. 
The first three studies assessed the association between internal and external self-relevance and 
benign and malicious envy. In Studies 4 – 7, I manipulated internal and external self-relevance 
and assessed how they affect benign and malicious envy.  
The first part investigated how internal and external self-relevance, measured by 
internal and external importance of values, predict benign and malicious envy. In Study 1 and 
Study 2, I measured internal and external value importance at Time Point 1 and benign and 
malicious envy reactions towards an upward comparison standard one week later. Study 3 
extended findings of the first studies in a well-powered online study. Data of Studies 1 - 3 were 
integrated in a first meta-analysis.  
After having obtained first evidence for an association between internal and external 
self-relevance and envy, I aimed to replicate their relationship in a between-subjects design. 
To this end, I manipulated internal and external self-relevance in a value affirmation task. 
Participants had to write about the importance or non-importance of a value for them and their 
social group. Participants where then confronted with comparison standards described in 
different vignettes and their envious reaction towards these comparison standards was 
measured. These data were integrated in a second meta-analysis.  
Preregistrations, materials, data, and analysis scripts can be found under the following 
link: https://osf.io/c6e9p/. Preregistrations and materials can also be found in Appendix A, C, 
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Study 1 investigates whether internal and external self-relevance of values predict 
benign and malicious envy. I assessed internal self-relevance using an established measure for 
personal values (i.e., Portrait Values Questionnaire [PVQ; Schwartz, 2003]). I assessed 
external self-relevance with an adapted version of this questionnaire. Schwartz (1992) 
suggested the possibility of measuring institutional and cultural values by modifying the scale 
anchors of the value questionnaire. Instead of asking how important a value is to a person, 
participants could be asked: “How important is value X as a guiding principle in people’s lives, 
in the eyes of (culture group Y)?” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 51). This procedure has been successfully 
used in previous research (Bernard et al., 2006). I used a similar version adapted to the PVQ. 
Furthermore, I wrote comparison vignettes based on the PVQ to create an adequate comparison 
standard for every value. The vignettes were supposed to elicit an upward comparison and an 
envious reaction. To explore the effectiveness of that procedure, I ran an exploratory study. 
The predicted relationships between internal and external self-relevance and benign and 
malicious envy based on my research question and hypotheses were further investigated in the 
following studies.  
 
Methods 
Sample. I collected data from 70 participants at Time Point 1 via Amazon MTurk. I 
excluded one participant who indicated after an attention check that I should not use their data 
(Meade & Craig, 2012). After one week, I contacted the same participants again. The final 
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sample at Time Point 2 consisted of 58 participants (Mage = 34.65, SD = 10.57, 25 female, 33 
male). All analyses were calculated with the final sample of N = 58. 
 
Materials. To measure internal self-relevance, participants completed the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 2003). The PVQ consists of 21 portraits of people 
endorsing different values (e.g., item for benevolence: It’s very important to her to help the 
people around her. She wants to care for their well-being.). Participants rated the extent to 
which this value is important to them by indicating their similarity to the portrayed person 
(How much is this person like you?) on a 6-point scale (1 very much like me – 6 not like me at 
all). The phrasing of the items was matched to participant gender. Prior research indicates that 
the PVQ has adequate psychometric properties (Schwartz, 2003). A complete list of items can 
be found in Table 11. Next, I adapted the PVQ to measure external self-relevance. I confronted 
participants with the same portraits as described above. This time, I asked them to rate the 
extent to which the portrayed person is like people in their social environment (How much is 
this person like the average member of your society?) on a 6-point scale (1 very much like 
him/her – 6 not like him/her at all).  
At time point two, all participants read ten vignettes describing a person who perfectly 
embodied a certain value. Vignettes were written based on the value descriptions of the PVQ 
(example for self-direction vignette: He/She thinks up new ideas and is very creative. He/She 
does things in his/her own original way. He/She makes his/her own decision about what he/she 
does. He/She is free and not dependent on others, see Table 14 for a list of all vignettes). After 
every vignette, I measured participants’ emotional reaction towards the described person. I 
measured benign envy (The person inspires me to get this quality myself.), malicious envy (I 
want this person not to have this quality anymore.), pain (Imagining this person feels painful.), 
general envy (I feel envy towards this person.) and admiration (I feel admiration towards this 
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person.) on a 7-point scale (1 not at all – 6 very much). I chose a prototypical item for each 
emotion based on established measures of envy (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018) and admiration 
(Schindler, Paech, & Löwenbrück, 2014). I included admiration for exploratory reasons. To 
explore the quality of the vignettes, I also measured how vividly participants were able to 
imagine the described person on a 7-point scale (How vividly could you imagine this person? 
1 not at all – 6 very much).1  
 
Procedure. To avoid memory effects and participants’ tendency to answer consistently 
to similar items, I measured internal and external self-relevance and emotional reactions to 
upward comparisons separately from each other. At Time Point 1, participants completed both, 
internal and external self-relevance of value scales. After one week, I invited participants again 
to take part in a study. In this study, I confronted each participant with every vignette describing 
the ten basic values. Then, participants rated their emotional reaction towards these vignettes 
in a within-subjects design.  
 
Data analysis strategy. Because every participant rated their emotional reaction to 
every vignette representing a certain value, values were crossed with participants. To account 
for the nested structure of the data, I analyzed data with multilevel regression models using 
packages lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, 
Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) in R (R Core Team, 2017). I calculated a model for each 
dependent variable with fixed effects for internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction (predictors were group mean-centered for participant and value) and random 
intercepts for participant and value. Scales for internal and external self-relevance ranged from 
                                                 
1 Analyses did not reveal any results that could be of interest for this investigation and are therefore not 
reported.  
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1 (very much like me) to 6 (not at all like me) with increasing numbers signalling less value 
endorsement. I reverse coded these scales to facilitate interpretation and comparability to the 
results of the following studies.  
 
Results 
Correlation of internal and external self-relevance. There was an average correlation 
between internal and external measures of value self-relevance of rmean= .213 (SD = .149; see 
Table 1, for correlations per value). Thus, there was a small to medium correlation between 
measures of internal and external self-relevance. This implies that internal and external self-
relevance correlated, but could still be distinguished as the correlation was not perfect. 
 
Model comparison. For all dependent variables, I first compared null-models to the 
full multilevel regression models. A null-model is an empty multilevel regression model that 
contains only the random effects. A comparison between the null-model and a multilevel 
 
Figure 1. Fixed effects of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy 
in Study 1. Left: Benign envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Right: Malicious envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Scales of internal and external self-relevance were group mean-centered. Y-Axes 
were zoomed in to illustrate the differences between conditions. 
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regression model that contains all predictors indicates whether the predictors explain a 
significant part of the variance of the dependent variable. Models including internal and 
external self-relevance, and their interaction as predictors provided a better fit to the data than 
the null-model (pain: drop-in deviance χ² = 11.51, p < .001; general envy: χ² = 30.29, p < .001; 
admiration: drop-in deviance χ² = 73.90, p < .001; benign envy: drop-in deviance χ² = 79.16, p 
< .001; malicious envy: drop-in deviance χ² = 25.71, p < .001). Thus, internal and external self-
relevance explained variance in dependent measures and are meaningful predictors for all 
dependent variables.  
 
Multilevel regression results. My hypotheses expected that internal self-relevance 
would be associated with more benign envy and less malicious envy. Furthermore, I 
hypothesized that external self-relevance would be associated with less benign envy and more 
malicious envy. I also predicted an interaction of internal and external self-relevance for 
malicious envy. Separate multilevel regression analyses were conducted to predict each 
emotion by internal and external self-relevance and their interaction. More internal self-
relevance was related to increased feelings of benign envy, B = 0.58, SE B = 0.06, p < .0012 
(see Table 2 for statistics of all regression analyses in Study 1, see Figure 1 for regression 
results for benign and malicious envy). More internal self-relevance was related to lower 
feelings of malicious envy, B = -0.21, SE B = 0.04, p < .001. External self-relevance was 
related to more malicious envy, B = 0.12, SE B = 0.06, p = .034. External self-relevance did 
not significantly predict benign envy, B = -0.07, SE B = 0.08, p = .389.  
Additionally, internal self-relevance was a positive predictor of general envy, B = 0.31, 
SE B = 0.06, p < .001 and admiration, B = 0.50, SE B = 0.06, p < .001, and a negative predictor 
                                                 
2 Please note that calculations of effect size in multilevel modelling is complex and their interpretation 
difficult (Nezlek, 2008, p. 854). Some Author even recommend not to use effects sizes for fixed effects in 
multilevel models at all (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998, p. 119). I do not report effect sizes because of their limited 
interpretability.  
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of pain, B = -0.15, SE B = 0.05, p = .001. External self-relevance did not significantly predict 
feelings of envy, B = 0.04, SE B = 0.06, p = .623, admiration, B = -0.08, SE B = 0.07, p = .300, 
or pain, B = 0.03, SE B = 0.016, p = .623. There were no significant interactions between 
internal and external self-relevance on feelings of envy, B = 0.14, SE B = 0.08, p = .087, benign 
envy, B = -0.002, SE B = 0.09, p = .981, admiration, B = 0.06, SE B = 0.08, p = .467, malicious 
envy B = -0.02, SE B = 0.06, p = .704, or pain, B = 0.05, SE B = 0.07, p = .394. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 showed differential associations between internal self-relevance and emotional 
reactions to upward comparisons. First, measures for internal and external self-relevance of 
values showed a small to medium correlation indicating that participants were able to 
disentangle both measures. Second, whereas more internal self-relevance was related to 
stronger feelings of benign envy, more internal self-relevance was related to lower feelings of 
malicious envy. That supports my predictions on the effects of internal self-relevance. Data 
showed that seeing someone excel in a domain that is internally self-relevant is linked to benign 
reactions towards that person, seeing someone excel in a domain that is not internally self-
relevant is linked to malicious reactions towards that person. Additionally, external self-
relevance predicted increased feelings of malicious envy. Seeing someone excel in a domain 
that is important to others was related to malicious reactions towards that person. The predicted 
interaction between internal and external self-relevance on malicious envy and external self-
relevance as a predictor of benign envy were not found in this study. One reason might be that 
this initial study relied on a small sample of participants. I will increase power in the following 
study to allow a better test for my predictions. In addition, different comparison processes may 
have elicited different emotional processes besides the one I intended to measure. The PVQ 
measures forced participants to compare to the person described in the items. In the vignettes, 
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participants had to compare themselves to another person. . I aimed to overcome this limitation 
by using a different measure for internal and external self-relevance.  
Interestingly, internal self-relevance was related to increased levels of general envy and 
admiration and decreased levels of pain. However, these tests were exploratory and should be 
interpreted cautiously. Further studies will reveal whether these associations will be replicated.  
 
Study 2 
Study 2 set out to replicate and extend the effects found in Study 1 with a larger sample 
and by using a different measure for internal and external value importance and emotions.  
 
Methods 
Sample. I collected data from 201 participants at Time Point 1 via Amazon MTurk. No 
participant had to be excluded based on my attention check (Meade & Craig, 2012). After one 
week, I contacted the same participants again. The final sample at Time Point 2 consisted of 
178 participants (Mage = 36.01, SD = 11.98, 86 female, 90 male, 2 other). All analyses were 
calculated with the final sample of N = 178.  
 
Materials. To measure internal self-relevance, participants first completed the 
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). The SVS consists of 56 single-worded items 
measuring the different basic values (e.g., pleasure, freedom, creativity, wealth, authority, 
curious, daring; see Table 12 for a complete list of items). Participants rated the extent to which 
these values are important to them as a guiding principle in their life (Rate the importance of 
each value item as a guiding principle in YOUR LIFE) on a 9-point scale (1 – opposed to my 
values, 2 – not important, …, 8 – very important, 9 – of supreme importance). Next, I adapted 
the SVS to measure external self-relevance. I presented the same items as in the SVS described 
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above to the participants. This time, I asked them to rate the extent to which each value item 
was a guiding principle in their social group (Rate the importance of each value item as a 
guiding principle in YOUR SOCIETY).  
At Time Point 2, every participant read the ten vignettes developed in Study 1 (see 
Table 14). Again, every vignette described a person who perfectly embodies a certain value. 
Vignettes were written based on the value descriptions of the PVQ. After each vignette, I 
measured participants’ emotional reaction towards the person described in every vignette. To 
measure emotions, I built composite items combining several items from established measures 
for envy (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018) and admiration (Schindler et al., 2014) on a scale from 
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Pain in envy was measured by I feel tormented, inadequate, and 
depressed., benign envy was measured by I feel deep longing for this person’s quality and want 
to work harder to also obtain exactly the same quality. I feel motivated by this person and 
devise a plan to obtain this quality as well, admiration was measured by His/her quality 
impresses and elates me. I admire him/her for his/her quality. I am continually impressed by 
what he/she does and I feel that his/her quality is admirable, and malicious envy was measured 
by I feel hatred and hostile towards this person and secretly wish that he/she would lose this 
quality. I would like to complain to someone else about this person. To explore the quality of 
the vignettes, I also measured how vividly participants were able to imagine the described 
person on a 7-point scale (How vividly could you imagine this person? 1 not at all – 6 very 
much).3  
 
Procedure. As in Study 1, I measured internal and external self-relevance and 
emotional reactions to upward comparisons separately from each other. At Time Point 1, 
                                                 
3 Analyses did not reveal any results that could be of interest for this investigation and are therefore not 
reported.  
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participants completed internal and external value scales. After one week, I invited participants 
again to take part in another study. In this study, I measured participants’ emotional reaction 
towards the person described in each vignette portraying one of the ten basic values.  
 
Data analysis strategy. As in Study 1, values were crossed with participants. To 
account for the nested structure of the data, I analyzed data with multilevel regression models 
using packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) in R (R Core 
Team, 2017). I calculated a model for each dependent variable with fixed effects for internal 
and external self-relevance and their interaction (predictors were group mean-centered for 
participant and value) and random intercepts for participant and value. 
 
Results 
Correlation of internal and external self-relevance. There was an average correlation 
between internal and external measures of value self-relevance, rmean = .385 (SD = .110; see 
Table 1 for correlations per value), indicating a medium-size correlation between measures of 
internal and external self-relevance. This implies that internal and external self-relevance were 
related but could still be distinguished.  
 
Model comparison. Models including internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction as predictors provided a better fit to the data than the null-model without any 
predictors for admiration, benign envy and malicious envy (benign envy: drop-in deviance χ² 
= 206.01, p < .001; malicious envy: drop-in deviance χ² = 33.73, p < .001; admiration: drop-in 
deviance χ² = 211.08, p < .001). I conclude that internal and external self-relevance are 
significant predictors for admiration, benign envy, and malicious envy. For pain, the predictors 
did not increase model fit compared to the null-model, drop-in deviance χ² = 1.93, p = .587. To 
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treat all dependent variables consistently, I report multilevel regressions for pain although the 
model including the predictors did not provide a better fit to the data than the null-model.  
 
Multilevel regression results. I predicted that internal self-relevance would be 
associated with more benign envy and less malicious envy. Furthermore, I predicted that 
external self-relevance would be associated with more malicious envy and less benign envy. 
Additionally, I predicted an interaction between internal and external self-relevance on 
malicious envy. Indeed, internal self-relevance positively predicted feelings of benign envy, B 
= 0.48, SE B = 0.03, p < .001 and negatively predicted feelings of malicious envy, B = -0.09, 
SE B = 0.02, p < .001 (see Table 3 and Figure 2 for statistics of regression analyses in Study 
2). As predicted, external self-relevance negatively predicted feelings of benign envy, B = -
0.14, SE B = 0.03, p < .001, and positively predicted malicious envy B = 0.09, SE B = 0.02, p 
< .001. There were no significant interactions between internal and external self-relevance on 
Figure 2. Fixed effects of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy, 
Study 2. Left: Benign envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Right: Malicious envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Scales of internal and external self-relevance were group mean-centered. Y-Axes 
were zoomed in to illustrate the differences between conditions. 
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feelings of benign envy, B = 0.00, SE B = 0.03, p = .893 and malicious envy, B = 0.00, SE B 
= 0.02, p = .650.  
Neither internal self-relevance, B = -0.01, SE B = 0.02, p = .527, nor external self-
relevance, B = 0.02, SE B = 0.02, p = .254, nor their interaction, B = 0.01, SE B = 0.02, p = 
.591, predicted feelings of pain. Internal self-relevance positively predicted admiration, B = 
0.44, SE B = 0.03, p < .001. External self-relevance negatively predicted admiration, B = -
0.17, SE B = 0.03, p < .001. There was no interaction between internal and external self-
relevance on admiration, B = -0.03, SE B = 0.03, p = .298.  
 
Discussion 
Study 2 confirmed and extended the results of Study 1. Measures for internal and 
external self-relevance of values showed a medium correlation indicating that participants were 
able to disentangle both measures. Most importantly, as predicted, the more internally self-
relevant a value was the more benign envy and the less malicious envy people experienced 
when confronted with a person who perfectly embodied the value. Additionally, I found the 
expected effects of external self-relevance: The more externally important a value was the 
stronger people reacted with malicious envy towards the comparison standard. In contrast, and 
also as expected, people reacted with less benign envy towards a person who perfectly endorsed 
a value of external self-relevance. Data did not show the expected interaction between internal 
and external self-relevance on malicious envy. Study 2 mirrors and extends the predicted 
effects of internal and external self-relevance shown in Study 1. I sought to further confirm the 
pattern, by preregistering my hypotheses and increasing power to provide an adequate test of 
my hypotheses.  
There were no significant associations between internal and external self-relevance on 
pain. Data in Study 1 suggested that internal self-relevance was related to less pain. A finding 
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I could not confirm here. I will further explore the relation between internal and external self-
relevance and pain.  
Data revealed a positive association between internal self-relevance and admiration and 
a negative association between external self-relevance and admiration. These data resemble the 
relation between internal and external self-relevance and benign envy. However, benign envy 
was positively associated with pain, B = 0.13, SE B = 0.00, p < .0014. Admiration was not 
associated with pain, B = -0.02, SE B = 0.04, p = .482. Thus, benign envy is clearly a painful 
feeling of envy. Other research also showed that benign envy and admiration can be 
differentiated (Crusius, Blatz, & Lange, in prep.; Van de Ven et al., 2011). I measured 
admiration in Study 1 and 2 for exploratory reasons. The next studies will focus on how internal 
and external self-relevance predict benign and malicious envy.  
 
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in a larger sample and with 
an established measure for benign and malicious envy and pain in envy (Lange, Weidman, et 
al., 2018). Procedure, hypotheses, and analysis plan were preregistered for this study (see 
Figure 10).  
 
Methods 
Sample. I collected data from 412 participants via Amazon MTurk. I excluded those 
who did not agree that I could use their data after an attention check (n = 4; Meade & Craig, 
2012). The final sample consisted of 408 participants (Mage = 38.58, SD = 11.50, 226 female, 
182 male). Different to Studies 1 and 2, I included all questionnaires at one time point.  
                                                 
4 I conducted multilevel regressions with random intercepts for participant and value, and pain as a 
predictor for benign envy and pain as a predictor for admiration. 
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Materials. Internal and external self-relevance of values were measured as in Study 2. 
To measure internal values, participants completed the SVS (Schwartz, 1992). To make items 
easier to understand, I added descriptions of every item (Schwartz, 2012). Participants 
answered on a scale from 0 (not important) to 7 (of supreme importance). Next, participants 
completed an adapted version of the SVS to measure external self-relevance (see Table 13 for 
a complete list of items).  
After completing the two measures for internal and external self-relevance of values, 
participants read the ten vignettes developed in Study 1 (see Table 14). Again, every vignette 
described a person who perfectly embodies a certain value. After each vignette, I measured 
participants’ emotional reaction towards the described person. I measured benign envy, 
malicious envy, and pain using the PaDE Scale (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). Participants 
answered on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). All items can be found in Table 17.  
 
Data analysis strategy. I analyzed the data as in Studies 1 and 2. I calculated multilevel 
models with fixed effects for internal and external values and their interaction (group mean-
centered scales for participant and value) and random intercepts for participants and values. I 
preregistered to run models that also included random slopes for internal and external self-
relevance. However, these models did not converge. As preregistered, I reduced model 
constraints by removing random slopes for participants and values. 
 
Results 
Correlation of internal and external self-relevance. There was an average correlation 
between internal and external measures of value self-relevance of rmean= .527 (SD = .057; see 
Table 1 for correlations per value) indicating a large correlation between measures of internal 
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and external self-relevance. This implies that internal and external self-relevance were difficult 
to distinguish in the present study. However, the correlation was not perfect indicating that the 
two concepts were at least partially distinguishable. 
 
Model comparison. For all dependent variables, models including internal and external 
self-relevance as predictors provided a better fit to the data than the null-model without any 
predictors (benign envy: drop-in deviance χ² = 732.11, p < .001; malicious envy: drop-in 
deviance χ² = 82.67). Thus, internal and external self-relevance explained a significant part of 
the variance in dependent measures. For pain in envy, the model with predictors did not provide 
a better fit to the data than the null-model, drop-in deviance χ² = 1.43, p = .699. For consistency 
in treating the dependent variables, I report multilevel regression results for all models.  
 
Multilevel regression results. I predicted that internal self-relevance would be related 
to more benign and less malicious envy. Furthermore, I predicted that external self-relevance 
would be related to less benign and more malicious envy. I also predicted an interaction 
between internal and external self-relevance on malicious envy. As predicted, internal self-
relevance was related to higher feelings of benign envy, B = 0.59, SE B = 0.02, p < .001 (see 
Table 4 and Figure 3 for statistics of regression analyses in Study 3). As predicted, internal 
self-relevance was related to lower feelings of malicious envy, B = -0.05, SE B = 0.01, p < 
.001. Contrary to predictions, external self-relevance did not significantly predict feelings of 
benign envy, B = -0.03, SE B = 0.02, p = .157, nor malicious envy, B = 0.01, SE B = 0.01, p 
= .495. Unlike as predicted, there was no significant interaction between internal and external 
self-relevance on malicious envy, B = 0.00, SE B = 0.01, p = .710. There was no interaction 
between internal and external self-relevance on feelings of benign envy, B = -0.03, SE B = 
0.02, p = .137 (exploratory). 
42 Study 3 Empirical Evidence 
Additionally, I predicted that internal self-relevance would be related to less pain and 
external self-relevance would be related to more pain. Multilevel regression analyses for pain 
in envy revealed that neither internal self-relevance, B = 0.01, SE B = 0.01, p = .293, nor 
external self-relevance, B = -0.01, SE B = 0.01, p = .461, nor their interaction, B = -0.00, SE 
B = 0.01, p = .905, predicted pain in envy.  
 
Discussion 
Study 3 confirmed the predicted relations between internal self-relevance and benign 
and malicious envy. Seeing someone excel in a domain that was internally self-relevant was 
related to more benign envy, but less malicious envy. The predicted effects of external self-
relevance on benign and malicious envy, and the predicted interaction between internal and 
external self-relevance on malicious envy did not emerge in Study 3. This might be due to the 
strong correlation of measures for internal and external self-relevance. As I always controlled 
Figure 3. Fixed effects of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy, 
Study 3. Left: Benign envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Right: Malicious envy predicted by internal and external self-relevance and their 
interaction. Scales of internal and external self-relevance were group mean-centered. Y-Axes 
were zoomed in to illustrate the differences between conditions. 
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for the other form of self-relevance, and these were highly correlated in this study, external 
self-relevance was unlikely to show an effect beyond internal self-relevance, especially as the 
effect of internal self-relevance was stronger in all studies. Additionally, the means of 
malicious envy ratings were rather low, which may have reduced the variance making it 
difficult to show effects on malicious envy. Nevertheless, the data confirmed the effect of 
internal self-relevance on malicious envy.  
I also expected internal self-relevance to be related to decreased levels of pain and 
external self-relevance to be related to increased levels of pain. Data did not reveal that internal, 
or external self-relevance, or their interaction predicted pain. The different forms of self-
relevance did not seem to be related to painful feelings when seeing someone excel.  
To provide a comprehensive test of my predictions, I integrated data from Studies 1, 2 
and, 3 in a meta-analysis. Since all three studies used a similar design, this is viable way to test 
for the consistency of the predicted effects across studies. 
 
Meta-Analysis of Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Methods 
Data analysis strategy. I integrated data from studies 1, 2 and 3 by merging the data 
from all three studies into one dataset. Then, I ran one multilevel analysis on the merged data 
set for each dependent variable. The dataset consisted of data by 648 participants measured on 
10 values in three studies. I specified random intercepts for participants, values, and studies. 
Introducing a random effect for study allowed me to control for variations between studies. 
This approach is similar to a classic random effects meta-analysis (Pastor & Lazowski, 2018). 
I further specified fixed effects for internal and external self-relevance (group mean-centered 
for participants, values, and studies) and their interaction. I ran separate models to predict 
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benign envy, malicious envy, and pain by internal self-relevance, external self-relevance, and 
their interaction (see Table 5). 
 
Results  
Benign envy. The multilevel regression analysis revealed that internal self-relevance 
positively predicted benign envy, B = 0.55, SE B = 0.02, p < .001. External self-relevance 
negatively predicted benign envy, B = -0.07, SE B = 0.02, p < .001. There was no significant 
interaction between internal and external self-relevance on benign envy, B = -0.03, SE B = 
0.01, p = .056 (see Figure 4 for a descriptive plot of these results). 
 
Malicious envy. The multilevel regression analysis revealed that internal self-relevance 
negatively predicted malicious envy, B = -0.08, SE B = 0.01, p < .001. External self-relevance 
positively predicted malicious envy, B = 0.05, SE B = 0.01, p < .001. There was no significant 
interaction between internal and external self-relevance on malicious envy, B = 0.00, SE B = 
0.01, p = .648 (see Figure 4 for a descriptive plot of these results).  
Figure 4. Meta-analytical multilevel regression for benign envy and malicious envy predicted 
by internal and external self-relevance. Left: Benign envy predicted by internal and external 
self-relevance and their interaction. Right: Malicious envy predicted by internal and external 
self-relevance and their interaction. Scales of internal and external self-relevance were group 
mean-centered. Y-Axes were zoomed in to illustrate the differences between conditions. 
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Pain. The multilevel regression analysis revealed no significant effects of internal self-
relevance, B = -0.02, SE B = 0.01, p = .092, external self-relevance, B = 0.02, SE B = 0.01, p 
= .086, or their interaction on pain in envy, B = 0.01, SE B = 0.01, p = .497. 
 
Discussion 
Meta-analytical findings confirmed the predicted effects of internal self-relevance on 
benign and malicious envy: Seeing someone excel in a domain that is internally self-relevant, 
was related to more benign envy, but less malicious envy. Meta-analytical findings also 
confirmed the predicted effects of external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy: 
Seeing someone excel in a domain that is externally self-relevant, was related to more 
malicious envy, but less benign envy.  
I furthermore predicted an interaction between internal and external self-relevance on 
malicious envy. I expected the positive relation between external self-relevance and malicious 
envy to be stronger for lower levels of internal self-relevance. However, there was no empirical 
evidence in this set of studies for an interaction on malicious envy.  
Neither internal self-relevance, nor external self-relevance, nor their interaction 
significantly predicted pain. The results indicate that pain is not influenced by internal and 
external self-relevance. Based on the literature, I would have expected self-relevance to 
influence pain. However, I did not have directional predictions about differential effects of 
internal and external self-relevance on pain. The present data suggest that internal and external 
self-relevance influence those forms of envy that are related to motivational consequences 
rather than the core affective component of envy, namely pain.  
The non-significant effects on pain might question whether I captured envy at all. 
However, the data replicated precious findings on the relationships between the envy 
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components (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). Pain was positively correlated with malicious 
envy, r = .698, p < .001, and benign envy, r = .067, p < .001, indicating that all envy 
components showed the expected relationships.  
An advantage of classical meta-analysis is that it provides an effect size of the average 
effect across studies that is comparable to other investigations. However, it is not advised to 
calculate conventional effect size measures, such as beta regression coefficients, for multilevel 
analyses because standard errors of fixed effects are influenced by the random effects structure 
(Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017; Kreft & Leeuw, 1998; Nezlek, 2008). The nested 
structure makes it difficult to compare effect sizes of multilevel designs with each other. 
However, provided that the same study design is used, unstandardized regression coefficients 
can still be compared with each other. The current meta-regression showed an association 
between internal self-relevance and benign envy that was in absolute terms about seven times 
as large as the negative association between internal self-relevance and malicious envy. 
Similarly, the effect of internal self-relevance on benign envy was in absolute terms about eight 
times as large as the effect of external self-relevance on benign envy and ten times as large as 
the effect of external self-relevance on malicious envy. The association between internal self-
relevance and malicious envy was only 1.5 times as large as the association between external 
self-relevance and malicious envy. From this I conclude that internal self-relevance is the 
strongest predictor overall, in particular for benign envy. Internal and external self-relevance 
predicted malicious envy equally strong.  
Taken together, correlational studies showed that self-relevance can be distinguished in 
internal and external self-relevance. Internal and external self-relevance have different effects 
on envious reactions towards upward comparisons. The more important a comparison domain 
is to the person him/herself, the more the person tries to achieve this quality as well. However, 
the less important a comparison domain is to the person the more the person wishes harm to 
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the superior other and the more painful this comparison feels. Even though of smaller effect 
sizes, the effects of external self-relevance were in the opposite direction. The more important 
a comparison domain is to a person’s social group, the more likely people react with malicious 
tendencies towards the superior person. Thus, the less important a comparison domain is to 
others, the less people will try to achieve the same qualities as well, while still feeling envy, 
namely malicious envy.  
The data were not in line with the more secondary prediction that internal and external 
self-relevance interact in predicting malicious envy. From these non-significant results cannot 
be differentiated whether the statistical power was not high enough to reveal an interaction 
effect or whether there is no interaction effect in the first place. At the very least, the data 
suggest that an interaction between internal and external self-relevance does not have a strong 
influence on envy.  
 
Overview of Studies 4 – 7 
The data of Studies 1 – 3 suggested that the more internally self-relevant a value is the 
more benign envy and the less malicious envy people feel when comparing to a superior other. 
Additionally, the data suggested that the more externally self-relevant a value is the more 
malicious envy and the less benign envy people feel when comparing to a superior other.  
The second part of the current research investigates the question how internal and 
external self-relevance influence benign and malicious envy with a different methodological 
approach. I manipulated internal and external self-relevance in a between-subjects design to 
test whether the effects of Studies 1 – 3 can be replicated. I expected that internal self-relevance 
will increase benign envy, and external self-relevance will decrease malicious envy. I also 
expected that internal self-relevance will decrease malicious envy, and external self-relevance 
will increase malicious envy. Additionally, I made the more secondary prediction of an 
48 Overview of Studies 4 – 7 Empirical Evidence 
interaction effect on malicious envy. I expected the effect of external self-relevance to be 
especially strong when internal self-relevance was low. To test these predictions, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) 
x 2 (external self-relevance: low, high) between-subjects design. Self-relevance was induced 
by the internal and external self-relevance of values in a value affirmation writing task. After 
the value affirmation task, participants read a vignette about a person who perfectly embodied 
a certain value. I measured participants’ envious reactions towards that person. In Study 4, I 
first measured the importance of values with the PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001). Then, 
participants wrote about why their most important value was important to them or not and why 
this value was important to their social group or not. Participants were then confronted with a 
person who perfectly lived according to that value. Vignettes were the same as in Studies 1 – 
3. Then, benign envy, malicious envy, and pain were measured with the PaDE scale (Lange, 
Weidman, et al., 2018). In Study 5, participants first ranked values according to their 
importance. Then, a value of average importance was selected for the manipulation of internal 
and external self-relevance. This procedure was supposed to strengthen the manipulation of 
particularly external self-relevance. The same procedure for value manipulation was used in 
Study 6, but the vignettes were put in a more concrete context. This was again supposed to 
strengthen the manipulation as well as the validity of the vignettes. Finally, Study 7 had a 
similar design with even more concrete vignettes that were supposed to fuel envious reactions 
by putting the story in a different context. Study 7 was also supposed to provide the strongest 
causal evidence for the effect of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious 
envy by using a strong manipulation and high-powered tests for my predictions. Procedure, 
hypotheses, and analysis plan were preregistered for Studies 4 – 7 (see Appendix A). All 
materials can be found in Appendix C.  
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Study 4 
Methods 
Sample. Previous research showed a small to medium effect of the value affirmation 
task on emotion ratings (Tamir et al., 2016). A-priori power calculations indicated that I would 
need 350 participants to find a significant interaction between internal and external self-
relevance of values (d = 0.30, α = .05, 1-β = .80). Sample sizes for all studies were planned 
with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). To ensure enough power after drop-
outs, I aimed for 400 participants who were collected via Amazon MTurk. As preregistered, I 
excluded data from participants who indicated that I should not use their data after an attention 
check (n = 10; Meade & Craig, 2012). The final sample consisted of 393 participants (Mage = 
37.31, SD = 12.36, 222 female, 171 male). Procedure, hypotheses, and analysis plan were 
preregistered for this study (see Figure 11). 
 
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions of the 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low: high) 
between-subjects design. First, I measured the importance of the ten basic values using the 
PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001), as in Studies 1 and 2. The PVQ was followed by a writing task 
using an adapted version of the value affirmation task (e.g., Tamir et al., 2016). The value 
affirmation task supposes that the importance of a value for a participant can be increased or 
decreased by him/her by writing about why a certain value is important or not important to 
him/herself. In the high internal self-relevance condition, participants wrote about a value that 
was of high importance to them. In the low internal self-relevance condition, participants wrote 
about a value that was of low importance to them (instructions: You indicated that value X is 
of (NO) special IMPORTANCE to YOU. Why is value X of (NO) special importance to you? 
Please explain why you think that it is (not) important to behave according to this value; for 
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detailed instructions, see Table 18). As the terms for values are rather abstract words (e.g., self-
direction), I inserted keywords describing the respective value to facilitate writing (e.g., 
creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curious, independent; cf. Schwartz, 2012). After the 
internal self-relevance task, external self-relevance of the value was manipulated. In the low 
external self-relevance condition, participants wrote about why the value they wrote about in 
the internal self-relevance task was of low importance to their social group. In the high external 
self-relevance condition, participants wrote about why this value was of high importance to 
their social group (instruction: Now, think about why value X could be of [NO] special 
IMPORTANCE in your SOCIAL GROUP! Please explain why it could be [not] important to 
the people around you to behave according to value X.).  
As a manipulation check, I asked participants to rate whether the value they were 
writing about was important to them ([value X] is important to me, internal self-relevance 
manipulation check) and to their social group ([value X] is important to my social group, 
external self-relevance manipulation check) on a 7-point scale (1 - not at all important, 7 - very 
important).  
Then, I confronted participants with a vignette describing a person who perfectly 
embodied a certain value. The described person represented the value that participants wrote 
about in the value affirmation task. I created the vignettes according to the PVQ (example of a 
person who represents the value of achievement: “He/She shows his/her abilities. People 
admire him/her for what he/she does. He/She is very successful. People recognize his/her 
achievements“). All vignettes can be found in Table 22. I measured participants’ reaction of 
benign and malicious envy, and pain in envy towards this person (Lange, Weidman, et al., 
2018; see Table 25).  
 
Results 
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Manipulation check. An ANOVA on ratings of how important the value participants 
wrote about was to themselves, revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, F(1,389) = 
375.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .491. As expected, values of high internal self-relevance were rated as 
more important to the participants, M = 6.31, SD = 1.00, than values of low internal self-
relevance, M = 2.63, SD = 1.59. The manipulation check also revealed the predicted main effect 
of external self-relevance on the question how important the value was to participants’ social 
group, F(1,389) = 25.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .060. As predicted, high externally self-relevant values 
were rated as more important to others, M = 4.88, SD = 1.68, than values of low external self-
relevance, M = 3.77, SD = 1.88. Additionally, internal self-relevance affected the perceived 
importance of the value to others, F(1,389) = 58.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .130 (exploratory). High 
internally self-relevant values were rated as more important to others, M = 5.19, SD = 1.44, 
than low internally self-relevant values, M = 3.48, SD = 1.85. 
 
Effect on envy. I predicted that a MANOVA on all envy ratings (i.e. benign envy, 
malicious envy, pain) would reveal an interaction between internal and external self-relevance. 
Figure 5. Means and SEM of benign envy and malicious envy by internal self-relevance (high, 
low) and external self-relevance (high, low) in Study 4. Y-Axes were zoomed in to illustrate 
the differences between conditions.  
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The MANOVA revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.51, F(2,387) 
= 201.00, p < .001, but no main effect of external self-relevance, Pillais’ trace =0.01, F(2,387) 
= 1.62, p = .199, nor an interaction between internal and external self-relevance or interaction, 
Pillais’ trace = 0.01, F(2,387) = 2.01, p = .135.  
The main predictions focused on effects of internal and external self-relevance on 
benign and malicious envy, separately. The main predictions were that internal self-relevance 
would increase benign envy and decrease malicious envy, and that external self-relevance 
would decrease benign envy and increase malicious envy. I also preregistered the more 
secondary prediction of an interaction effect on malicious envy. 
 To test these predictions, I preregistered to run separate 2 (internal self-relevance: low, 
high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low, high) ANOVAs for benign envy, malicious envy, and 
pain (see Figure 5 for results on benign and malicious envy, see Table 6 for descriptive 
statistics). As, predicted, the ANOVA for benign envy revealed a main effect of internal self-
relevance, F(1,388) = 164.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .298. High internal self-relevance elicited more 
benign envy, M = 5.47, SD = 1.34, than low internal self-relevance, M = 2.54, SD = 1.59. The 
predicted main effect of external self-relevance did not reach significance, F(1,388) = 0.28, p 
= .594, ηp2 = .001. The ANOVA for malicious envy revealed a significant effect of internal 
self-relevance, F(1,388) = 11.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .029. As predicted, low internal self-relevance 
elicited more malicious envy, M = 2.24, SD = 1.38, than high internal self-relevance, M = 1.60, 
SD = 1.12. Neither the predicted main effect of external self-relevance, F(1,388) = 2.53, p = 
.112, ηp2 = .001, nor the predicted interaction between internal and external self-relevance on 
malicious envy, F(1,388) = 0.02, p = .899, ηp2 < .001, were significant. An exploratory ANOVA 
on pain in envy revealed no significant effects (internal self-relevance: F(1,388) = 0.52, p = 
.820, ηp2 < .001; external self-relevance: F(1,388) = 0.04, p = .846, ηp2 < .001; interaction: 
F(1,388) = 1.83, p = .176, ηp2 < .001).  
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Discussion  
Study 4 confirmed the effect of internal self-relevance on benign and malicious envy. 
Whereas high internal self-relevance increased benign envy, high internal self-relevance 
decreased malicious envy. Seeing someone who excels in a domain that is important to a person 
elicits benign envy. Seeing someone who excels in a domain that is not important to a person 
elicits malicious envy.  
Study 4 did not reveal effects of external self-relevance. As noted above, all upward 
comparison standards portrayed people embodying a certain value. Values are desired 
attributes per se. It may be difficult to manipulate external self-relevance beyond the relevance 
that these values already have. Besides, as shown in the manipulation check, the effect of the 
external self-relevance manipulation was only small. These methodological reasons may have 
caused the non-significant effects of external self-relevance. 
There was also no interaction between internal and external self-relevance in the 
MANOVA and on malicious envy. For this study, I chose a design that should increase the 
chance to also find an interaction between internal and external self-relevance. In the internal 
self-relevance condition, I confronted participants with a value that was of high vs. low 
importance to them. Then, they should write about reasons why this value was or was not 
important to their social group. By using this design, I thought to amplify differences between 
internal and external self-relevance. However, data did not reveal an interaction between 
internal and external self-relevance in the MANOVA and in particular on malicious envy. 
However, this interaction represents a riskier prediction that requires more power than the tests 
of my main predictions concerning main effects of internal and external self-relevance on 
benign and malicious envy. If there is an interaction effect it was at least not strong enough to 
influence malicious envy in this study.  
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Besides the interaction effect on malicious envy, I preregistered an interaction effect on 
the MANOVA predicting all envy measures (benign envy, malicious envy, and pain) by 
internal and external self-relevance. Conventional statistical procedure suggests to test this 
interaction in a MANOVA to see whether there are differences on at least one of these emotions 
to justify to then disentangle results per emotion. However, the crucial hypotheses concerned 
specific effects for each emotion. I therefore also preregistered detailed predictions per 
emotion. The MANOVA was thus not an informative analysis for the detailed predictions per 
emotion.  
The absence of effects on pain is somewhat surprising because a general effect of self-
relevance on emotions can be expected. However, internal and external self-relevance did not 
differentially affect pain in this study.  
The current design may not have been ideal the test my hypotheses for several reasons. 
I selected values that were either very important or not at all important to the participants for 
the subsequent tasks. I did so to amplify differences between internal and external self-
relevance to increase chances to find an interaction effect. However, it might have been more 
difficult to imagine how a value that is highly important to a person cannot be important to 
others and the other way around. Additionally, this design might have introduced confounds. 
Maybe only certain values are very important or not important to people. However, the data 
show that the whole range of values was selected. Also, which values were selected in this 
study did not differ extensively from selected values in Studies 5 to 7. Overall, selected values 
were about equally distributed. Still, this design might have introduced other confounds. I 
addressed these limitations in Study 5 by choosing a value of average importance to 
participants which is then used in the value affirmation task to manipulate internal and external 
self-relevance.  
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Study 5 
Study 5 sought to overcome limitations of Study 4. To avoid confounds because of the 
selection of values that were initially ranked as very or not important to participants, I selected 
values that participants indicated to have average importance to them. This should further 
disentangle internal and external self-relevance and facilitate the writing task. I further assumed 
that the relevance of values of average importance could be more easily increased or decreased 
than the relevance of values of extremely high or low importance.  
In attempt to increase the strength of the manipulation of external self-relevance, I 
changed instructions of the writing task (value affirmation task) by emphasizing the ideal and 
ought to character of the values. More precisely, to increase internal self-relevance, I chose 
vocabulary used in studies on self-discrepancy theory to address the ideal self  (Higgins, 1987). 
To increase external self-relevance, I chose vocabulary to address the ought self as this is more 
defined by external sources of motivation (e.g., Hong, Triyono, & Ong, 2013). I preregistered 
all hypotheses and analyses (see Figure 12).  
 
Methods 
Sample. Previous research showed a small to medium effect of the value affirmation 
task on emotion ratings (Tamir et al., 2016). A-priori power calculations revealed that 
approximately 300 participants are needed to find a significant effect in a t-Tests for 
independent samples (one-sided, d = 0.3, α = .05, 1-β = .80). I collected data from 300 
participants via Amazon MTurk. I preregistered to include only participants who agreed that I 
could use their data after an attention check (excluded n = 3; Meade & Craig, 2012) and who 
wrote about the importance or non-importance of a value to them or their social group 
according to the condition they were assigned to (excluded n = 32). This second exclusion 
criterion was introduced to ensure the quality of the data by excluding participants who did not 
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properly read the instructions. The final sample consisted of N = 265 participants (Mage = 36.06, 
SD = 11.44, 132 female, 133 male). 
 
Materials and procedure. Participants saw a list of the ten basic values and ranked 
these values according to their importance via drag and drop. Each value was described more 
specifically by keywords to help in understanding (see Table 21). From participants’ value 
ranking, I chose the value of average importance. I assumed that values of average importance 
could be more easily increased or decreased in their relevance than values of extremely high 
or low importance. Then, I asked participants to write about the importance versus non-
importance of the chosen value to them and their social group in a 2 (internal self-relevance: 
low vs. high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low vs. high) between-subjects design using an 
adapted version of the value affirmation task (adapted from Tamir et al., 2016). Detailed 
descriptions of instructions can be found in Table 19. For example, participants in the low 
internal and high external self-relevance condition read the following instructions: Think about 
the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why could [value X] NOT be important for YOU? Please 
explain why it would NOT be ideal and important to YOU to behave according to [value X]. 
Write it down below in a few sentences. (…) Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for 
your social group. Why should [value X] be important for your SOCIAL GROUP? Please 
explain why it should be important to the people around you to behave according to [value X]. 
Write it down below in a few sentences.  
Next, I used the same manipulation check as in Study 4. Then, people were confronted 
with a vignette describing a person that perfectly embodied a certain value. The person 
represented the value that participants wrote about in the value affirmation task (i.e., a value 
that was of average importance to them.). I used the same vignettes as in Study 4 describing a 
virtuous person by adapting and combining items from the PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001; see 
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Table 22 for a list of all vignettes). I measured participants’ reaction of benign and malicious 
envy and pain in envy towards this person (adapted from Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). 
 
Results 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA on how important the value participants wrote 
about was to themselves revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, F(1,261) = 21.07, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .075. As predicted, high internally self-relevant values were rated as more 
important, M = 5.50, SD = 1.27, than values of low internal self-relevance, M = 4.50, SD = 
1.72. The second manipulation check revealed the predicted main effect of external self-
relevance on the question how important the value was to participants’ social group, F(1,261) 
= 24.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .085. As predicted, high externally self-relevant values were rated as 
more important to others, M = 5.27, SD = 1.23, than values of low external self-relevance, M 
= 4.02, SD = 1.68. 
 
Effect on envy. I predicted that a MANOVA on all envy ratings would reveal an 
interaction between internal and external self-relevance. The MANOVA revealed a main effect 
of internal self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.023, F(2,260) = 3.09, p = .047, but no main effect 
of external self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.011, F(2,260) = 1.49, p = .227, or interaction 
between internal and external self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.006, F(2,260) = 0.84, p = .434.  
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As in Study 4, my crucial predictions concerned effects of internal and external self-
relevance on the specific emotions of benign and malicious envy. I therefore preregistered to 
run separate 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low, high) 
ANOVAs for benign envy and malicious envy (see Figure 6 and Table 7 for descriptive 
statistics). 
The ANOVA on benign envy revealed the predicted effect of internal self-relevance, 
F(1,261) = 4.76, p = .030, ηp2 = .018. As depicted in Figure 6, high internal self-relevance 
elicited more benign envy, M = 4.58, SD = 1.63, than low internal self-relevance, M = 4.09, SD 
= 1.62. The predicted main effect of external self-relevance did not reach significance, F(1,261) 
= 2.82, p = .094, ηp2 = .011. I predicted that malicious envy would be stronger for values of low 
internal self-relevance, and for values of high external self-relevance. In line with my 
theoretical reasoning, I predicted that malicious envy would be strongest when internal self-
relevance was low and external self-relevance was high. However, the ANOVA for malicious 
envy revealed no significant effect of internal self-relevance, F(1,261) = 1.88, p = .171, ηp2 = 
.007, nor external self-relevance, F(1,261) = 0.47, p = .495, ηp2 = .002, and no interaction, 
Figure 6. Means and SEM of benign envy and malicious envy by internal self-relevance (high, 
low) and external self-relevance (high, low) in Study 5. Y-Axes were zoomed in to illustrate 
the differences between conditions.  
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F(1,261) = 1.58, p = .209, ηp2 = .006. An exploratory ANOVA on pain in envy revealed no 
significant effects of internal and external self-relevance (internal self-relevance: F(1,261) = 
0.82, p = .365, ηp2 = .003, external self-relevance: F(1,261) = 0.32, p = .571, ηp2 = .001, 
interaction: F(1,261) = 1.03, p = .312, ηp2 = .004).  
 
Discussion 
Study 5 confirmed that benign envy was stronger when a value was of high internal 
self-relevance. Seeing someone excel in a domain that is internally self-relevance elicits benign 
envy towards that person increasing the motivation to excel in this domain as well. However, 
data did not reveal the predicted main effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy. This 
contradicts previous findings and might be because of methodological limitations that will be 
outlined below. Furthermore, there was no significant main effect of external self-relevance on 
benign and malicious envy nor an interaction effect on malicious envy. An exploratory analysis 
did also not reveal any effects on pain.  
Several reasons may have made it difficult to find these effects. Because of the 
exclusion criteria, my final sample was smaller than it should have been based on power 
calculations. Additionally, it might have been too difficult to make a connection between the 
essays participants wrote in the value affirmation task and the subsequent vignettes. This may 
have hindered the transfer of effects of the manipulation to the emotional reactions to the 
vignette. In addition, the person descriptions were very abstract and without concrete details, 
for example about the circumstances of meeting the person. This may have prevented a vivid 
imagination of the described stories and weakened the manipulation. Additionally, when 
presenting the vignettes, there was no external social group present which may not have made 
external self-relevance salient enough to show an effect on emotion. I sought to address these 
methodological issues in Study 6.  
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Study 6 
To overcome limitations of Study 5, I changed vignettes to facilitate imagining the 
situation and introduced a social group to make external self-relevance more salient. I included 
a more detailed description of the situation, including the circumstances under which 
participants would meet this person. I also added more concrete examples of how a behavior 
according to a certain value would look like. Likewise, I introduced a significant social group 
to increase the external self-relevance of the comparison. Also, I aimed for higher a-priori 
power compared to Study 5 (1-ß = .90). I preregistered all measures, hypotheses, and analyses 
(see Figure 13). 
 
Methods 
Sample. A-priori power calculations indicated that 382 participants would be needed 
to find significant effects in a t-test for independent samples assuming small to medium effect 
size (one-sided, d = 0.3, α = .05, 1-β = .90). To allow for some drop outs, I preregistered to 
collect data from 400 participants via Amazon MTurk. As preregistered, I included only 
participants who agreed that I could use their data (N = 398). Furthermore, I preregistered to 
exclude participants who did not follow the instructions of the writing task according to the 
condition they were assigned to (n = 54). Data exclusion was handled by a research assistant 
blind to conditions and hypotheses. The final sample consisted of 344 participants (Mage = 
36.15, SD = 10.81, 176 female, 168 male).  
 
Materials and procedure. As in Study 5, participants first saw a list of the ten basic 
values and ranked these values according to their importance as guiding principles in their life 
via drag and drop. Each value was described more specifically by keywords to help in 
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understanding (see Table 21). From each participant’s value ranking, I chose a value of average 
importance. I used the same value affirmation task as in Study 5. Participants had to write about 
the importance or non-importance of the chosen value to them and their social group in a 2 
(internal self-relevance: low vs. high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low vs. high) between-
subjects design. Detailed descriptions of instructions can be found in Table 19. I used the same 
manipulation check as in Study 4 and 5, assessing whether the value they wrote about in the 
value affirmation task was important to themselves or their social group.  
Then, participants were confronted with a vignette describing a person who perfectly 
embodied a certain value. The described person represented the value that participants wrote 
about in the value affirmation task (i.e., a value that was of average importance to them.). 
Before describing the person, I introduced the situation by explaining the circumstances of 
meeting the person. They should imagine meeting this person at a garden party with many new 
neighbors. I introduced other neighbors to make the social context and thus external self-
relevance more salient. The person was described in more detail by using the person 
descriptions of the PVQ together with more concrete behaviors to facilitate social comparison 
(example vignette for the value stimulation: […] She talks about a safari trip she recently took. 
You realize that Anna has a very exciting life. In general, she is always looking for adventures, 
takes risks, and does lots of different things in her life. She enjoys surprises and doing new 
things.). I also presented a picture of the person to make it easier to imagine the interaction. On 
this picture, the person displayed an ambivalent pride gesture as this was found to fuel envy in 
the perceiver (Lange & Crusius, 2015b). I used pictures from the University of California, 
Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). I then reminded 
participants of what they wrote about in the value affirmation task, and gave a summary of the 
vignettes, saying which value the person embodied and whether this value was important or 
not important to them and their social group. All vignettes can be found in Table 23. After 
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reading the vignette, participants rated their emotional reaction of benign envy, malicious envy, 
and pain towards this person (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). 
 
Results 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA on how important the value participants wrote about 
was to themselves revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, F(1,340) = 18.04, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .050. As predicted, high internal self-relevant values were rated as more important, M = 
5.43, SD = 1.52, than values of low internal self-relevance, M = 4.41, SD = 1.56. Data 
confirmed a predicted main effect of external self-relevance on the question how important the 
value was to participants’ social group, F(1,340) = 13.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .038. As predicted, 
high external self-relevant values were rated as more important to others, M = 5.21, SD = 1.37, 
than values of low self-relevance, M = 4.21, SD = 1.51. 
 
Effect on envy. As in the preceding studies, the main predictions were that internal 
self-relevance would increase benign envy and decrease malicious envy, that external self-
relevance would decrease benign envy and increase malicious envy. I also preregistered the 
more secondary prediction of an interaction effect on malicious envy.  
To test these predictions I preregistered to first run a MANOVA on all envy ratings. 
The MANOVA revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.248, 
F(2,340) = 56.04, p < .001, a main effect of external self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.028, 
F(2,340) = 4.89, p = .008, but not the predicted interaction between internal and external self-
relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.014, F(2,340) = 2.48, p = .085.  
To test my main predictions, I further preregistered to run separate 2 (internal self-
relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-relevance: low, high) ANOVAs for benign envy and 
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malicious envy (see Figure 7 for results for benign and malicious envy, see Table 8 for 
descriptive statistics of all envy measures). 
As predicted, the ANOVA on benign envy ratings revealed a significant effect of 
internal self-relevance, F(1,340) = 65.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .162. High internal self-relevance 
elicited more benign envy, M = 4.22, SD = 1.73, than low internal self-relevance, M = 2.50, SD 
= 1.41. I predicted an effect of external self-relevance on benign envy, F(1,340) = 5.30, p = 
.022, ηp2 = .015. However, this effect showed a reversed pattern than predicted with more 
benign envy when external self-relevance was high, M = 2.52, SD = 1.80, than when external 
self-relevance was low, M = 3.27, SD = 1.80. There was no significant interaction effect of 
internal and external self-relevance on benign envy, F(1,340) = 2.40, p = .122, ηp2 = .007. I 
predicted that the ANOVA on malicious envy ratings would reveal effects of internal and 
external self-relevance and an interaction effect. However, neither the effect of internal self-
relevance, F(1,340) = 0.95, p = .757, ηp2 < .001, nor the effect of external self-relevance, 
F(1,340) = 0.17, p = .676, ηp2 < .001, nor their interaction, F(1,340) = 0.02, p = .899, ηp2 < .001, 
on malicious envy were significant. I explored the effect of internal and external self-relevance 
on pain ratings. Pain was higher when internal self-relevance was high, M = 2.11, SD = 1.41, 
than when it was low, M = 1.98 SD = 1.25, F(1,340) = 4.51, p = .034, ηp2 = .013. There was 
also a significant interaction between internal and external self-relevance, F(1,340) = 7.68, p = 
.037, ηp2 = .013. Post hoc t-tests revealed that when internal self-relevance was high, 
participants experienced more pain when external self-relevance was low, M = 2.38, SD = 1.57, 
than when it was high, M = 2.85, SD = 1.19, t(178) = 2.56, p = .045 (Bonferroni corrected). All 
other post hoc pairwise comparisons on pain ratings were not significant. 
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Discussion  
Study 6 confirmed that internal self-relevance increased benign envy. However, 
contrary to my predictions, I found that benign envy was higher when external self-relevance 
was high. This might be interpreted as a general relevance effect: Benign envy was higher when 
self-relevance was high without distinguishing between internal and external self-relevance. 
However, this contradicts my previous findings and should be interpreted with caution unless 
the pattern is replicated in future studies.  
The expected main effects and interaction on malicious envy did not emerge. Again, 
there might be methodological reasons for the absence of this effect. First, the items for 
malicious envy were very negative (e.g., I feel hatred.), and potentially less socially appropriate 
to admit (e.g., I feel hostile towards her.). This may explain low ratings on the malicious envy 
scale across conditions which may hinder to find effects on that scale. The situation would need 
to elicit strong emotions in order to make people report high levels of malicious envy. Maybe, 
the joyful context described in the vignettes (i.e., a garden party) was not appropriate for this. 
Figure 7. Means and SEM of benign envy and malicious envy by internal self-relevance (high, 
low) and external self-relevance (high, low) in Study 6. Y-Axes were zoomed in to illustrate 
the differences between conditions.  
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Furthermore, the neighborhood context might not be as prone to elicit strong emotions. 
Additionally, vignettes described virtuous people which supposedly made it more unlikely to 
admit harmful intentions towards that person. Finally, the hypothetical framing of sentences in 
the value affirmation task may have been confusing and potentially weakened the 
manipulation.  
Again, there was no significant interaction between internal and external self-relevance 
on malicious envy. This interaction represents a riskier prediction that requires more power 
than the tests of my main predictions concerning main effects of internal and external self-
relevance on benign and malicious envy. If there is an interaction effect it was at least not 
strong enough to influence malicious envy in this study.  
As in Study 4 and 5, the predicted interaction effect in the MANOVA did not emerge. 
I included this test because conventional statistical procedure would suggest to run a 
MANOVA to see whether there are differences on at least one of these emotions to justify to 
then disentangle results per emotion. However, the crucial hypotheses concerned specific 
effects for each emotion. The MANOVA was thus not an informative analysis for the detailed 
predictions per emotion.  
I further explored effects of internal and external self-relevance on pain. Pain was 
increased by high internal self-relevance. This contradicts meta-analytical findings from the 
first part of this research. Additionally, there was an interaction effect on pain. When internal 
self-relevance was high, low external self-relevance elicited more pain than high external self-
relevance. This finding is surprising as it did not emerge in previous studies. I will explore 
effects on pain in the next study to see whether these effects will be replicated.  
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Study 7 
Study 7 sought to address the limitations of my previous studies. First, I altered the 
context of the vignettes to the workplace. Indeed, the workplace is especially prone for envious 
feelings to occur (cf. Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 2008). Second, I simplified manipulation 
instructions, for example by changing the conjunctive statements to indicatives. I also increased 
statistical power to allow for an adequate test of my predictions. I preregistered all measures, 
hypotheses and analyses (see Figure 14). Taken together, Study 7 should reveal the strongest 
causal evidence for the effect of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious 
envy in this line of research.  
 
Methods 
Sample. A-priori power calculations indicated that 470 participants would be needed 
to find significant effects in the t-Tests for independent samples (two-sided, d = 0.3, α = .05, 
1-β = .90). For this study, I based power calculations on a two-sided t-test to aim for enough 
power in the exploratory t-tests on pain in envy. To allow for some drop outs, I preregistered 
to collect data from 500 participants via Amazon mTurk. As preregistered, I included only 
participants who agreed that I could use their data (N = 504, excluded n = 8; Meade & Craig, 
2012). Sample sizes as indicated on MTurk can differ from the sample size in the survey 
software because of technical reasons. This is why the data contained four participants more 
than expected. Furthermore, I preregistered to exclude participants who did not complete the 
writing task according to the condition they were assigned to (excluded n = 97). Data exclusion 
was handled by a research assistant blind to condition and hypotheses. Potential reasons for 
this number of exclusions will be outlined in the discussion. The final sample consisted of 407 
participants Mage = 37.07, SD = 11.25, 242 female, 165 male).  
 
Empirical Evidence Study 7 67 
Materials and procedure. As in Studies 5 and 6, participants first saw a list of the ten 
basic values and ranked these values according to their importance as guiding principles in 
their life via drag and drop. Each value was described more specifically by keywords to help 
in understanding (see Table 21). From each participant’s value ranking, I chose a value of 
average importance. I assumed that a value of average importance can be easily increased or 
decreased in its relevance. I used a similar value affirmation task as in Studies 5 and 6. I asked 
participants to write about the importance versus non-importance of the chosen value to them 
and their social group in a 2 (internal self-relevance: low vs. high) x 2 (external self-relevance: 
low vs. high) design. Compared to Studies 5 and 6, I changed the hypothetical nature of the 
questions and instead asked participants why a certain value is or is not important to them and 
their social group (e.g., instruction for high internal and high external self-relevance: Think 
about the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why is [value X] important for YOU? Please 
explain why it is important to YOU to behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a 
few sentences. […] Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for other people. Why is [value 
X] important for OTHER PEOPLE? Imagine that you work in a company. Why is [value X] 
important for the OTHER PEOPLE in your COMPANY? Please explain why it is important to 
the people in your company to behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few 
sentences.). Furthermore, I specified the social group as their colleagues to facilitate the 
transfer of this task to the vignettes they read later. Detailed descriptions of instructions can be 
found in Table 20. I again used the same manipulation check as in Studies 4 - 6, assessing 
whether the value was important to the participants and their colleagues.  
As in Studies 4 - 6, participants then read a vignette describing a person that perfectly 
embodied a certain value. The described person represented the value that participants wrote 
about in the value affirmation task (i.e., a value that was of average importance to them 
according to the initial value ranking). Person descriptions were created by matching items of 
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the PVQ. Before describing the person, I described the circumstances of meeting the person. 
Compared to Study 6, I changed the setting to a professional company setting. All vignettes 
can be found in Table 24. After reading the vignette, participants rated their emotional reaction 
of benign envy, malicious envy, and pain towards this person (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018) 
 
Results 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA on how important the value participants wrote about 
was to themselves revealed a main effect of internal self-relevance, F(1,403) = 59.15, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .138. As predicted, high internally self-relevant values were rated as more important, M 
= 5.79, SD = 1.21, than values of low internal self-relevance, M = 4.21, SD = 1.61. Data 
confirmed the predicted main effect of external self-relevance on the question how important 
the value was to the participants’ social group, F(1,403) = 30.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .070. As 
predicted, high externally self-relevant values were rated as more important to others, M = 5.72, 
SD = 1.12, than values of low external self-relevance, M = 4.57, SD = 1.33. 
 
Figure 8. Means and SEM of benign envy and malicious envy by internal self-relevance (high, 
low) and external self-relevance (high, low) in Study 7. Y-Axes were zoomed in to illustrate 
the differences between conditions.  
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Effect on envy. As in the previous studies, my main predictions concerned differential 
effects of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy. I expected internal 
self-relevance to increase benign envy and external self-relevance to decrease benign envy. 
Additionally, I expected internal self-relevance to decrease malicious envy and external self-
relevance to increase malicious envy. I also predicted the more secondary hypothesis of an 
interaction effect on malicious envy.  
I first preregistered that a MANOVA on envy ratings would reveal an interaction 
between internal and external self-relevance. The MANOVA revealed a main effect of internal 
self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.259, F(2,402) = 70.23, p < .001, no main effect of external 
self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.003, F(2,402) = 0.66, p = .519, but an interaction between 
internal and external self-relevance, Pillais’ trace = 0.024, F(2,402) = 4.90, p = .008.  
Crucially, I further preregistered to run separate 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 
2 (external self-relevance: low, high) ANOVAs for benign envy and malicious envy to test the 
main predictions (see Figure 8 for descriptive statistics for benign and malicious envy, see 
Table 9 for descriptive statistics of envy measures).  
The ANOVA on benign envy ratings revealed an effect of internal self-relevance, 
F(1,403) = 68.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .144. As predicted, high internal self-relevance elicited more 
benign envy, M = 4.56, SD = 1.70, than low internal self-relevance, M = 2.81, SD = 1.55. The 
predicted effect of external self-relevance on benign envy was not significant, F(1,403) = 0.84, 
p = .359, ηp2 = .002. There was no significant interaction effect of internal and external self-
relevance on benign envy, F(1,403) = 1.63, p = .202, ηp2 = .004. I predicted that the ANOVA 
on malicious envy would reveal effects of internal and external self-relevance and an 
interaction effect. As predicted, low internal self-relevance elicited more malicious envy, M = 
1.92, SD = 1.22, than high internal self-relevance, M = 1.75, SD = 1.12, F(1,403) = 68.17, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .011. There was no significant effect of external self-relevance, F(1,403) = 0.07, p 
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= .785, ηp2 < .001, nor an interaction effect, F(1,403) = 2.74, p = .099, ηp2 = .007. I explored 
the effect of internal and external self-relevance on pain. There were no significant effects of 
internal, F(1,403) = 3.25, p = .072, ηp2 = .008, and external self-relevance on pain in envy, 
F(1,403) = 0.86, p = .354, ηp2 = .002. Yet, there was a significant interaction between internal 
and external self-relevance, F(1,403) = 4.49, p = .035, ηp2 = .011. However, post hoc t-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected) revealed no significant differences in the pairwise comparisons of all 
four conditions for pain. 
 
Discussion  
Study 7 again confirmed the effect that internal self-relevance of a value increased 
benign envy and decreased malicious envy. Seeing someone excel in a domain that is important 
to a person elicited benign tendencies fostering the motivation to excel in this domain as well. 
Seeing someone excel in a domain that was not important to a person elicited malicious envy 
fostering the motivation to harm the superior person. Although predicted, there was no effect 
of external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy. Manipulating external self-relevance 
beyond the relevance that values intrinsically have may be difficult. This is also suggested by 
the small effect size of the effect of external self-relevance on the manipulation check. Another 
reason why manipulating external self-relevance may be more difficult is, that it requires that 
participants can easily assess the importance of a certain value to their social group. This 
importance may be not as accessible to them as the importance for internally self-relevant 
values. Other reasons why manipulating external self-relevance may have been more difficult 
than manipulating internal self-relevance will be discussed in the General Discussion.  
Another difficulty in Study 7 was that I had to exclude more participants than in my 
previous studies based on predefined exclusion criteria. I excluded participants who did not 
complete the value affirmation task according to the instructions. For example, some 
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participants wrote about why the value was important to them, although they were instructed 
to write why the value was not important to them. Other participants were reluctant to speak 
for their social group, etc. One reason why participants failed to follow the instructions might 
be that participants had to write why a certain value is or is not important to them. However, 
the presented value was actually of average importance. Maybe this was more difficult to 
imagine than e.g., instructions in Study 6 that where more hypothetically framed ([…] why 
could it [not] be important […]). Additionally, this may have prevented them from judging 
why a value is or is not important to their social group. Nevertheless, this exclusion criterion 
was important to ensure the quality of the data.  
The interaction effect between internal and external self-relevance on pain that was 
found in Study 6 did not replicate in Study 7. It seems that effects of internal and external self-
relevance on pain are not very consistent in the present studies. A meta-analysis will reveal 
whether there is an overall effect of internal and external self-relevance on pain across the 
studies.  
 
Meta-Analysis of Studies 4 – 7 
I integrated data from this second part of the current research in a meta-analysis in order 
to provide a comprehensive overview of effects. As for Studies 1 – 3, I integrated data from 
Studies 4 – 7 in a multilevel meta-analytical regression. I chose the multilevel approach to 
report findings consistently and facilitate comparison to results of the first three studies. A 
multilevel meta-analysis is an adequate procedure to integrate the present findings because it 
allows to control for variance of effects across studies. Additionally, this approach is a similar 
procedure as classical random-effects meta-analysis (Pastor & Lazowski, 2018).  
 
Methods 
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Analysis strategy. I integrated findings from Studies 4 – 7. First, I merged data from 
all four studies into one dataset. Then, I ran a multilevel analysis on the merged data set for 
every dependent variable. The sample consisted of N = 1408 participants measured in four 
studies. I specified by-study random intercepts. Random intercepts allow intercepts (i.e., 
means) of the dependent variable to differ between studies. Introducing these random effects 
for study, models variations between studies. I consider this approach adequate because of 
differences in the design of each study. I further specified fixed effects for internal self-
relevance, external self-relevance and their interaction. Contrasts were effect coded to be able 
to interpret main effects independent from each other, as it would be the case in an ANOVA. I 
ran separate models to predict benign envy and malicious envy ratings. I further explored 
effects on pain ratings. As in the meta-analysis for Studies 1 – 3, I analyzed the data using 
packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) in R (R Core Team, 
2017). Plots depicting the effects on benign and malicious envy as estimated by the models 
were generated using the package jtools (Long, 2018; see Figure 9).  
 
Results 
Benign envy. I predicted that internal self-relevance would increase feelings of benign 
envy and external self-relevance would decrease feelings of benign envy. Multilevel meta-
regression results revealed that internal self-relevance had a positive effect on benign envy 
across studies, B = 0.92, SE B = 0.04, p < .001 (see Table 10 for detailed multilevel regression 
results of every measure). There was a positive effect of external self-relevance on benign envy 
across studies, B = 0.09, SE B = 0.04, p = .041. There was no interaction effect on benign envy 
across studies, B = -0.05, SE B = 0.04, p = .217.  
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Malicious envy. I predicted that internal self-relevance would decrease malicious envy 
and external self-relevance would increase malicious envy. Additionally, I predicted the more 
secondary hypothesis of an interaction effect on malicious envy. I expected the effect of 
external self-relevance to be especially strong when internal self-relevance was low. Multilevel 
meta-regression results revealed that internal self-relevance had a negative effect on malicious 
envy across studies, B = -0.13, SE B = 0.03, p < .001. There was no effect of external self-
relevance on malicious envy across studies, B = -0.03, SE B = .03, p = .430. There was also no 
interaction effect on malicious envy across studies, B = 0.05, SE B = .03, p = .113.  
 
Pain. I explored effects of internal and external self-relevance on pain. Multilevel meta-
regression results revealed no effects of internal self-relevance, B = -0.01, SE B = 0.03, p = 
.729, external self-relevance, B = -0.03, SE B = 0.03, p = .319, and no interaction on pain 
across studies, B = -0.00, SE B = 0.03, p = .976. 
 
Discussion 
Figure 9. Estimates of benign envy and malicious envy by internal self-relevance (high, low) 
and external self-relevance (high, low) as predicted by the multilevel meta-analyses. Y-Axes 
were zoomed in to illustrate the differences between conditions.  
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Meta-analytical findings revealed the expected effect of internal self-relevance on 
benign envy and on malicious envy. This replicated findings from the first part of the current 
research. Seeing someone excel in a domain that is internally important to a person elicits more 
benign envy. Seeing someone excel in a domain that is not internally important to a person 
elicits more malicious envy. An advantage of classical meta-analysis is that it provides effect 
sizes across studies. Measures for effect sizes are difficult to calculate and interpret for 
multilevel analyses (Hox et al., 2017; Kreft & Leeuw, 1998; Nezlek, 2008). However, we can 
still compare estimates of each predictor in the different models to each other and infer their 
relative size. The effect of internal self-relevance on benign envy seems to be in absolute terms 
seven times as large as the effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy.  
Meta-analytical findings did not show the expected effects of external self-relevance on 
benign envy and on malicious envy. I predicted that external self-relevance would decrease 
benign envy, and increase malicious envy. This predicted relationship emerged in the meta-
analysis of Studies 1 – 3, where more external self-relevance was associated with more 
malicious envy, and more external self-relevance was associated with less benign envy. In the 
meta-analyses of Studies 4 – 7, there was no significant effect on malicious envy. Contrarily, 
there was a positive effect of external self-relevance on benign envy. More external self-
relevance increased benign envy. However, this result did not emerge in any other study and 
contradicts previous findings. It is therefore to interpret with caution. The inconsistent and 
mostly non-significant effects of external self-relevance across Studies 4 – 7 might be because 
of difficulties in manipulating external self-relevance. Other potential reasons will be outlined 
in the General Discussion.  
Additionally, the meta-analysis on malicious envy did not reveal an interaction effect 
of internal and external-self-relevance. Thus, in this set of studies, there was no empirical 
evidence for an interaction effect on malicious envy.  
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There were no consistent effects of internal and external self-relevance on pain. It seems 
that the interaction effect found in Studies 6 and 7 was not reliable across studies und should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. Across studies, the different forms of self-relevance did 
not seem to influence painful feelings when seeing someone excel. The effect of internal self-
relevance or external self-relevance on pain was at least not strong enough to emerge in Studies 
4 – 7. The non-significant effects on pain might question whether I measured envy at all. 
However, the data replicated precious findings on the relationships between the envy 
components (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). Pain was positively correlated with malicious 
envy, r = .640, p < .001, and benign envy, r = .207, p < .001, indicating that all envy 
components showed the expected relationships. Taken together, the results indicate that 
internal and external self-relevance influence benign and malicious envy, those forms of envy 
that are related to action tendencies, but not the form of envy that represents painful feelings.  
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General Discussion 
 
The current research asked the question: what do we envy? According to the literature, 
we envy what is important, i.e., what is relevant to us (Smith, 2004). Envy arises in upward 
social comparisons. Upward social comparisons are stronger when comparing in a domain that 
is self-relevant (Tesser & Smith, 1980). Additionally, every emotion supposedly only arises 
when a situation activates our goals, beliefs, values or concerns, i.e. when a situation is self-
relevant (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Kirby, 2009). 
However, the definition of self-relevance is underspecified (Scherer, 2013) and empirical, 
particularly experimental, research on the impact of self-relevance on emotions is scarce (De 
Leersnyder, Koval, Kuppens, & Mesquita, 2017; Olteanu, Golani, Eitam, & Kron, 2018). I 
argued that self-relevance can be defined by different sources: internal self-relevance, i.e., what 
is important to an individual person, and external self-relevance, i.e., what is important to others 
(Baldwin & Baccus, 2004; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Khaptsova & Schwartz, 2016; Leary et al., 
2015; Lu, 2006; Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Further, I claimed that the different sources of 
self-relevance should have distinct influences on envy. Envy as a comparison-based emotion 
should be more intense when a comparison domain is more relevant to a person. Envy as a 
status-related emotion can also be elicited when a comparison domain is not important to a 
person as long as attaining the object of envy signals status (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange, et 
al., 2018). I argued that in order to disentangle these different sources of self-relevance on envy 
we need to consider the difference between benign and malicious envy. I predicted that self-
relevance differentially influences benign and malicious envy. High internal self-relevance 
should increase benign envy, while external self-relevance should attenuate benign envy. Low 
internal self-relevance should increase malicious envy, while high external self-relevance 
should increase malicious envy. As a secondary hypothesis, I also predicted that the effect of 
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external self-relevance on malicious envy should be more pronounced for low internal self-
relevance.  
The results partially confirmed these predictions. People reacted with more benign envy 
when seeing someone who achieved something that was internally important to them. People 
reacted with more malicious envy when seeing someone who achieved something that was not 
internally important to them. Cumulative evidence from the first three studies supported the 
prediction that external self-relevance was associated with less benign envy and more 
malicious envy. Data from Studies 4 – 7, applying a different methodological approach, did 
not confirm the effect of external self-relevance. The interaction effect of internal and external 
self-relevance on malicious envy lacked empirical support.  
What do these results imply for our research question? What do we envy? The current 
investigation supports the idea that internal as well as external self-relevance predict envious 
responding. More specifically, the different forms of self-relevance can have different effects 
on benign and malicious envy. Data suggests when we envy what we desire, a more benign 
form of envy arises. When we envy what we do not really desire, a more malicious form of 
envy arises. The effect of external self-relevance was less consistent. Data from a within-
subjects design supported the idea that when we envy what is important to others, malicious 
envy arises and benign envy is attenuated. However, this effect was not confirmed in a 
between-subjects design by manipulating internal and external self-relevance. This is probably 
because of methodological constraints (potential reasons will be outlined below). Most 
importantly, the effect of internal self-relevance was consistent across studies. People envy 
what is important to them in a way that increases upward motivation, and, at the same time, 
people envy what is not important to them in a way that causes harmful intentions towards the 
envied person.  
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The current research shows that different sources of self-relevance can have differential 
effects on emotions, such as envy. The current research also shows that in order to understand 
differential effects of internal and external self-relevance, the differentiation between benign 
and malicious envy needs to be taken into account. The data thereby suggests that a detailed 
understanding of appraisals such as self-relevance is important for concise predictions of 
emotional reactions in specific situations.  
I chose to study values as an operationalization of what is self-relevant to a person. 
More precisely, I asked participants about the importance of certain values to themselves and 
to their social group. Then, participants were confronted with descriptions of others who 
perfectly embodied certain values. Interestingly, the current research shows that envy can be 
experienced towards highly virtuous people. Apparently, being good and righteous does not 
protect one from being envied as even those qualities can become the object of envy. 
Additionally, the effect of internal self-relevance on benign and malicious envy emerged across 
different values. Previous research has focused on specific value-emotion-relationships (De 
Leersnyder et al., 2017). The current research shows that different concerns can be triggered 
regardless of the actual content of the value indicating that the source of self-relevance of a 
specific value has an impact beyond the content of a value. Thus, the current research extends 
previous research by providing a more detailed understanding of how values influence 
emotions beyond their specific content.  
In addition to the effect of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious 
envy, I explored the effects of internal and external self-relevance on pain. Pain is characterized 
by preoccupation with the event and a painful feeling of inferiority (Lange, Weidman, et al., 
2018). There was the tendency that internal self-relevance reduces pain and external self-
relevance increases pain (see Study 3). This finding is rather surprising because I would have 
expected unidirectional effects of internal and external self-relevance on pain. Pain, as the core 
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affective component of envy portraying negative affect, should be stronger the more self-
relevant a situation is irrespective if a situation is internally or externally self-relevant. 
However, the effect from Study 3 was not consistent across studies. Furthermore, meta-
analyses did not reveal an effect of internal and external self-relevance on pain. Although, data 
replicated the expected correlations between the envy components (Lange, Weidman, et al., 
2018). The mostly non-significant differential effect of internal and external self-relevance on 
pain may indicate that the effect of self-relevance on envy only shapes those envy components 
that are more strongly related to motivational consequences. Pain may only be induced by 
upward comparison and may not differentiate between internal and external self-relevance. 
Thus, the present research underlines that in order to fully understand envious reactions to 
upward comparisons, envy cannot only be conceptualized as pain, as suggested by others (Tai, 
Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012). The present data indicates that for a detailed understanding 
of the psychological processes of envy, the differentiation between benign and malicious envy 
is necessary.  
 
Explanations of Main Findings 
The effect of internal self-relevance on benign envy. The first main finding of the 
present research showed that a comparison domain that is internally important to a person 
increases benign envy. This has implications for research on envy in particular and emotions 
in general.  
When deriving hypotheses for the current investigation, I proposed several mechanisms 
that could explain this effect of internal self-relevance on benign envy. I expected internal self-
relevance to increase benign envy because internal self-relevance increases achievement and 
approach motivation, self-efficacy, deservingness and perceived control which should be 
related to increased levels of benign envy (see p. 21). The current data speak in favor of the 
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proposed mechanisms. However, I did not yet test these mechanisms directly. Future research 
should study why exactly internal self-relevance is linked to increased benign envy. 
Additionally, the present data are in line with the common conception that more self-
relevance causes more intense emotions (e.g., Smith & Kirby, 2009). On top of that, research 
on social comparison shows that comparisons are stronger the more self-relevant a comparison 
domain is (Tesser & Smith, 1980). Accordingly, comparison-based emotions, such as benign 
envy, should be more intense when a social comparison is self-relevant (Salovey & Rodin, 
1984). This prediction is confirmed by the present data. Taken together, the effect of internal 
self-relevance on benign envy confirms the proposed mechanisms and is in line with theoretical 
concepts of envy and emotions.  
 
The effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy. The second main finding of 
the present research was that a comparison domain that is not internally important, increases 
feelings of malicious envy. This, too, has implications for research on envy and more generally 
for emotions.  
Based on the literature, I proposed several mechanisms that could explain the effect of 
internal self-relevance on malicious envy. I suggested that low internal self-relevance is 
associated with avoidance motivation, low perceived control, low deservingness, other-focus 
and low self-efficacy. These factors were also associated with malicious envy. Low internal-
self-relevance should therefore elicit more malicious envy (see p. 23). The present data are in 
line with the proposed mechanisms. However, I did not empirically test this prediction. Future 
research should study in more detail why low internal self-relevance is associated with more 
malicious envy.  
Beyond these proposed mechanisms, the current data have several implications for 
emotion research. First, how could something that is not important to a person elicit an 
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emotional reaction? Let’s illustrate this with an example from the hypothetical point of view 
of one of the participants: The participant first rates the importance of the value of security as 
not important to him. Then, the participant is confronted with someone who is very successful 
in living a very secure life, she even gets praised by others for this lifestyle. Based on the 
present findings, the participant is likely to feel malicious envy towards this person. The 
participant rates that he feels hatred towards that person and does not want her to be secure 
anymore. Why does seeing someone excel in a domain that is not internally important cause 
an emotional reaction at all? 
At first, it seems that this effect on malicious envy contradicts a core assumption of 
emotion theory stating that the primary appraisal needs to recognize the relevance of a situation 
to a person’s needs before an emotion can arise (Lazarus, 1991). Contrarily, the current 
research may suggest that even non-important stimuli can cause an emotional reaction. 
However, I argue that this interpretation should be made with caution. I argue that a value that 
is not internally self-relevant can transport relevance on a different dimension. 
First, seeing someone excel in a value domain that is not internally self-relevant might 
be interpreted as an obstacle for the pursuit of one’s own goals. The described person is 
obviously successful in living according to a value that is not important to the envier. In 
contrast, the envier is trying to be successful in living completely different values. Thus, seeing 
this other person is likely to question the envier’s lifestyle. It might even hinder the envier in 
living according to his important life goals. This could be especially prevalent in the context 
of values. First, values are claimed to be universal (Schwartz, 1994). The person thinks that it 
is best if everyone pursued his important values. Someone who endorses different values can 
therefore not pursue the same values. Second, values are supposed to form a circumplex (e.g., 
Schwartz, 2012). This means that values are organized in a circular model with competing 
values opposing each other. Values that oppose each other guide incompatible motivations, 
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and values that are close to each other guide compatible motivations (e.g., Schwartz, 2012). 
That means that, for example, the value of self-direction is important to a person, and therefore 
the value of security is not important to a person. Opposing values have been found to cause 
opposing motivation and even opposing emotions (Maio et al., 2009; Tamir et al., 2016). The 
circumplex model has also been demonstrated to apply intra-individually (Gollan & Witte, 
2014), which implies that seeing someone excel in a value that is not internally relevant, means 
that this person endorses a value opposite of what is important to the person.. Thus, seeing 
someone excel in a value that is not important causes malicious envy probably because the 
superior person endorses opposing values and thereby symbolizes an obstacle in the envier’s 
goal pursuit.  
The claim that a situation must be self-relevant is important because it allows people to 
selectively react to situations that have implications for a person’s well-being (Smith & Kirby, 
2009). The present study seems to contradict this claim by indicating that even not important 
situations can cause an emotional reaction. However, I argue that this is unlikely as a general 
claim. My methodological procedure was designed in a way that it gives every described person 
in the vignette relevance by confronting the participant with this other person. Thus, the 
methodological procedure made the described person salient simply by mentioning her. On top 
of that, the other person was successful and therefore attracted participants’ attention because 
success signals status and status is a desired goal in itself (Anderson et al., 2015). Additionally, 
the person descriptions in my vignettes made clear that the portrayed value was at least 
important to one other person – the described person itself. The importance of that particular 
value to at least one other person was therefore obvious based on my methods. In a more natural 
setting, stimuli that have no self-relevance might not have received any attention and would 
therefore also not have elicited any emotion. However, also in a natural setting, stimuli are 
made salient because others pay attention to it (Tomasello, 1995). Like in my vignettes, it 
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happens regularly that we are confronted with people who endorse values opposing our own 
value system. This is relevant to us because it first may trigger an obstacle in our own goal 
pursuit. Second, this person can get attention and praise from others, which makes it also salient 
to us because we care about attention from others. Summarizing, whilst at first sight this study 
might indicate that unimportant situations can also cause an emotional reaction, the used 
vignettes might have actually been self-relevant to the participants causing the examined 
emotional reaction. This self-relevance was however on a different dimension than internal 
self-relevance caused by my methodological procedure. 
Another explanation for the effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy could 
be that the object of comparison in our studies, namely a value, was always inherently relevant 
on a social dimension. As argued in the introduction, values are prototypes of what is self-
relevant. I chose to study values as an operationalization of self-relevance. I did so because 
values reflect, on the one hand, what is important to a person and, on the other hand, socially 
shared guiding principles (e.g., Vauclair et al., 2015). They therefore have the power to 
transport personal and social meaning. That is also why I aimed to manipulate the internal and 
external self-relevance of values. However, despite the manipulation, I may not have been able 
to make a value totally unimportant on the respective dimension. Values may always represent 
important dimensions because people have learned throughout their lives that this is a value 
that can be important to others. Even if a value is of low internal self-relevance, it keeps some 
kind of self-relevance on a social level. That is why I argue that in the case that a value was of 
low internal self-relevance people may still have felt relevance of this value on a social 
dimension. I suppose this is the reason why people reacted with malicious envy towards that 
person. It would still be interesting to know what happens if a person achieved something that 
is not important on any possible dimension. Future research should address this question.  
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In sum, what do the present research findings imply about the appraisal of self-
relevance? The concept of self-relevance is not a simple construct. I showed that there is more 
to self-relevance than simply the importance of a value to a person. My results indicate that 
emotions can be elicited even when a value is not internally important to a person. The simple 
conceptualization of self-relevance cannot hold here. In more complex social situations, values 
can become relevant on several dimensions. They can at least be both internally and externally 
relevant. It is therefore important to study the different sources of self-relevance.  
  
Implications for the status-hypothesis. What do these effects mean for the status-
hypothesis of envy? Previous research supports the idea that people envy others for having a 
superior status position (see Crusius & Lange, 2017, for a similar argumentation). This implies 
that envy is about what is valued highly by members of a person’s social group. Translated into 
the context of my research design, it means that external self-relevance should have increased 
envious reactions towards a superior other. However, there was no consistent effect of external 
self-relevance on benign and malicious envy. Meta-analytical findings of the first part of this 
research indicate that external self-relevance was associated with more malicious envy and less 
benign envy. It seems that only malicious envy is more intense when seeing a superior other in 
a status position. Accordingly, the present results partially question the conceptualisation of 
envy as a status-related emotion. However, as we measured envious reactions towards a person 
who excelled in the domain of values, the comparison domain inherently possessed some 
external self-relevance. So, the person in my vignettes excelled in a value domain of external 
self-relevance, even if it was said not to be internally or externally self-relevant in the 
manipulation. Thus, my research cannot falsify the status-hypothesis of envy because I could 
not fully disentangle internal and external self-relevance. Nonetheless, when there was an 
effect of external self-relevance it was always weaker than the effect of internal self-relevance 
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on benign and malicious envy. If a strong interpretation of the status-approach to envy were 
true this should not have been the case. I conclude that status cannot be the only source for 
envious reactions towards superior others. At the very least, envy domains that have little 
external importance, but strong internal self-relevance, are also capable of inducing envious 
reactions.   
 
Alternative Explanations 
I assume that internal and external self-relevance account for the reported effects on 
benign and malicious envy. Nevertheless, there are some alternative explanations that could 
account for the effects as well. First, similarity might explain the effects found in the present 
study. It might be that people perceived others who seem to endorse similar values as more 
similar to them. Undeniably, similarity is an important factor in driving social comparisons 
(Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1991; Tesser & Smith, 1980) and envy (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; 
Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). This literature indicates that people are more envious towards 
people who are similar to them. However, similarity has so far been related to increase both, 
benign and malicious envy (see Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2018, for a review; Van de Ven et 
al., 2009). Thus, I would not expect differential effects on benign and malicious envy. 
Similarity is therefore unlikely to explain the differential effects of self-relevance on benign 
and malicious envy.  
Second, liking might explain the effects. It might be that people reacted with more 
benign envy when internal self-relevance was high because they liked this person more and 
therefore did not want to express harmful intentions towards this person. However, this does 
not explain why we also find a negative association between external self-relevance and benign 
envy, at least in the first part of this research. Why would someone who endorses a value that 
is important to others not be liked? After all, this person is similar to members of a person’s 
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social group and should thus also be liked (e.g., Amodio & Showers, 2005). This should then 
elicit the tendency to emulate that person and, thus, benign envy. However, I found a different 
pattern of results, and therefore do not think that liking accounts for the described effects.  
Third, the effects could be explained by the envier’s sense of control. Maybe values that 
are internally important are values that participants feel competent to pursue because they have 
tried to live according to these important values before. This would then be related to more 
benign envy, fostering the motivation to improve. Values that are not internally important may 
also be values people have no knowledge on how to pursue them. Therefore, low internal self-
relevance could be associated with malicious envy, fostering the motivation to take away the 
other’s advantage. I outlined in the introduction that control is a potential mechanism driving 
the effects of internal and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy. Future 
research should test this prediction.  
Another alternative explanation concerns the definition of external self-relevance: Does 
external self-relevance really reflect people’s desire for status? One could counter that what is 
important to others is important to a person because the person wants to establish bonds with 
their social group. External self-relevance might rather reflect the need to belong (Deci & Ryan, 
2002). However, looking at the content of what people are most envious about, such as material 
possessions, attractiveness, success, and popularity (Poelker et al., 2016), it seems most likely 
that envy is about what brings status in a social group (see introduction of this dissertation for 
a longer argumentation). However, this does not rule out the alternative explanation that 
external self-relevance is more about the need to belong than about the desire for status. I 
started studying the effects of external self-relevance, i.e., self-relevance that is defined by 
other people. What really drives external self-relevance is not clear yet and should be addressed 
in future research. 
General Discussion Alternative Explanations 87 
Another alternative explanation could be that status can be something that is internally 
important to a person. Thus, it might not be possible to differentiate between internal and 
external self-relevance. This idea is partially supported by my data in the first three studies: 
Measures of internal and external self-relevance were on average moderately correlated. 
However, this correlation was not perfect, indicating that people can differentiate between what 
is important to them and what is important to others. Additionally, I argued above that the 
negative association between internal self-relevance and malicious envy might have emerged 
because something that is not internally important is potentially externally important. In order 
for this mechanism to lead to opposing effects, internal and external self-relevance needed to 
be disentangled. However, there may nevertheless be some overlap between internal self-
relevance and external self-relevance, an argument that is partially supported by self-
determination theory. Self-determination theory argues that extrinsic motivation can be 
internalized (Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, the effects that are caused by internal and external 
motivation can still be disentangled and lead to different effects (Deci et al., 1999; Ryan & 
Connell, 1989; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2006). Therefore, I argue that also 
internal and external self-relevance can be differentiated and lead to different effects on 
emotions such as envy.  
Another critical point might be that effects could be driven by only a few values. 
Accordingly, I might not have studied the effects of self-relevance but only of certain values. 
To address this question, I examined effects of internal and external self-relevance per value in 
every study. Tables 26 to 32 show effects of internal and external self-relevance per value in 
each study. The direction of the effects is very consistent for the effect of internal self-relevance 
on benign envy (60 out of 70 regression coefficients or mean differences were in the direction 
of the main effect). The effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy was somewhat less 
consistent (41 out of 70 regression coefficients or mean differences were in the direction of the 
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main effect). Still, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern for specific values. I argued 
that the association between low internal self-relevance with more malicious envy emerges 
because low internal self-relevance implies extrinsic relevance. Extrinsic self-relevance might 
be more strongly supported by certain values, such as power or achievement, so called “social 
values” (Schwartz, 2012). However, the pattern does not seem to be consistent in the current 
investigation. Nevertheless, future research should study whether certain values elicit different 
effects of internal or external self-relevance.   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Manipulation of external self-relevance. In addition to the effect of internal self-
relevance on benign and malicious envy, I also predicted that external self-relevance would 
decrease benign envy and increase malicious envy. However, empirical data on this effect were 
not consistent across studies. Data confirmed this prediction in the first three studies, and data 
from Studies 4 – 7 did not. Several methodological reasons could account for the non-
significance of an effect in Studies 4 – 7. First, Studies 4 – 7 had a between-subjects design 
which has less statistical power compared to the within-subjects design in Studies 1 – 3. 
However, I considered this design as appropriate to show the causal relationship between self-
relevance and benign and malicious envy. Nevertheless, this might have made it difficult to 
find an effect of external self-relevance. In particular, since effects of external self-relevance 
may be weaker than effects of internal self-relevance as indicated by the manipulation check. 
It seems that the effect of external self-relevance, if it exists, was too weak to show an effect 
with the methodological approach used in Studies 4 – 7.  
Second, it may have been more difficult to manipulate external self-relevance beyond 
the inherent relevance of values. As outlined above, the negative effect of internal self-
relevance on malicious envy could emerge because low internal self-relevance triggers external 
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self-relevance because of the inherent social relevance of values. People may know that values 
are per se relevant domains even if they themselves do not endorse them. Thus, it could have 
been too difficult to manipulate external self-relevance beyond the relevance that values 
already have themselves.  
Third, the value affirmation task may have been more difficult for participants to create 
externally self-relevant values used in the procedure. Participants had to write about the 
importance or non-importance of a certain value for their social group. This requires knowledge 
about what is important to others, which may be less accessible to participants than knowledge 
about what is important or non-important to themselves. This effect may have been amplified 
by the order in which the manipulation of internal and external self-relevance was presented. 
The manipulation of internal self-relevance was always presented before the manipulation of 
external self-relevance. My reasoning was that it might be easier for participants to first think 
about the importance or non-importance of a value for them personally, and then contrast what 
they think is important for their social group from their own opinion. However, this may have 
made the task even more difficult because it required a further cognitive step that was not 
necessary for the manipulation of internal self-relevance. Taken together, the non-significant 
effect of external self-relevance in the second part of the current findings may have been caused 
by methodological constraints. Future research should find a more effective operationalization 
of external self-relevance, for example by using more concrete objects of comparison whose 
internal or external self-relevance can be easier manipulated.   
 
Effect size. Another limitation concerns the rather small effect size that internal self-
relevance had on malicious envy compared to the larger effect it had on benign envy. Meta-
analytical findings revealed that the negative effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy 
is rather small (meta-analysis part 1: B = -0.078, SE B = 0.01, p < .001, meta-analysis part 2: 
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B = 1.846, SE B = 0.89, p = .009), compared to the positive effect of internal self-relevance on 
benign envy (meta-analysis part 1: B = 0.548, SE B = 0.017, p < .001, meta-analysis part 2: B 
= -0.348, SE B = 0.118, p = .026). This might be due to the manner in which malicious envy 
items were phrased (e.g., I feel hostile towards this person, I feel hatred), which may have 
sounded rather harsh, making it difficult for participants to rate high on these items. 
Furthermore, previous research has found correlations of malicious envy with social 
desirability (Lange et al., 2016; Lange, Paulhus, et al., 2018). This may explain why means of 
malicious envy are on the lower end of the scale throughout all studies (Moverall = 1.93, SDoverall 
= 0.22). Presumably, there was a bottom effect making it less likely to find significant effects 
on the malicious envy scale, which makes it even more remarkable that the data consistently 
showed significant differences of internal self-relevance on malicious envy. However, given 
the methodological limitations of the scale, I cannot comment on how strong the effect of self-
relevance on envy actually is. Presumably, the effect size is larger than indicated in the current 
research.  
 
Values operationalizing self-relevance. In the present set of studies, I operationalized 
self-relevance by values. More precisely, I based my research on the theory of basic values 
(Schwartz, 1992). According to literature, this theory has been supported by numerous studies, 
and it also provides measures of adequate psychometric properties (Schwartz & Butenko, 
2014). However, even the well-established theory of basic values is subject to changes and 
revisions. For example, there does not seem to be a definitive set of basic values. A refined 
theory of basic values proposes that there are 19 values to best describe what is important to 
people across different cultures (Schwartz et al., 2012). To make a concrete statement on how 
the content of a single value affects envious responding to an upward comparison, one should 
use the best and most refined set of values available. For the present research, I chose the set 
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of values that seemed the most established and is being used in current research (Tamir et al., 
2016). Even if the set of values I used could have been an even more precise description of 
what is important to people, I was not particularly interested in the content of the values. 
Instead, I used values to induce self-relevance in participants. Furthermore, it has not been 
questioned that the 10 basic values reflect important value dimensions, and they are also part 
of more refined theories (Schwartz et al., 2016). I suppose that the results would not change 
when choosing a different set of values since my predictions are not based on the specific 
content of a value.  
Still, values present only part of what is self-relevant to a person. Self-relevance has 
been defined by a person’s needs, attachments, values, current goals, and beliefs (Frijda, 1993; 
Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2005; Smith & Kirby, 2009). I chose to study values as a prototype of 
what is relevant to a person because they reflect guiding principles in a person’s life (Schwartz, 
2006b) and reflect what is important to others (Vauclair et al., 2015). Furthermore, effects of 
values on emotions have been shown to reflect effects of self-relevance on emotions (e.g., De 
Leersnyder et al., 2017). However, values only constitute part of what is self-relevant to a 
person. Future research should address whether internal and external needs, attachments, 
current goals, or beliefs have different effects on benign and malicious envy. Although I do not 
see potential reasons why that would lead to differences to the present findings, it would be 
interesting to study how internal and external facets of other self-relevant domains influence 
emotions.  
Likewise, future research should reveal whether effects are consistent across different 
objects of comparison. Values represent very abstract objects of comparison. The question 
arises whether effects would be similar for more concrete objects of comparison, such as cars, 
attractiveness, or results in a performance test. I predict effects to be similar, but stronger, for 
more concrete objects of comparison. The described persons in my vignettes achieved 
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something virtuous. Maybe, this made it less likely for participants to admit feeling envious 
towards this person. This problem may be absolved for more concrete objects of comparisons. 
Future research should address this question.  
 
Introducing a new terminology. The present research introduced a new terminology 
in emotion research: internal and external self-relevance. As outlined in the introduction and 
supported by data, I argue that it is important to disentangle effects of internal and external 
self-relevance. I thereby draw upon other theories that also distinguish internal and external 
factors on psychological processes (e.g., Baldwin & Baccus, 2004; Leary et al., 2015; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). I closely followed the differentiation between intrapsychic and interpersonal 
motives introduced by Leary et al. (2015). I think it was adequate to use that definition as I 
studied self-relevance which is partially defined by values. Values are defined as trans-
situational motives (Schwartz, 1992), and the resulting motivations are intertwined with 
emotions (De Leersnyder et al., 2017; Nelissen et al., 2007). It is however not parsimonious to 
introduce a new terminology to the literature instead of using established concepts. I do so 
because the theory by Leary et al. (2015) is rooted in the area of motivation research. Thus, it 
is unclear whether we can entirely translate this to emotion research. However, future research 
should study how established phenomena and theories of motivation research also explain 
findings in emotion research, and vice versa. The current investigation is an example for why 
a closer communication between different fields of research can be fruitful.  
The current investigation is also an example for why it is very important to choose 
precise definitions. This can be illustrated with an example from self-determination theory. 
They introduced the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as well as autonomous and 
controlled motives in goal pursuit (Ryan & Deci, 2000). These concepts seem very close to 
each other, and the question arises whether they denote the same constructs. However, this 
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“why” and “what” of goal pursuit can be disentangled, and it has been shown to be important 
in order to predict behavior more precisely (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, potential differences between concepts of internal and external self-relevance, 
and other differentiations such as intrapsychic and interpersonal motives, should be addressed 
in future research.  
 
Generalizability. A critical point of the current research concerns the generalizability 
of the present results. All my studies were conducted online via Amazon MTurk in the US. 
Accordingly, I cannot guarantee generalizability beyond this population. In the context of 
values, this could be an issue since cultures differ in which values they prioritize (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2006a). However, the present data use values to show a general 
principle of how self-relevance affects emotions making the specific content of the value not 
important for my theoretical and methodological approach. There is also little reason to believe 
that the influence of self-relevance on emotions differs between cultures. Furthermore, MTurk 
samples were shown to be more similar to the general population (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016) than samples of undergraduate psychology 
students in a laboratory (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Additionally, findings rarely 
seem to differ between laboratory and MTurk samples (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). I 
propose that the present results can be replicated with other samples and other cultures. 
Nevertheless, future research should address this question.  
Another methodological limitation concerns the reliance on self-report measures. 
Participants rated their envious reactions towards a vignette on items of the PaDE Scale (Lange, 
Weidman, et al., 2018). This scale has been developed in a bottom-up approach and has 
adequate psychometric properties (Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018). I am convinced that this 
measure captures the concepts of benign and malicious envy and is therefore the best measure 
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currently available. Crucially, the items of the PaDE scale also measure action tendencies (e.g., 
I want to work harder to also obtain this quality). However, I do not know whether the 
measured responses would translate into behavior. Although, previous research has shown 
various effects of envy on behavioral outcomes, such as money burning (Zizzo & Oswald, 
2001), gossiping about the envied person (Wert & Salovey, 2004), perseverance when working 
at a task (Van de Ven et al., 2011) and higher performance (Lange & Crusius, 2015a). I would 
therefore expect the effects of internal and external self-relevance to also affect behavioral 
outcomes of benign and malicious envy. Future research should test this prediction.  
 
Implications for Other Research Areas 
The current investigation opens several interesting directions for other research areas 
beyond research on appraisal processes and envy. First of all, the question arises how internal 
and external self-relevance shape other distinct emotions. I proposed that the influence of self-
relevance is particularly interesting for comparison-based emotions because social 
comparisons are also influenced by the self-relevance of a comparison domain. I therefore set 
out to study how self-relevance affects envious responding to upward social comparisons. A 
similar investigation has been conducted for experiences of pride (Osch et al., 2018). Pride 
seems to be influenced by internal rather than external factors. However, Osch et al. (2018) did 
not study the appraisal of self-relevance specifically. Additionally, the differentiation between 
authentic (about effortful achievements) and hubristic pride (about stable qualities) was not 
examined (Tracy & Robins, 2007). It may be that hubristic pride is more prone to influences 
from others than authentic pride. If a situation is not perceived as internally relevant, success 
might be attributed to external and uncontrollable causes which is more likely to elicit hubristic 
pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Future research should test how internal and external self-
relevance influence authentic and hubristic pride.  
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Other emotions can be influenced by internal and external factors as well. It has been 
argued that social factors in appraisal processes should be studied because they can be an 
important factor in shaping emotions (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Thus, the differentiation in 
internal and external factors provides interesting new research question that could potentially 
influence every emotion. This distinction in internal and external factors of appraisal processes 
could be particularly fruitful for certain emotions, such as guilt and shame. The differentiation 
between experiences of guilt and shame has been discussed extensively (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). One difference between guilt and shame can be explained by different causal 
attributions of a situation (Tracy & Robins, 2006). This could partially be explained by how 
internally or externally self-relevant a situation was. Future research should test this prediction.  
It has also been discussed that research on emotion regulation should take into accout 
research on appraisal processes (Yih, Uusberg, Taxer, & Gross, 2018). As I provide a more 
detailed understanding of the appraisal of self-relevance, it will be interesting to study how 
internal and external self-relevance drive emotion regulation strategies. Emotion regulation 
theory proposes different emotion regulation strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal and 
suppression (see Gross, 2007, for a comprehensive overview). When doing cognitive 
reappraisal, people change their cognitive representation of an emotion-eliciting situation and 
thereby change the emotional experience (e.g., Gross & John, 2003). Suppression involves 
modulating the emotional response by inhibiting emotion expression (e.g., Gross, 2007). I 
argue that internally relevant situations would elicit more reappraisal because the person has 
more knowledge and perceived control in such a situation. Situations that are more externally 
self-relevant would elicit more suppression strategies because the person is not motivated 
enough to change the situation and will rather try to avoid it. Together, the distinction between 
internal and external factors in the elicitation of emotions opens interesting directions for future 
research on emotions and emotion regulation.  
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The current findings offer interesting insights for research beyond emotions, such as 
moral cognition or economic decision making. I studied how people react emotionally towards 
a person who embodies a certain value. Data revealed that participants felt envy, which is 
supposedly one of the “deadly sins”, even towards these highly virtuous persons. This finding 
could explain a prominent finding in morality research – the do-gooder derogation 
(Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers, & van den Bos, 2013; Minson & Monin, 2012; Monin, 
2007). People who “do good” out of moral reasons are associated with a negative valence, and 
are rated negatively (Minson & Monin, 2012) supposedly because they indicate a threatening 
social comparison (Monin, 2007). Cramwinckel et al. (2013) found that moral refusers are 
disliked by participants because their moral behavior presented a moral threat to participants. 
Moral refusers were bogus participants who refused to eat a sausage out of moral reasons, after 
participants had already eaten a sausage. They disliked the moral refuser more than non-moral 
refusers. This research shows how displaying high moral standards can lead to negative 
evaluations by the perceiver. This is similar to the present research. I also confronted 
participants with a virtuous person. If that value was not important to the participant, people 
reacted with increased harmful intentions towards that person. This is comparable to the 
condition in Cramwinckel et al. (2013) where participants had to eat the sausage, thereby 
contradicting the behavior of the moral refuser. However, my research goes beyond that finding 
because I also find productive intentions in the form of benign envy. Future research should 
address under which condition “do-gooders” elicit emulation rather than devaluation.  
The present results also relate to findings on economic behavior. High achievers in the 
workplace can be the target of harmful behaviors from their colleagues, such as aggression, 
bullying or harassment (Jensen, Patel, & Raver, 2014; Lam, Van der Vegt, Walter, & Huang, 
2011). In economic decision making a similar effect is referred to as antisocial punishment 
(Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008). Antisocial punishment refers to the finding that people 
General Discussion Implications for Other Research Areas 97 
punish those who contribute generously in a public goods game (Irwin & Horne, 2013). This 
effect supposedly arises because these generous people violate a descriptive norm of how much 
one should contribute, even when their contribution is actually better for the group (Irwin & 
Horne, 2013). I argue that such an effect emerges when norms are externally defined. In 
contrast, high performers can also motivate the inferior persons to work harder (see Sterling et 
al., 2016, for a review). I argue that such an effect emerges when norms are internally defined. 
Thus, the differentiation between internal and external self-relevance can have different effects 
on economic decision making and job performance. Furthermore, this effect could be driven 
by benign and malicious envy: High achievers can cause benign envy which causes higher 
performance by the envier when the task is internally important. High achievers can also cause 
malicious envy which causes aggressive behavior towards the superior other when the task is 
externally important. Future research should test whether this prediction can be confirmed in 
an economic context.  
This could also apply in a classroom setting. Effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
on academic achievements show that higher intrinsic motivation is associated with deeper 
engagement in learning activities, better conceptual learning, and higher persistence than 
extrinsic motivation (Vansteenkiste et al., 2006). Envy is likely to arise in an academic context 
(Pekrun, 2009; Rentzsch et al., 2015). It would therefore be interesting to see whether envy 
could account for effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on academic performance.  
The presented research also provides insights for how upward social comparisons could 
be used strategically to promote progress. I argue that the present findings can be helpful to 
understand how envious reactions towards a superior others can be productive. Focusing on 
what is important for the person instead of focusing on what is important to others can prevent 
harmful reactions towards the other and rather help to use envy’s productive forces. 
98 Conclusion General Discussion 
Taken together, the present research connects to research on emotions, emotion 
regulation, morality, economic behavior, and school psychology. Based on my findings, I 
outlined several future directions for basic and applied research. Studying the effects of internal 
and external self-relevance on benign and malicious envy, as well as other emotions, could 
help explain behavior in various settings.  
 
Conclusion 
The present research sought to answer the question what people are envious about. 
Across seven studies, empirical evidence indicates that seeing someone excel in a domain that 
is internally self-relevant will intensify feelings of benign envy, fostering the motivation to 
improve. Seeing someone excel in a domain that is not internally self-relevance will intensify 
feelings of malicious envy, fostering the motivation to harm the envied person. The role of 
external self-relevance was less clear in the present research. Still, there was the tendency that 
external self-relevance attenuates feelings of benign envy and strengthens feelings of malicious 
envy.  
The data suggested that even comparison domains that are not important to a person 
can elicit an emotional reaction, namely malicious envy. This seemed to contradict theories on 
emotions that argue that the primary appraisal of self-relevance is a necessary precondition for 
emotions. I argued that the effect of internal self-relevance on malicious envy could emerge 
because domains that are not internally self-relevance are considered relevant on an external 
dimension. To conclude, the present research indicates that a more detailed understanding of 
appraisal processes is necessary for a comprehensive understanding what people are envious 
about.  
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Figure 10. Preregistration of Study 3 as preregistered on aspredicted.org. 
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Figure 11. Preregistration of Study 4 as preregistered on osf.io. Internal self-relevance is 
referred to as personal value. External self-relevance is referred to as societal value.  
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Figure 12. Preregistration of Study 5 as preregistered on aspredicted.org. 
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Figure 13. Preregistration of Study 6 as preregistered on aspredicted.org. 




Figure 14. Preregistration of Study 7 as preregistered on aspredicted.org. 
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Table 1  
Correlations Between Internal and External Self-Relevance, Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Value Correlation internal 
and external self-
relevance, Study 1 
Correlation internal 
and external self-
relevance, Study 2 
Correlation internal and 
external self-relevance, 
Study 3 
Power r = .079, p = .516 r = .223, p = .001 r = .500, p < .001 
Achievement r = .286, p = .017 r = .407, p < .001 r = .536, p < .001 
Self-Direction r = .236, p = .050 r = .359, p < .001 r = .434, p < .001 
Stimulation r = -.065, p = .595 r = .198, p = .005 r = .515, p < .001 
Benevolence r = .429, p < .001 r = .392, p < .001 r = .523, p < .001 
Universalism r = .251, p = .037 r = .405, p < .001 r = .489, p < .001 
Tradition r = .191, p = .116 r = .486, p < .001 r = .545, p < .001 
Conformity r = .121, p = .322 r = .407, p < .001 r = .547, p < .001 
Security r = .416, p < .001 r = .568, p < .001 r = .660, p < .001 
Hedonism r = .191, p = .115 r = .420, p < .001 r = .519, p < .001 
 
Table 2  
Multilevel Regression Results, Study 1 
  Benign Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.22 0.30 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.58 0.06 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.07 0.08 .389 
 Interaction 0.00 0.09 .981 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 0.88 0.94  
 Intercept (value) 0.69 0.83  
 Residual 2.00 1.42  
  Malicious Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.86 0.19 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.21 0.05 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.12 0.06 .034 
 Interaction -0.03 0.07 .705 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 0.86 0.93  
 Intercept (value) 0.18 0.42  
 Residual 1.00 1.00  
  Pain 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
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 Intercept 2.07 0.17 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.15 0.05  .001 
 External self-relevance 0.03 0.06 0.623 
 Interaction 0.06 0.07 .394 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.11 1.05  
 Intercept (value) 0.07 0.26  
 Residual 1.11 1.05  
  Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.04 0.26 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.31 0.06 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.04 0.08 .623 
 Interaction 0.14 0.08 .087 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.55 1.24  
 Intercept (value) 0.35 0.59  
 Residual 1.64 1.28  
  Admiration 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.38 0.32 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.50 0.06 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.08 0.07 .299 
 Interaction 0.06 0.08 .467 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.04 1.02  
 Intercept (value) 0.84 0.92  
 Residual 1.60 1.26  
 
Table 3  
Multilevel Regression Results, Study 2 
  Benign Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.33 0.23 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.48 0.03 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.14 0.03 < .001 
 Interaction 0.02 0.03 .630 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.06 1.03  
 Intercept (value) 0.44 0.66  
 Residual 1.99 1.41  
  Malicious Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.75 0.12 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.09 0.02 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.09 0.02 < .001 
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 Interaction 0.02 0.02 .279 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 0.95 0.98  
 Intercept (value) 0.08 0.28  
 Residual 0.83 0.91  
  Pain 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.78 0.10 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.01 0.02 .560 
 External self-relevance 0.02 0.02 .269 
 Interaction 0.01 0.02 .728 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.04 1.02  
 Intercept (value) 0.05 0.22  
 Residual 0.79 0.89  
  Admiration 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.67 0.26 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.43 0.03 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.17 0.03 < .001 
 Interaction -0.02 0.03 .484 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 0.93 0.96  
 Intercept (value) 0.60 0.78  
 Residual 1.73 1.32  
  
Table 4  
Multilevel Regression Results, Study 3 
  Benign Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.26 0.18 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.59 0.02 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.03 0.02 .157 
 Interaction -0.03 0.02 .137 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.14 1.07  
 Intercept (value) 0.30 0.55  
 Residual 1.64 1.28  
  Malicious Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.73 0.07 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.05 0.01 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.01 0.01 .495 
 Interaction 0.00 0.01 .710 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
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 Intercept (participant) 1.25 1.12  
 Intercept (value) 0.02 0.15  
 Residual 0.39 0.63  
  Pain in Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.64 0.06 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.01 0.01 .293 
 External self-relevance -0.01 0.01 .461 
 Interaction 0.00 0.01 .905 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.20 1.09  
 Intercept (value) 0.01 0.10  
 Residual 0.30 0.55 
 
Table 5  
Meta-Analytical Multilevel Regression Results, Studies 1, 2, and 3 
  Benign Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.28 0.19 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.55 0.02 < .001 
 External self-relevance -0.07 0.18 < .001 
 Interaction -0.03 0.02 0.06 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.09 1.04  
 Intercept (value) 0.36 0.60  
 Intercept (study) 0.00 0.00  
 Residual 1.79 1.34  
  Malicious Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.75 0.08 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.08 0.01 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.05 0.01 < .001 
 Interaction 0.00 0.01 0.648 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (participant) 1.14 1.07  
 Intercept (value) 0.04 0.20  
 Intercept (study) 0.00 0.00  
 Residual 0.58 0.76  
  Pain 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.78 0.10 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.02 0.01 0.092 
 External self-relevance 0.02 0.01 0.086 
 Interaction 0.01 0.01 0.497 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
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 Intercept (participant) 1.15 1.07  
 Intercept (value) 0.02 0.14  
 Intercept (study) 0.02 0.13  
 Residual 0.52 0.72  
 
Table 6  
Descriptive Statistics, Study 4 
Variable 
Mlow internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mlow internal, high 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, high 
external (SD) 
Benign envy 2.60 (1.62) 2.48 (1.57) 5.33 (1.40) 5.60 (1.28) 
Malicious envy 2.38 (1.49) 2.10 (1,24) 1.77 (1.27) 1.45 (0.95) 
Pain 1.73 (1.17) 1.70 (1.05) 1.77 (1.31) 1.44 (0.78) 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
 
Table 7  
Descriptive Statistics, Study 5 
Variable 
Mlow internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mlow internal, high 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, high 
external (SD) 
Benign envy 3.83 (1.62) 4.32 (1.60) 4.47 (1.71) 4.68 (1.56) 
Malicious envy 2.17 (1.34) 2.01 (1.29) 1.85 (1.13) 2.09 (1.41) 
Pain 1.96 (1.23) 1.83 (1.25) 1.76 (1.17) 1.94 (1.37) 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
 
Table 8  
Descriptive Statistics, Study 6 
Variable 
Mlow internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mlow internal, high 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, high 
external (SD) 
Benign envy 2.20 (1.15) 2.77 (1.56) 4.20 (1.75) 4.24 (1.73) 
Malicious envy 1.99 (1.18) 1.91 (1.12) 1.93 (1.23) 1.89 (1.29) 
Pain 1.77 (1.94) 2.01 (1.32) 2.38 (1.57) 1.85 (1.19) 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
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Table 9  
Descriptive Statistics, Study 7 
Variable 
Mlow internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mlow internal, high 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, low 
external (SD) 
Mhigh internal, high 
external (SD) 
Benign envy 2.68 (1.51) 2.91 (1.59) 4.66 (1.68) 4.47 (1.72) 
Malicious envy 1.94 (1.31) 1.90 (1.15) 1.57 (0.96) 1.91 (1.24) 
Pain 2.17 (1.39) 1.99 (1.28) 1.83 (1.07) 2.19 (1.40) 




Meta-Analytical Multilevel Regression Results of Studies 4 - 7 
  Benign Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.83 0.17 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance 0.92 0.04 < .001 
 External self-relevance 0.09 0.04 0.041 
 Interaction -0.05 0.04 0.217 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (study) 0.12 0.34  
 Residual 2.62 1.63  
  Malicious Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.92 0.03 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.13 0.03 < .05 
 External self-relevance -0.02 0.03 0.430 
 Interaction 0.05 0.03 0.113 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (study) 0.00 0.00  
 Residual 1.51 1.23  
  Pain in Envy 
Fixed effects B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.95 0.03 < .001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.01 0.03 0.729 
 External self-relevance -0.03 0.03 0.319 
 Interaction -0.00 0.03 0.976 
Random effects Variance St. deviation  
 Intercept (study) 0.02 0.15  
 Residual 1.54 1.24  
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Table 11  
Items of the PVQ (Schwartz, 2003) Measuring Internal Self-Relevance and External Self-
Relevance in Study 1 
Instructions for internal self-relevance: Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each 
description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Tick the box to the 
right that shows how much the person in the description is like you. 
How much is this person like you? 
Instructions for external self-relevance: The next part is about the values in your society. What 
do you expect the average member of your society to value? 
We again briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how 
much each person is or is not like the average member of your society. Tick the box to the right 
that shows how much the person in the description is like the average member of your society. 




1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her5. She likes 
to do thinks in her own original way. 
11. It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. 
She likes to be free and not dependent on others. 
Stimulation 6. She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks 
it is important to do lots of different things in life. 
15. She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an 
exciting life  
Hedonism 10. Having a good time is important to her. She likes to “spoil” herself. 
                                                 
5 Gender matched. Male participants read about male persons.  
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21. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do 
things that give her pleasure. 
Achievement 4. It is important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire 
what she does. 
13. Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will 
recognize her achievements. 
Power 2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
17. It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do 
what she says. 
Security 5. It’s important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything 
that might endanger her safety. 
14. It is important to her that the government ensures her safety against all 
threats. She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
Conformity 7. She believes that people should do what they are told. She thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 
16. It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid 
doing anything people would say is wrong. 
Tradition 9. It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw 
attention to herself. 
20. Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed 
down by her religion or her family. 
Benevolence 12. It’s very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to 
care for their well-being. 
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18. It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote 
herself to people close to her. 
Universalism 3. She thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated 
equally. She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
8. It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even 
when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them. 
19. She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after 
the environment is important to her. 
 Note. For internal self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 
6 (not like me at all). For external self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very 
much like her) to 6 (not like her at all). Scale was reverse coded for analyses.  
 
Table 12 
Items of the SVS (Schwartz, 1992) Measuring Internal Self-Relevance and External Self-
Relevance in Study 2  
Instructions for internal self-relevance: Below you find a list of values. Please rate the 
importance of the following values as a guiding principle in your life. Please use a scale from 
1 (opposed to my values), 2 (not important), …, 8 (very important), to 9 (of supreme 
importance). Please use the "opposed to my values" to indicate if the described value is 
opposed to your values. 
Instructions for external self-relevance: Below you find again the list of values. This time we 
want you to rate the importance of the following values as a guiding principle in your society. 
Please indicate to what extent each value represents the values of the people in your society. 
In other words: What do you expect an average member of your society to value? Please use a 
scale from 1 (opposed to my values), 2 (not important), … , 8 (very important), to 9 (of supreme 
Appendix Appendix C: Materials for Studies 1 – 3 135 
importance). Please use the "opposed to society's values" to indicate if the described value is 
opposed to society's values. 
Subscale Item 
Self-Direction Creativity, Curious, Freedom, Choosing own goals, Independent 
Stimulation Daring, A varied life, An exciting life 
Hedonism Enjoying life, Pleasure 
Achievement Successful, Capable, Ambitious, Influential, Intelligent, Self-respect 
Power Social power, Authority, Wealth, Preserving my public image, Social 
recognition 
Security National security, clean, social order, family security, reciprocation of 
favors, Healthy, Sense of Belonging 
Conformity Politeness, Honoring parents and elders, Obedient, Self-discipline 
Tradition Devout, Accepting portion in life, Humble, Moderate, Respect for 
tradition, Detachment 
Benevolence Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal, Responsible, A spiritual life, Mature 
love, Meaning in life, True friendship 
Universalism Protecting the environment, A world of beauty, Unity with nature, Broad-
minded, Social justice, Wisdom, Equality, A world at peace, Inner 
harmony 
 Note. For internal self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 
6 (not like me at all). For internal self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very 
much like her) to 6 (not like her at all). Scale was reverse coded for analyses.  
 
Table 13  
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Items of the SVS (Schwartz, 1992) Measuring Internal Self-Relevance and External Self-
Relevance in Study 3  
Instructions for internal self-relevance: Below you find a list of values. Please rate the 
importance of the following values as a guiding principle in YOUR life. Some of the values are 
phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less important for you. Please indicate to what 
extent each value represents the YOUR values. Please use a scale from 0 (not important) to 7 
(of supreme importance). Please use the "opposed to my values" to indicate if the described 
value is opposed to your values. 
Instructions for external self-relevance: Below you find a list of values. Please rate the 
importance of the following values as a guiding principle in your COMMUNITY. Some of the 
values are phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less important for people in your 
community. Please indicate to what extent each value represents the values of the people in 
your COMMUNITY. In other words: What do you expect an average member of your 
COMMUNITY to value? Please use a scale from 0 (not important) to 7 (of supreme 
importance). Please use the "opposed to my community's values" to indicate if the described 




Creativity (uniqueness, imagination), Curious (interested in everything, 
exploring), Freedom (freedom of action and thought), Choosing own goals 
(selecting own purposes), Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
Stimulation Daring (seeking adventure, risk), A varied life (filled with challenge, novelty 
and change), An exciting life (stimulating experiences) 
Hedonism Enjoying life (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.), Pleasure (gratification of 
desires) 
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Achievement Successful (achieving goals), Capable (competent, effective, efficient), 
Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring), Influential (having an impact on people 
and events), Intelligent (logical, thinking), Self-respect (belief in one's own 
worth) 
Power Social power (control over others, dominance), Authority (the right to lead 
or command), Wealth (material possessions, money), Preserving my public 
image (protecting my "face"), Social recognition (respect, approval by 
others) 
Security National security (protection of my nation from enemies), clean (neat, tidy), 
social order (stability of society), family security (safety for loved ones), 
reciprocation of favors (avoidance of indebtedness), Healthy (not being sick 
physically or mentally), Sense of Belonging (feeling that others care about 
me) 
Conformity Politeness (courtesy, good manners), Honoring parents and elders (showing 
respect), Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations), Self-discipline (self-
restraint, resistance to temptation) 
 Tradition Devout (holding to religious faith & belief), Accepting portion in life 
(submitting to life's circumstances), Humble (modest, self-effacing), 
Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling & action), Respect for tradition 
(preservation of time-honored customs) 
Benevolence Helpful (working for the welfare of others), Honest (genuine, sincere), 
Forgiving (willing to pardon others), Loyal (faithful to my friends, group), 
Responsible (dependable, reliable), A spiritual life (emphasis on spiritual 
not material matters), Mature love (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy), 
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Meaning in life (a purpose in life), True friendship (close, supportive 
friends) 
Universalism Protecting the environment (preserving nature), A world of beauty (beauty 
of nature and the arts), Unity with nature (fitting into nature), Broad-minded 
(tolerant of different ideas and beliefs), Social justice (correcting injustice, 
care for the weak), Wisdom (a mature understanding of life), Equality (equal 
opportunity for all), A world at peace (free of war and conflict), Inner 
harmony (at peace with myself) 
 Note. For internal self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 
6 (not like me at all). For internal self-relevance, answers were given on a scale from 1 (very 
much like her) to 6 (not like her at all). Scale was reverse coded for analyses.  
 
Table 14 
Vignettes Based on PVQ (Schwartz, 2003) in Study 1, 2, and 3 
Instruction: In the following we'll describe a person to you. This person has a special quality 
that distinguishes this person from yourself and others. Please try to imagine this person as 
vividly as possible. Imagine how it would feel to meet this person. After you have imagined this 
person, we'll ask you several question about your feelings towards this person. 
[next page] This person has a special quality that distinguishes this person from yourself and 
others. Please try to imagine this person as vividly as possible! Imagine how it would feel to 




He/She thinks up new ideas and is very creative. He/She does things in 
his/her own original way. He/She makes his/her own decision about what 
he/she does. He/She is free and not dependent on others. 
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Stimulation He/She likes surprises and always does new things. He/She does lots of 
different things in life. He/She has adventures and takes risks. He/She has 
an exciting life. 
Hedonism He/She has a good time. He/She “spoils” him-/herself. He/She takes every 
chance he/she can to have fun. He/She does things that give him/her 
pleasure. 
Achievement He/She shows his/her abilities. People admire him/her for what he/she does. 
He/She is very successful. People recognize his/her achievements. 
Power He/She is very rich. He/She has a lot of money and expensive things. He/She 
gets respect from others. People do what he/she says. 
Security He/She lives in secure surroundings. He/She is successful in avoiding 
everything that might endanger his/her safety. His/Her local authorities 
ensure his/her safety against all threats. His/Her community is strong so it 
can defend its citizens. 
Conformity He/She is successful in avoiding everything people would say is wrong. 
He/She follows rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. He/She 
always behaves properly. He/She does what he/she is told to do. 
Tradition He/She is humble and modest. He/She doesn’t draw attention to him-
/herself. He/She is traditional. He/She follows the customs handed down by 
his/her religion or his/her family. 
Benevolence He/She helps the people around him/her. He/She cares for their well-being. 
He/She is loyal to his/her friends. He/She devotes him-/herself to people 
close to him/her. 
Universalism He/She treats every person in the world equally. He/She acts in a way that 
gives everyone equal opportunities in life. He/She listens to people who are 
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different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still 
understands them. He/She strongly believes that people should care for 
nature. He/She looks after the environment. 
 
Table 15 
Items of Dependent Variables in Study 1 
Subscale Item 
Benign envy The person inspires me to get this quality myself. 
Malicious envy I want this person not to have this quality anymore. 
Pain Imagining this person feels painful. 
General envy I feel envy towards this person. 
Admiration I feel admiration towards this person. 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
 
Table 16  
Items of Dependent Variables in Study 2 
Subscale Item 
Benign envy I feel deep longing for this person’s quality and want to work harder to 
also obtain exactly the same quality. I feel motivated by this person and 
devise a plan to obtain this quality as well. 
Malicious envy I feel hatred and hostile towards this person and secretly wish that he/she 
would lose this quality. I would like to complain to someone else about 
this person. 
Pain I feel tormented, inadequate and depressed. 
Appendix Appendix C: Materials for Studies 1 – 3 141 
Admiration His/her quality impresses and elates me. I admire him/her for his/her 
quality. I am continually impressed by what he/she does and I feel that 
his/her quality is admirable. 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
 
Table 17 
Items of Dependent Variables in Study 3 (adapted from Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018) 
Instruction: Please answer the following questions about your thoughts and feelings when 
confronted with the described person. Read the following statements carefully! Indicate how 
much you agree with each statement on a scale from 1 'not at all' to 7 'very much '. 
Subscale Item 
Benign envy I feel deep longing for this quality. 
I want to work harder to also obtain exactly the same quality. 
I would like to devise a plan to obtain this quality as well. 
This person motivates me to become just like him/her. 
Malicious envy I would like to complain to someone else about this person. 
I feel hostile towards this person. 
I secretly wish that this person would lose his/her quality. 
I feel hatred. 
Pain I feel tormented. 
I feel inadequate. 
I feel depressed. 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
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Table 18 
Manipulation of Internal and External Self-Relevance of Values: Instructions for Value 
Affirmation Task in Study 4 
















You indicated that [value X] has NO special importance to YOU. Please 
explain why it is not at all important to you to behave according to [value X]. 
Write it down below in a few sentences. To remind you, [value X] can be 
described by these keywords: [keywords value X]. They should help you to 
answer this question. 
high 
You indicated that [value X] is of special IMPORTANCE to YOU. Why is 
[value X] of special importance to you? Please explain why you think that it 
is important to behave according to this value. Write it down below in a few 
sentences. The [value X] can be described by these keywords: [keywords for 















Now, think about why [value X] could have NO importance in your social 
group! Please explain why it could be not at all important to the people around 
you to behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few sentences. 
To remind you, [value X] can be described by these keywords: [keywords 
value X]. They should help you to answer this question. 
high 
Now, think about why [value X] could be of special IMPORTANCE in your 
SOCIAL GROUP! Please explain why it could be important to the people 
around you to behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few 
sentences. To remind you, the value [value X] can be described by these 
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keywords: [keywords describing value X]. They should help you to answer 
this question. 
Note. Factors were combined in a 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-
relevance: low, high) design. Every instruction was followed by a writing block.  
 
Table 19 
Manipulation of Internal and External Self-Relevance of Values: Instructions for Value 
Affirmation Task in Study 5 and 6 
















Think about the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why could [value X] NOT 
be important for YOU? Please explain why it would NOT be ideal and 
important to YOU to behave according to [value X].Write it down below in a 
few sentences. 
high 
Think about the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why could [value X] be 
important for YOU? Please explain why it would be ideal and important to 
















Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for your social group. Why should 
[value X] NOT be important for your SOCIAL GROUP? Please explain why 
it should NOT be important to the people around you to behave according to 
[value X]. Write it down below in a few sentences. 
high 
Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for your social group. Why should 
[value X] be important for your SOCIAL GROUP? Please explain why it 
should be important to the people around you to behave according to [value 
X]. Write it down below in a few sentences. 
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Note. Factors were combined in a 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-
relevance: low, high) design. Every instruction was followed by a writing block.  
 
Table 20  
Manipulation of Internal and External Self-Relevance of Values: Instructions for Value 
Affirmation Task in Study 7 
















Think about the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why is [value X] NOT 
important for YOU? Please explain why it is NOT important to YOU to 
behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few sentences. 
high 
Think about the meaning of [value X] for your life. Why is [value X] 
important for YOU? Please explain why it is important to YOU to behave 
















Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for other people. Why is [value 
X] NOT important for OTHER PEOPLE? Imagine that you work in a 
company. Why is [value X] NOT important for the OTHER PEOPLE in your 
COMPANY? Please explain why it is NOT important to the people in your 
company to behave according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few 
sentences. 
high 
Now, think about the meaning of [value X] for other people. Why is [value 
X] important for OTHER PEOPLE? Imagine that you work in a company. 
Why is [value X] important for the OTHER PEOPLE in your COMPANY? 
Please explain why it is important to the people in your company to behave 
according to [value X]. Write it down below in a few sentences. 
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Note. Factors were combined in a 2 (internal self-relevance: low, high) x 2 (external self-
relevance: low, high) design. Every instruction was followed by a writing block.  
 
Table 21  
Values and Keywords Used for Value Ranking in Study 5, 6, and 7  
Item 
Self-Direction: creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curious, independent 
Stimulation: a varied life, an exciting life, daring 
Hedonism: pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent 
Achievement: ambitious, successful, capable, influential 
Power: authority, wealth, social power  
Security: social order, family security, national security, clean, reciprocation of favors 
Conformity: obedient, self-discipline, politeness, honouring parents and elders 
Tradition: respect for tradition, humble, devout, accepting my portion in life 
Benevolence: helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, loyal, true friendship, mature love 
Universalism: broadminded, social justice, equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity 
with nature, wisdom, protecting the environment 
 Note. Participants had to rank the values according to their importance via drag and drop.  
 
Table 22  
Vignettes Based on PVQ (Schwartz, 2003) in Study 4 and 5 
Instruction: In the following we'll describe a person to you. This person has a special quality 
that distinguishes this person from yourself and others. Please try to imagine this person as 
vividly as possible. Imagine how it would feel to meet this person. After you have imagined this 
person, we'll ask you several question about your feelings towards this person. 
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This person has a special quality that distinguishes this person from yourself and others. Please 




He/She thinks up new ideas and is very creative. He/She does things in 
his/her own original way. He/She makes his/her own decision about what 
he/she does. He/She is free and not dependent on others. 
Stimulation He/She likes surprises and always does new things. He/She does lots of 
different things in life. He/She has adventures and takes risks. He/She has 
an exciting life. 
Hedonism He/She has a good time. He/She “spoils” him-/herself. He/She takes every 
chance he/she can to have fun. He/She does things that give him/her 
pleasure. 
Achievement He/She shows his/her abilities. People admire him/her for what he/she does. 
He/She is very successful. People recognize his/her achievements. 
Power He/She is very rich. He/She has a lot of money and expensive things. He/She 
gets respect from others. People do what he/she says. 
Security He/She lives in secure surroundings. He/She is successful in avoiding 
everything that might endanger his/her safety. His/Her local authorities 
ensure his/her safety against all threats. His/Her community is strong so it 
can defend its citizens. 
Conformity He/She is successful in avoiding everything people would say is wrong. 
He/She follows rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. He/She 
always behaves properly. He/She does what he/she is told to do. 
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Tradition He/She is humble and modest. He/She doesn’t draw attention to him-
/herself. He/She is traditional. He/She follows the customs handed down by 
his/her religion or his/her family. 
Benevolence He/She helps the people around him/her. He/She cares for their well-being. 
He/She is loyal to his/her friends. He/She devotes him-/herself to people 
close to him/her. 
Universalism He/She treats every person in the world equally. He/She acts in a way that 
gives everyone equal opportunities in life. He/She listens to people who are 
different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still 
understands them. He/She strongly believes that people should care for 




Vignettes in Study 6 
Instruction before every vignette: Imagine the following situation as vividly as possible: 
Imagine that you just moved to a new neighborhood. You are very happy to have moved there 
because you like your new house and the surroundings. Your neighbor Peter invited some 
friends and people from the neighborhood to a summer party. You are very happy about the 
invitation because now you can finally meet the people from your neighborhood. You would 
very much like to establish your place within the group. It is a nice evening. You and your 
neighbors are having a good time. You are having a conversation with some people in the 
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She talks about a new design project idea she recently developed. You realize 
that Anna is making her own decisions about what she does. In general she is 
creative, good at thinking up new ideas, and she does things in her own original 
way. She enjoys being free to plan and to choose her activities for herself. You 
start thinking about how independent you really are. [picture of Anna] Remember 
the essay you just wrote about self-direction. As reminder, you can read it here 
again: [essay on internal self-relevance of self-direction value] [essay on external 
self-relevance of self-direction value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as self-directed as Anna. Also remind yourself that 
it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as self-directed as 
Anna. [next page] This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to 
imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very self-directed. Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as self-directed as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
NEIGHBORS to be as self-directed as Anna. 
Stimulati
on 
She talks about a safari trip she recently took. You realize that Anna has a very 
exciting life. In general, she is always looking for adventures, takes risks, and 
does lots of different things in her life. She enjoys surprises and doing new things. 
You start thinking about when was the last time you had an exciting experience. 
                                                 
6 Vignettes were matched to participant gender. Male participants read about a person called Tom and 
saw a male picture expressing pride from the University of California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions 
(Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009).  
7 In every vignette, participants saw a female picture expressing pride from the University of 
California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy et al., 2009). 
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[picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about stimulation. As 
reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of 
stimulation value] [essay on external self-relevance of stimulation value] Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adventurous as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
NEIGHBORS to be as adventurous as Anna. [next page] This is a summary of 
the situation we just asked you to imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is that 
she is very adventurous. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT 
to YOU to be as adventurous as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as adventurous as Anna. 
Hedonis
m 
She talks about her last beach holiday, which she really enjoyed. You realize that 
Anna seeks every chance she can to have fun. In general she likes to “spoil” 
herself and having a good time is important to her. She enjoys doing things that 
give her pleasure. You start thinking about when was the last time you really 
enjoyed yourself. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about 
hedonism. As reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-
relevance of hedonism value] [essay on external self-relevance of hedonism 
value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as 
hedonistic as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT 
to your NEIGHBORS to be as hedonistic as Anna. [next page] This is a summary 
of the situation we just asked you to imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is 
that she is very hedonistic. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT 
to YOU to be as hedonistic as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as hedonistic as Anna. 
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Achieve
ment 
She talks about how she recently finished a really hard project at her management 
job. You realize that Anna is very achieving. In general everything she does 
seems to be successful, and she likes to impress others with her many abilities. 
She enjoys being admired for what she does. You start thinking about what were 
your latest achievements. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote 
about achievement. As reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal 
self-relevance of achievement value] [essay on external self-relevance of 
achievement value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to 
YOU to be as achieving as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as achieving as Anna. [next page] 
This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to imagine: You met Anna. 
Anna's quality is that she is very achieving. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as achieving as Anna. Also remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as achieving as 
Anna. 
Power She talks about her employees that work for her in her consulting company and 
at home. You realize that people do what Anna says. In general she is very rich 
and she has a lot of expensive things. She enjoys being in charge and telling 
others what to do. You start thinking about your position at your job. [picture of 
Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about power. As reminder, you can 
read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of power value] [essay on 
external self-relevance of power value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as powerful as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as powerful as Anna. 
[next page] This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to imagine: You 
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met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very powerful. Remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as powerful as Anna. Also remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as 
powerful as Anna. 
Security She talks about the new alarm system that secures her house. You realize that 
Anna avoids anything that might endanger her safety. In general, she is concerned 
that social order be protected and that her community be safe from threats. She 
enjoys living in secure surroundings. You start thinking about what you do to 
stay safe nowadays. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about 
security. As reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance 
of security value] [essay on external self-relevance of security value] Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as secure as Anna. 
Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS 
to be as secure as Anna. [next page] This is a summary of the situation we just 
asked you to imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very secure. 
Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as secure as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
NEIGHBORS to be as secure as Anna. 
Conform
ity 
She mentions that this year no-one in her company can allow themselves a day 
off and that’s why she cancelled a vacation that she planned to do. You realize 
that Anna is someone who behaves very properly. In general she avoids doing 
anything people would say is wrong and she follows rules at all times, even when 
no-one is watching. She enjoys doing what she is told. You start thinking about 
when was the last time you held your own wishes back. [insert picture of Anna] 
Remember the essay you just wrote about conformity. As reminder, you can read 
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it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of conformity value] [essay on 
external self-relevance of conformity value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adapted as Anna. Also remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as adapted as 
Anna. [next page] This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to 
imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very adapted. Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adapted as Anna. 
Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS 
to be as adapted as Anna. 
Tradition She talks about how she decided to stay abstinent until marriage. You realize that 
Anna is very religious. In general she believes that people should be satisfied 
with what they have and that one should not ask for more than that. She enjoys 
doing what her religion requires. You start thinking about what you actually do 
to uphold the traditions of your family. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay 
you just wrote about tradition. As reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on 
internal self-relevance of tradition value] [essay on external self-relevance of 
tradition value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU 
to be as traditional as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as traditional as Anna. [next page] 
This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to imagine: You met Anna. 
Anna's quality is that she is very traditional. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as traditional as Anna. Also remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as traditional 
as Anna. 
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Benevole
nce 
She recently helped your neighbor through a difficult period of his life. You 
realize that Anna is very caring. In general she always helps the people around 
her and she is loyal to her friends. She enjoys devoting herself to people close to 
her. You start thinking about what were your latest good deeds. [picture of Anna] 
Remember the essay you just wrote about benevolence. As reminder, you can 
read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of benevolence value] [essay 
on external self-relevance of benevolence value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as benevolent as Anna. Also remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as benevolent 
as Anna. [next page] This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to 
imagine: You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very benevolent. Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as benevolent as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
NEIGHBORS to be as benevolent as Anna. 
Universa
lism 
She talks about her last urban greening project for an environmental organization. 
You realize that Anna strongly believes that people should care for nature and 
look after the environment. Nevertheless she tries her best to understand people 
who disagree with her. In general she treats every person she meets equally and 
wants justice for everybody, even for people she does not know. She enjoys 
listening to people who are different from her. You start thinking about what you 
actually do to make the world a better place. [picture of Anna] Remember the 
essay you just wrote about universalism. As reminder, you can read it here again: 
[essay on internal self-relevance of universalism value] [essay on external self-
relevance of universalism value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as universal as Anna. Also remind yourself that it 
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is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as universal as Anna. 
[next page] This is a summary of the situation we just asked you to imagine: You 
met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very universal. Remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as universal as Anna. Also remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your NEIGHBORS to be as 
universal as Anna.  
Note. Vignettes were matched to participant gender. Pictures of pride expressions were taken 
from the University of California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy et al., 2009). 
Whether a value was framed as not or very important to the participant or the participant’s 
neighbors depended on the condition the participants was assigned to.  
 
Table 24 
Vignettes in Study 7 
Instruction before every vignette: Imagine the following situation as vividly as possible: 
Imagine that you just started working in a new company. You are very happy that you got the 
job because this is the position you have always wanted and it gives you great opportunities to 
succeed. After an important meeting there is a little get-together with your colleagues. You 
were looking forward to this because you can finally meet all your new colleagues to help you 
to establish your position in the company. It is a nice evening. You and your colleagues are 
having a good time. You’re having a conversation with some people. Anna8, who is well known 
in all of the company (see picture below)9, is one of them.  
Value Vignette 
                                                 
8 Vignettes were matched to participant gender. Male participants read about a person called Tom and 
saw a male picture expressing pride from the University of California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions 
(Tracy et al., 2009). 
9 In every vignette, participants saw a female picture expressing pride from the University of 
California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy et al., 2009). 
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Self-
Direction 
She talks about a new project idea she recently developed. You realize that Anna 
is making her own decisions about what she does. In general she is creative, good 
at thinking up new ideas, and she does things in her own original way. She enjoys 
being free to plan and to choose her activities for herself. You start thinking about 
how independent you really are. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just 
wrote about self-direction. As a reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on 
internal self-relevance of self-direction value] [essay on external self-relevance 
of self-direction value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to 
YOU to be as self-directed as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as self-directed as Anna. [new page] 
You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very self-directed. Remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as self-directed as Anna. Also 
remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to 
be as self-directed as Anna. 
Stimulati
on 
She talks about a safari trip she recently took. You realize that Anna has a very 
exciting life. In general, she is always looking for adventures, takes risks, and 
does lots of different things in her life. She enjoys surprises and doing new things. 
You start thinking about when was the last time you had an exciting experience. 
[picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about stimulation. As a 
reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of 
stimulation value] [essay on external self-relevance of stimulation value] Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adventurous as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
COLLEAGUES to be as adventurous as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's 
quality is that she is very adventurous. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
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IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adventurous as Anna. Also remind yourself that 




She talks about her last holiday, which she really enjoyed. You realize that Anna 
seeks every chance she can to have fun. In general she likes to “spoil” herself and 
having a good time is important to her. She enjoys doing things that give her 
pleasure. You start thinking about when was the last time you really enjoyed 
yourself. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about hedonism. 
As a reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of 
hedonism value] [essay on external self-relevance of hedonism value] Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as hedonistic as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
COLLEAGUES to be as hedonistic as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's 
quality is that she is very hedonistic. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as hedonistic as Anna. Also remind yourself that it 




She talks about a recent success at her job. You realize that Anna is very 
achieving. In general everything she does seems to be successful, and she likes 
to impress others with her many abilities. She enjoys being admired for what she 
does. You start thinking about what were your latest achievements. [picture of 
Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about achievement. As a reminder, 
you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of achievement value] 
[essay on external self-relevance of achievement value] Remind yourself that it 
is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as achieving as Anna. Also remind 
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yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as 
achieving as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very 
achieving. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be 
as achieving as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT 
to your COLLEAGUES to be as achieving as Anna. 
Power She talks about her employees that work for her in her department and at home. 
You realize that people do what Anna says. In general she is very rich and she 
has a lot of expensive things. She enjoys being in charge and telling others what 
to do. You start thinking about your position at your job. [picture of Anna] 
Remember the essay you just wrote about power. As a reminder, you can read it 
here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of power value] [essay on external 
self-relevance of power value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as powerful as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as powerful as Anna. 
[new page] You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very powerful. Remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as powerful as Anna. 
Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
COLLEAGUES to be as powerful as Anna. 
Security She talks about the new alarm system that secures her house. You realize that 
Anna avoids anything that might endanger her safety. In general, she is concerned 
that social order be protected and that her community be safe from threats. She 
enjoys living in secure surroundings. You start thinking about what you do to 
stay safe nowadays. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about 
security. As a reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-
relevance of security value] [essay on external self-relevance of security value] 
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Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as secure as 
Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
COLLEAGUES to be as secure as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's 
quality is that she is very secure. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as secure as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as secure as Anna. 
Conform
ity 
She mentions how she recently cancelled a vacation because her boss told her she 
cannot go this year. You realize that Anna is someone who behaves very 
properly. In general she avoids doing anything people would say is wrong and 
she follows rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. She enjoys doing 
what she is told. You start thinking about when was the last time you held your 
own wishes back. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote about 
conformity. As a reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal self-
relevance of conformity value] [essay on external self-relevance of conformity 
value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as 
adapted as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to 
your COLLEAGUES to be as adapted as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. 
Anna's quality is that she is very adapted. Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as adapted as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is 
NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as adapted as Anna. 
Tradition She talks about how she recently decided to stay abstinent until marriage. You 
realize that Anna is very religious. In general she believes that people should be 
satisfied with what they have and that one should not ask for more than that. She 
enjoys doing what her religion requires. You start thinking about what you 
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actually do to uphold the traditions of your family. [picture of Anna] Remember 
the essay you just wrote about tradition. As a reminder, you can read it here again: 
[essay on internal self-relevance of tradition value] [essay on external self-
relevance of tradition value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to YOU to be as traditional as Anna. Also remind yourself that it 
is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as traditional as 
Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very traditional. 
Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as traditional 
as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your 
COLLEAGUES to be as traditional as Anna. 
Benevole
nce 
She recently helped your colleague through a difficult period of his life. You 
realize that Anna is very caring. In general she always helps the people around 
her and she is loyal to her friends. She enjoys devoting herself to people close to 
her. You start thinking about what were your latest good deeds. [picture of Anna] 
Remember the essay you just wrote about benevolence. As a reminder, you can 
read it here again: [essay on internal self-relevance of benevolence value] [essay 
on external self-relevance of benevolence value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ 
VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as benevolent as Anna. Also remind yourself 
that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as benevolent 
as Anna. [new page] You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very benevolent. 
Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as 
benevolent as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT 
to your COLLEAGUES to be as benevolent as Anna. 
Universa
lism 
She talks about her projects at an environmental organization. You realize that 
Anna strongly believes that people should care for nature and look after the 
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environment. Nevertheless she tries her best to understand people who disagree 
with her. In general she treats every person she meets equally and wants justice 
for everybody, even for people she does not know. She enjoys listening to people 
who are different from her. You start thinking about what you actually do to make 
the world a better place. [picture of Anna] Remember the essay you just wrote 
about universalism. As a reminder, you can read it here again: [essay on internal 
self-relevance of universalism value] [essay on external self-relevance of 
universalism value] Remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to 
YOU to be as universal as Anna. Also remind yourself that it is NOT/ VERY 
IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as universal as Anna. [new page] 
You met Anna. Anna's quality is that she is very universal. Remind yourself that 
it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to YOU to be as universal as Anna. Also remind 
yourself that it is NOT/ VERY IMPORTANT to your COLLEAGUES to be as 
universal as Anna. 
Note. Male participants read vignettes about a fictional person named Tom. Pictures were the 
same as in Study 6. Whether a value was framed as not or very important to the participant or 




Items of Dependent Variables in Study 4 - 7 (adapted from Lange, Weidman, et al., 2018) 
Instruction: Please answer the following questions about your thoughts and feelings when 
confronted with the described person. Read the following statements carefully! Indicate how 
much you agree with each statement on a scale from 1 'not at all' to 7 'very much '. 
Subscale Item 
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Benign envy I feel deep longing for this quality. 
I want to work harder to also obtain exactly the same quality. 
I would like to devise a plan to obtain this quality as well. 
This person motivates me to become just like him/her. 
Malicious envy I would like to complain to someone else about this person. 
I feel hostile towards this person. 
I secretly wish that this person would lose his/her quality. 
I feel hatred. 
Pain I feel tormented. 
I feel inadequate. 
I feel depressed. 
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). In Study 6 and Study 
7, this person was replaced by Anna or Tom depending on participant gender.  
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Table 26 
Regression Results per Value, Study 1 
  Benign envy 
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept 8.395 4.813 0.087 
 Internal self-relevance -0.947 0.992 0.344 
 External self-relevance -1.052 1.096 0.342 
 Interaction 0.286 0.223 0.204 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept 7.865 4.280 0.072 
 Internal self-relevance -0.470 1.034 0.652 
 External self-relevance -1.875 1.128 0.102 
 Interaction 0.311 0.268 0.251 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.333 3.156 0.675 
 Internal self-relevance 0.371 0.911 0.686 
 External self-relevance -0.087 0.670 0.897 
 Interaction 0.087 0.189 0.649 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.652 4.340 0.549 
 Internal self-relevance 0.794 1.121 0.482 
 External self-relevance -0.413 0.948 0.665 
 Interaction -0.046 0.231 0.843 
Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.026 4.749 0.527 
 Internal self-relevance 0.370 0.996 0.712 
 External self-relevance -0.184 1.201 0.879 
 Interaction 0.069 0.241 0.777 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept -3.914 3.768 0.304 
 Internal self-relevance 1.817 0.786 0.025 
 External self-relevance 0.991 1.047 0.348 
 Interaction -0.178 0.213 0.406 
Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.970 3.544 0.581 
 Internal self-relevance 0.068 0.994 0.946 
 External self-relevance -0.367 0.922 0.692 
 Interaction 0.179 0.264 0.500 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.611 3.066 0.601 
 Internal self-relevance 1.376 0.738 0.068 
 External self-relevance 1.111 0.753 0.146 
 Interaction -0.230 0.185 0.220 
Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 12.722 4.677 0.009 
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 Internal self-relevance -2.657 1.352 0.055 
 External self-relevance -2.176 0.958 0.027 
 Interaction 0.612 0.274 0.030 
Achievement  B SE B p 
 Intercept -0.464 3.948 0.907 
 Internal self-relevance 1.353 1.018 0.189 
 External self-relevance 0.564 0.796 0.482 
 Interaction -0.143 0.200 0.477 
   Malicious envy  
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept 13.798 1.937 <0.001 
 Internal self-relevance -2.412 0.399 <0.001 
 External self-relevance -2.453 0.441 <0.001 
 Interaction 0.466 0.090 <0.001 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.589 3.424 0.654 
 Internal self-relevance 0.235 0.827 0.777 
 External self-relevance 0.708 0.902 0.436 
 Interaction -0.209 0.214 0.333 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.052 3.436 0.244 
 Internal self-relevance -0.598 0.991 0.549 
 External self-relevance -0.008 0.729 0.991 
 Interaction 0.054 0.206 0.796 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept -0.130 3.299 0.969 
 Internal self-relevance 0.943 0.841 0.267 
 External self-relevance 0.486 0.711 0.497 
 Interaction -0.214 0.174 0.223 
Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.861 3.593 0.429 
 Internal self-relevance -0.169 0.753 0.824 
 External self-relevance -0.114 0.909 0.901 
 Interaction -0.010 0.182 0.955 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.749 3.257 0.255 
 Internal self-relevance -0.379 0.680 0.580 
 External self-relevance -0.080 0.905 0.930 
 Interaction -0.006 0.184 0.973 
Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.960 3.351 0.145 
 Internal self-relevance -0.804 0.940 0.396 
 External self-relevance -0.414 0.872 0.637 
 Interaction 0.138 0.249 0.581 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.938 1.746 0.007 
 Internal self-relevance -0.640 0.420 0.134 
 External self-relevance -0.731 0.429 0.094 
 Interaction 0.121 0.105 0.254 
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Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.940 3.685 0.186 
 Internal self-relevance -0.866 1.065 0.420 
 External self-relevance -0.436 0.755 0.566 
 Interaction 0.138 0.216 0.525 
Achievement  B SE B P 
 Intercept 0.904 3.597 0.802 
 Internal self-relevance 0.362 0.927 0.698 
 External self-relevance 0.293 0.725 0.688 
 Interaction -0.107 0.182 0.557 
 
Table 27 
Regression Results per Value, Study 2 
  Benign envy 
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.840 3.752 0.625 
 Internal self-relevance 0.944 0.506 0.064 
 External self-relevance 0.679 0.619 0.275 
 Interaction -0.087 0.082 0.287 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.829 1.841 0.322 
 Internal self-relevance 1.215 0.324 <0.001 
 External self-relevance 0.296 0.363 0.416 
 Interaction -0.080 0.059 0.176 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.550 1.607 0.029 
 Internal self-relevance 0.095 0.370 0.797 
 External self-relevance -0.304 0.232 0.192 
 Interaction 0.061 0.052 0.242 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.895 3.990 0.469 
 Internal self-relevance 0.279 0.629 0.658 
 External self-relevance -0.639 0.615 0.300 
 Interaction 0.079 0.093 0.393 
Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.668 2.885 0.356 
 Internal self-relevance 0.294 0.403 0.466 
 External self-relevance -0.002 0.498 0.997 
 Interaction 0.013 0.067 0.844 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.175 2.374 0.081 
 Internal self-relevance 0.158 0.343 0.646 
 External self-relevance -0.563 0.413 0.174 
 Interaction 0.083 0.057 0.149 
Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept 4.499 2.591 0.084 
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 Internal self-relevance -0.080 0.395 0.840 
 External self-relevance -0.817 0.444 0.067 
 Interaction 0.114 0.064 0.079 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.886 1.579 0.069 
 Internal self-relevance 0.263 0.296 0.376 
 External self-relevance -0.124 0.273 0.650 
 Interaction 0.028 0.050 0.570 
Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 3.689 2.495 0.141 
 Internal self-relevance 0.219 0.402 0.587 
 External self-relevance -0.350 0.359 0.330 
 Interaction 0.020 0.055 0.722 
Achievement  B SE B p 
 Intercept 6.367 3.534 0.073 
 Internal self-relevance -0.269 0.532 0.613 
 External self-relevance -0.654 0.550 0.236 
 Interaction 0.106 0.080 0.187 
   Malicious envy  
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.606 2.768 0.348 
 Internal self-relevance -0.178 0.373 0.633 
 External self-relevance 0.028 0.457 0.952 
 Interaction <0.001 0.060 0.996 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.664 1.390 0.233 
 Internal self-relevance 0.419 0.245 0.089 
 External self-relevance 0.732 0.274 0.008 
 Interaction -0.095 0.044 0.033 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept -2.086 1.504 0.167 
 Internal self-relevance 0.795 0.346 0.023 
 External self-relevance 0.674 0.217 0.002 
 Interaction -0.118 0.048 0.016 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept 6.407 2.730 0.020 
 Internal self-relevance -0.578 0.431 0.182 
 External self-relevance -0.657 0.421 0.121 
 Interaction 0.075 0.063 0.235 
Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.635 2.141 0.767 
 Internal self-relevance 0.029 0.299 0.922 
 External self-relevance 0.312 0.369 0.399 
 Interaction -0.031 0.050 0.532 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.411 1.849 0.194 
 Internal self-relevance -0.225 0.267 0.401 
 External self-relevance 0.061 0.321 0.850 
 Interaction 0.005 0.044 0.902 
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Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.166 2.261 0.607 
 Internal self-relevance 0.319 0.345 0.356 
 External self-relevance 0.708 0.387 0.069 
 Interaction -0.082 0.056 0.145 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.249 1.108 0.044 
 Internal self-relevance -0.213 0.208 0.306 
 External self-relevance -0.197 0.192 0.307 
 Interaction 0.054 0.035 0.123 
Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.264 2.099 0.282 
 Internal self-relevance 0.068 0.338 0.841 
 External self-relevance 0.114 0.302 0.705 
 Interaction -0.030 0.046 0.518 
Achievement  B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.146 3.034 0.962 
 Internal self-relevance 0.215 0.457 0.638 
 External self-relevance 0.337 0.472 0.476 
 Interaction -0.044 0.069 0.525 
 
Table 28 
Regression Results per Value, Study 3 
  Benign envy 
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.373 1.247 0.271 
 Internal self-relevance 0.422 0.176 0.017 
 External self-relevance 0.063 0.229 0.782 
 Interaction 0.008 0.031 0.789 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept -1.234 1.069 0.249 
 Internal self-relevance 0.937 0.189 <0.001 
 External self-relevance 0.216 0.196 0.271 
 Interaction -0.038 0.032 0.235 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.623 0.673 0.355 
 Internal self-relevance 0.713 0.163 <0.001 
 External self-relevance 0.053 0.116 0.647 
 Interaction -0.018 0.025 0.468 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.046 1.642 0.213 
 Internal self-relevance 0.248 0.269 0.358 
 External self-relevance -0.422 0.268 0.117 
 Interaction 0.071 0.040 0.077 
Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.262 1.323 0.843 
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 Internal self-relevance 0.607 0.192 0.002 
 External self-relevance 0.141 0.235 0.548 
 Interaction -0.002 0.032 0.946 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept -2.154 1.177 0.068 
 Internal self-relevance 1.002 0.171 <0.001 
 External self-relevance 0.428 0.222 0.055 
 Interaction -0.051 0.030 0.094 
Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.120 1.364 0.412 
 Internal self-relevance 0.288 0.215 0.180 
 External self-relevance -0.166 0.240 0.490 
 Interaction 0.040 0.035 0.247 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.350 0.738 0.068 
 Internal self-relevance 0.464 0.139 <0.001 
 External self-relevance -0.041 0.147 0.780 
 Interaction 0.009 0.025 0.723 
Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.312 0.878 0.136 
 Internal self-relevance 0.351 0.143 0.015 
 External self-relevance -0.105 0.150 0.483 
 Interaction 0.020 0.022 0.378 
Achievement  B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.033 1.613 0.984 
 Internal self-relevance 0.385 0.249 0.124 
 External self-relevance 0.288 0.269 0.285 
 Interaction 0.005 0.039 0.902 
   Malicious envy  
Self-direction B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.415 1.069 0.024 
 Internal self-relevance -0.280 0.151 0.065 
 External self-relevance 0.123 0.196 0.530 
 Interaction 0.008 0.026 0.726 
Tradition B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.174 0.850 0.168 
 Internal self-relevance -0.003 0.150 0.985 
 External self-relevance 0.016 0.156 0.919 
 Interaction 0.013 0.025 0.606 
Power B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.078 0.607 0.076 
 Internal self-relevance 0.180 0.147 0.220 
 External self-relevance 0.024 0.104 0.819 
 Interaction <0.001 0.022 0.983 
Security B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.765 1.233 0.153 
 Internal self-relevance -0.086 0.202 0.671 
 External self-relevance 0.033 0.201 0.869 
 Interaction 0.005 0.030 0.857 
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Benevolence B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.853 1.174 0.115 
 Internal self-relevance -0.147 0.170 0.389 
 External self-relevance 0.101 0.209 0.629 
 Interaction 0.003 0.028 0.928 
Universalism B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.701 1.009 0.093 
 Internal self-relevance -0.161 0.146 0.273 
 External self-relevance 0.218 0.191 0.253 
 Interaction -0.008 0.026 0.772 
Conformity B SE B p 
 Intercept 0.443 1.063 0.677 
 Internal self-relevance 0.131 0.167 0.435 
 External self-relevance 0.353 0.187 0.060 
 Interaction -0.039 0.027 0.151 
Stimulation B SE B p 
 Intercept 2.065 0.566 <0.001 
 Internal self-relevance -0.228 0.106 0.033 
 External self-relevance -0.164 0.113 0.145 
 Interaction 0.057 0.019 0.002 
Hedonism B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.397 0.801 0.082 
 Internal self-relevance 0.095 0.131 0.466 
 External self-relevance 0.007 0.137 0.960 
 Interaction -0.006 0.020 0.771 
Achievement  B SE B p 
 Intercept 1.501 1.388 0.280 
 Internal self-relevance -0.095 0.215 0.657 
 External self-relevance 0.152 0.232 0.512 
 Interaction -0.002 0.033 0.945 
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Table 29 
Means and Standard Deviation Benign and Malicious Envy Ratings for Every Value in Every Condition in Study 4 
 Tradition (N = 36) Stimulation (N = 51) Self-direction (N = 49) Achievement (N = 32) Conformity (N = 38) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 2.55 (1.64) 2.57 (1.59) 5.19 (0.72) 3.02 (1.98) 2.20 (1.50) 
Internal high 5.35 (1.33) 5.62 (0.92) 5.11 (1.67) 5.91 (0.74) 5.50 (0.84) 
External low 3.55 (2.07) 3.34 (2.05) 4.98 (1.63) 4.32 (2.01) 3.10 (1.78) 
External high 4.28 (2.01) 3.24 (1.89) 5.21 (1.61) 3.67 (2.32) 2.10 (1.66) 
Malicious Envy                   
Internal low 2.34 (1.39) 1.53 (0.78) 4.19 (0.24) 1.35 (0.97) 2.70 (1.42) 
Internal high 2.47 (1.72) 2.02 (1.59) 1.39 (0.79) 2.14 (1.18) 2.12 (1.65) 
External low 2.67 (1.75) 1.79 (1.27) 1.77 (1.19) 1.71 (1.09) 2.88 (1.74) 
External high 2.06 (1.17) 1.50 (0.70) 1.51 (1.00) 1.52 (1.13) 2.44 (1.14) 
 Hedonism (N = 32) Benevolence (N = 34) Universalism (N = 43) Security (N = 38) Power (N = 39) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 2.47 (1.51) 3.75 (1.02) 3.20 (2.52) 2.67 (1.37) 1.92 (1.01) 
Internal high 4.53 (1.61) 5.92 (1.13) 5.66 (1.31) 5.38 (1.21) 5.88 (0.93) 
External low 3.16 (1.88) 5.53 (1.24) 5.63 (1.75) 4.05 (1.65) 2.49 (1.80) 
External high 2.53 (1.41) 5.54 (1.55) 5.24 (1.63) 5.08 (1.69) 2.57 (1.75) 
Malicious Envy                     
Internal low 3.24 (1.49) 2.71 (1.23) 3.15 (1.41) 2.67 (1.32) 1.80 (1.21) 
Internal high 1.78 (1.13) 1.32 (0.74) 1.18 (0.56) 1.52 (1.09) 2.62 (1.84) 
External low 2.79 (1.53) 1.68 (1.17) 1.52 (1.14) 1.62 (1.09) 2.15 (1.33) 
External high 3.08 (1.61) 1.46 (0.78) 1.36 (0.82) 1.96 (1.35) 1.70 (1.32) 
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Table 30 
Means and Standard Deviation Benign and Malicious Envy Ratings for Every Value in Every Condition in Study 5 
 Tradition (N = 23) Stimulation (N = 45) Self-direction (N = 25) Achievement (N = 26) Conformity (N = 22) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 3.98 (1.52) 4.08 (1.49) 4.44 (1.56) 4.94 (1.37) 2.84 (1.71) 
Internal high 3.70 (1.80) 4.18 (1.97) 5.48 (1.46) 4.67 (1.79) 4.88 (1.52) 
External low 3.65 (1.24) 3.76 (2.06) 4.92 (1.67) 4.67 (1.58) 3.53 (2.20) 
External high 4.12 (2.04) 4.42 (1.37) 5.31 (1.47) 4.83 (1.77) 3.61 (1.78) 
Malicious Envy                   
Internal low 2.15 (1.36) 1.59 (1.01) 1.94 (1.02) 1.97 (1.18) 2.21 (0.98) 
Internal high 1.30 (0.71) 1.60 (1.02) 1.92 (1.50) 2.24 (1.50) 1.69 (0.83) 
External low 1.67 (0.89) 1.50 (0.89) 1.83 (1.03) 1.83 (1.26) 1.75 (1.00) 
External high 1.92 (1.53) 1.67 (1.10) 2.04 (1.63) 2.48 (1.49) 2.18 (0.91) 
 Hedonism (N = 33) Benevolence (N = 21) Universalism (N = 25) Security (N = 29) Power (N = 16) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 3.94 (1.39) 4.25 (1.68) 5.14 (0.81) 3.20 (1.79) 4.91 (1.74) 
Internal high 4.30 (1.53) 4.91 (1.59) 5.00 (1.49) 4.39 (1.17) 4.05 (1.40) 
External low 4.32 (1.56) 4.62 (1.63) 4.89 (1.25) 3.50 (1.56) 4.61 (1.38) 
External high 3.94 (1.37) 4.57 (1.71) 5.12 (1.23) 4.66 (1.21) 4.68 (2.05) 
Malicious Envy                     
Internal low 2.07 (1.37) 1.57 (1.05) 2.02 (1.50) 2.34 (1.59) 3.32 (1.67) 
Internal high 2.67 (1.55) 1.91 (1.27) 2.00 (1.35) 1.64 (0.58) 3.65 (1.35) 
External low 2.30 (1.29) 1.98 (1.18) 1.75 (0.87) 2.04 (1.19) 3.89 (1.67) 
External high 2.42 (1.64) 1.55 (1.14) 2.11 (1.55) 1.68 (0.98) 2.82 (1.22) 
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Table 31 
Means and Standard Deviation of Benign and Malicious Envy Ratings for Every Value in Every Condition in Study 6 
 Tradition (N = 29) Stimulation (N = 41) Self-direction (N = 30) Achievement (N = 55) Conformity (N = 26) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 1.90 (1.09) 2.12 (1.30) 3.36 (1.75) 2.60 (1.44) 1.38 (0.58) 
Internal high 3.34 (1.61) 4.97 (1.35) 4.56 (1.93) 4.06 (1.65) 3.09 (1.75) 
External low 2.09 (1.21) 3.82 (2.10) 3.33 (1.76) 3.36 (1.56) 2.30 (1.32) 
External high 3.21 (1.69) 3.51 (1.85) 4.77 (1.85) 3.52 (1.86) 2.30 (1.77) 
Malicious Envy                   
Internal low 1.65 (0.93) 1.55 (0.83) 2.86 (1.52) 1.99 (1.15) 1.42 (0.91) 
Internal high 2.02 (1.20) 1.47 (0.72) 1.62 (0.99) 1.97 (1.33) 1.93 (1.24) 
External low 1.72 (1.02) 1.40 (0.52) 2.22 (1.32) 1.83 (1.20) 1.85 (1.07) 
External high 1.96 (1.15) 1.59 (0.91) 2.18 (1.51) 2.10 (1.29) 1.59 (1.15) 
 Hedonism (N = 40) Benevolence (N = 30) Universalism (N = 22) Security (N = 48) Power (N = 23) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 2.44 (1.12) 2.92 (1.54) 2.84 (1.47) 2.57 (1.39) 2.88 (1.44) 
Internal high 4.82 (1.43) 4.34 (1.04) 4.79 (2.13) 3.48 (1.66) 4.77 (1.93) 
External low 3.83 (1.68) 3.40 (1.46) 3.88 (2.20) 2.59 (1.80) 3.66 (2.01) 
External high 3.65 (1.89) 3.47 (1.62) 4.50 (2.00) 3.31 (1.38) 3.90 (1.90) 
Malicious Envy                     
Internal low 2.00 (1.24) 1.59 (0.87) 1.69 (0.85) 2.30 (1.27) 2.29 (1.14) 
Internal high 2.23 (1.10) 1.32 (0.61) 1.43 (0.67) 1.65 (1.14) 4.00 (1.87) 
External low 2.42 (1.31) 1.50 (0.92) 1.47 (0.71) 2.09 (1.26) 3.30 (1.63) 
External high 1.76 (0.84) 1.49 (0.69) 1.64 (0.81) 1.90 (1.25) 2.94 (1.87) 
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Table 32 
Means and Standard Deviation of Benign and Malicious Envy Ratings for Every Value in Every Condition in Study 7 
 Tradition (N = 39) Stimulation (N = 43) Self-direction (N = 54) Achievement (N = 57) Conformity (N = 34) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 2.42 (1.65) 2.55 (1.53) 3.21 (1.65) 2.76 (1.24) 2.44 (1.19) 
Internal high 3.70 (1.93) 4.53 (1.79) 5.10 (1.55) 4.93 (1.66) 4.21 (1.82) 
External low 3.20 (1.90) 3.09 (1.89) 4.26 (1.85) 4.57 (1.85) 3.47 (1.78) 
External high 2.96 (1.92) 3.80 (1.93) 4.47 (1.84) 3.75 (1.79) 3.21 (1.78) 
Malicious Envy                   
Internal low 2.28 (1.67) 1.48 (0.72) 2.08 (1.34) 1.93 (1.27) 2.00 (0.99) 
Internal high 1.70 (0.94) 1.92 (1.15) 1.45 (0.66) 1.64 (0.85) 2.10 (1.25) 
External low 1.84 (1.25) 1.56 (0.95) 1.75 (0.95) 1.70 (1.22) 1.82 (0.78) 
External high 2.11 (1.48) 1.78 (0.99) 1.64 (1.10) 1.79 (0.93) 2.24 (1.31) 
 Hedonism (N = 46) Benevolence (N = 39) Universalism (N = 18) Security (N = 54 ) Power (N = 23) 
Benign Envy M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Internal low 3.12 (1.38) 3.25 (1.98) 4.41 (2.20) 2.36 (1.34) 2.38 (1.44) 
Internal high 4.43 (1.56) 5.00 (1.28) 4.65 (1.76) 3.66 (1.77) 5.19 (1.36) 
External low 3.60 (1.73) 4.31 (1.65) 4.62 (2.13) 3.07 (1.80) 4.60 (2.00) 
External high 3.94 (1.49) 4.73 (1.84) 4.47 (1.84) 3.04 (1.65) 4.28 (1.72) 
Malicious Envy           
Internal low 2.41 (1.47) 1.79 (1.20) 1.88 (1.21) 1.44 (0.67) 1.92 (1.35) 
Internal high 1.86 (1.42) 1.28 (0.62) 1.18 (0.33) 1.52 (0.78) 3.37 (1.77) 
External low 1.88 (1.41) 1.50 (0.99) 1.22 (0.53) 1.36 (0.55) 2.88 (1.83) 
External high 2.38 (1.48) 1.32 (0.57) 1.70 (1.08) 1.59 (0.85) 3.12 (1.76) 
  
